American exceptionalism and henry kissinger’s management of foreign policy 1969-1973

Abstract

American exceptionalism implies that America’s political system and history are uniquely and positively exceptional. This thesis examines the self-aggrandizing portrait of America’s role in the world during one of the most tumultuous periods in American history (1969-1973) when Richard Nixon's foreign-security advisor, Henry A. Kissinger came up with a theory of Realpolitik upon which to base Nixon's diplomatic revolution. During the Nixon administration, the central debatable issue was the Vietnam War. America’s paradoxical decision to end U.S. intervention in Vietnam while pursuing a destructive policy had a disastrous impact on the country. Yet, the war generated fundamental changes in key international relationships. The unpredictable Sino-American rapprochement offered China the prospect of future concessions leading to normalization of relations basically on Chinese terms while working secretly to oust Taiwan from the United Nations. Unquestionably, this rapprochement was interconnected to the global struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, as America acknowledged Soviet parity, Détente- while promising hope for peace- ended in disappointment and frustration. This research therefore argues that American exceptionalism is a serious burden to executing an effective foreign policy. The most problematic aspect is that Kissinger, while aiming to reduce international tensions with China and the Soviet Union, has also maintained practices- mainly in Vietnam- at variance with the values of American exceptionalism.