قضاء الاستعجال في المادة الإدارية من خلال قانون الإجراءات المدنية والإدارية.

Abstract

Dealing with the administrative referent judge amounts to questioning the capacity of the administrative jurisdiction to offer litigants simple, rapid and effective legal remedies to protect themselves, at least temporarily, against the actions of administrative authorities. The development of a culture of emergency would help to make administrative judges aware of the issues, particularly individual issues, of the disputes before them. Such changes express a certain evolution of judicial review of legality more concerned with individual rights, and the shift from an objective administrative justice, based on control, to a subjective system, based on protection. The administrative judge could then fully play his role of guardian of the rights of citizens and scout of the administration. Moreover, the administrative judge is no longer asked to sanction violations of the law, but to have the administration positively respect the principle of legality: the judge should be the ultimate guarantor. The reality is there: to say the right, it is no longer enough for the administrative judge to note what is illegal; he may also have to prescribe what is legal through appropriate jurisdictional techniques. This is a fundamental dimension in any effort to build the rule of law. This is the central idea of this research object. The control of the administrative judge would certainly be inefficient if he managed to reconcile individual rights and freedoms with the imperative of public authority. Its control over the administration would only be effective if its decisions are actually carried out. Traditionally confined to a role of censor of the administration, the emergency administrative judge must now assume, in view of the new prerogatives, a preventive function allowing him to integrate into administrative action for, ultimately, better to control: it is the whole problem of the office of the judge which is thus posed. Hence the interest in examining in a first chapter the preparatory procedures - referral-report and referral-instruction- intended for establishing the facts or any element useful for the subsequent examination of a possible dispute. These preparatory procedures are not contingent on the existence of an emergency, but only on the usefulness of the measures requested. We will then attempt in a second chapter to identify the waiting procedures - the referral-useful measures and the referral-suspension; This will lead in a third chapter to dealing with substantive procedures or even substantive measures - fundamental freedom, interim relief, referred in contractual matters. The specific procedure should be compared with the substantive-summary procedures in tax matters. The few concluding remarks will attempt to modestly draw some lessons from the research undertaken, while introducing prospective questions induced by this humble study