

THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF FRÈRES MENTOURI, CONSTANTINE 1
FACULTY OF LETTERS AND LANGUAGES
DEPARTMENT OF LETTERS AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE

N°Ordre: 67/D3C/2019
N° Serie: 08/Ang/2019

**Iraq and the Evolution of Democratisation
Policy in U.S. Neo-conservatism
1980-2006**

**Thesis Submitted to the Department of Letters and English Language in Candidacy for
the Degree of Doctorate LMD in**

Anglo-Saxon Literature and Civilization

Submitted by:

SOUMIA BOUGUERRA

Supervised by:

Dr. NASR-EDDINE MEGHARBI

Board of Examiners

Chairman: **Prof. Hacène Saadi** University of Frères Mentouri, Constantine 1

Supervisor: **Dr. Nasr-Eddine Megharbi** University of Frères Mentouri, Constantine 1

Examiner: **Prof. Abdelhak El-Aggoune** University of 8 Mai 1945 Guelma

Examiner: **Prof. Ladi Toulgui** University of 8 Mai 1945 Guelma

2018

DEDICATION

To my children, **ARMINE, EZER ABD EL-MOUHEIMEN,** and **LYNE**

You have made me stronger, better and more fulfilled than I could have ever
imagined.

I LOVE YOU

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Nasr-Eddine Megharbi, for his keen supervision and insightful feedback. He has been patient and understanding with me, giving me advice and encouraging me to develop my own ideas and reflections.

I am equally thankful to members of the jury Pr. Saadi Hacène, Pr. Toulgui Ladi, and Pr. El-Aggoune Abdelhak for accepting to read and evaluate this work.

I extend my sincere gratitude to my family members who have been very supportive throughout the process. I thank my parents, who have given me the psychological support which I needed during my years of research. Very special thanks go to my husband and children whose infinite love was a vital source of encouragement. It would be hard to put into words how much their unfailing support has meant to me over the years. Their backing and patience were the most important of all as they helped me make it through to the end.

Abstract

This thesis focus is to show the centrality of Iraq in the conduct of neoconservative democratisation policy from 1980 up to the 2003 Iraq War. Neoconservatives steadily supported democracy promotion thinking and this goes hand in hand with their calls to its spreading to Iraq. Actually, US democratisation policy in Iraq has gone through phases depending on the neoconservative position to the principle. During immediate post-Cold War period, differences among neoconservatives over the perspective emerged along generational lines and this led to skepticism of the principle efficacy in general, and in Iraq in particular. During the 1990s, neoconservatives continued their discussions of democracy promotion that centered around toppling Saddam's regime and it was at that time that they developed prescriptions that would effectively be adopted for US foreign relations. Following the attacks of September 11 2001, the Bush administration officially announced an anti-terrorism grand strategy of armed democratisation in Iraq that was primarily planned by neoconservatives. In their support of US democratisation policy between the Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, neoconservatives showed different theoretical orientations from one that was sympathetic to realist thinking in the First Iraq War; to one much closer to liberal internationalist thought that was concerned with forcible regime change in Iraq in 2003.

Résumé

Le présent travail met en évidence la centralité de l'Iraq dans la politique de démocratisation menée par les néoconservateurs de 1980 jusqu'à la guerre de l'Iraq en 2003. Les néoconservateurs ont toujours supporté la promotion de la démocratie ce qui va en parallèle avec l'appel à sa promotion en Iraq. En effet, la politique américaine de démocratisation en Iraq est passée par plusieurs phases qui dépendaient de la position des néoconservateurs envers ce principe. Pendant la période immédiatement postérieure à la guerre froide, les différences parmi les néoconservateurs sur cette perspective étaient surtout des différences de générations ce qui suscita un scepticisme vis-à-vis l'efficacité de ce principe en général, et son efficacité en Iraq en particulier. Pendant les années 1990, les néoconservateurs continuèrent leur débat sur la promotion de la démocratie s'intéressaient surtout au renversement du régime de Saddam. C'était pendant cette période que les néoconservatistes avaient réussi à prescrire leurs recommandations sur la politique extérieure des États Unis. Après les attaques du 11 septembre 2001, l'administration Bush a officiellement annoncé sa grande stratégie anti-terroriste pour une démocratisation armée en Iraq qui avait été initialement planifiée par les néoconservateurs. Dans leur support à la politique américaine de démocratisation depuis la guerre du golf jusqu'à la guerre de l'Iraq en 2003, les néoconservateurs changèrent leur orientation vis-à-vis les théories des relations internationales, d'une vision sympathisante envers la pensée réaliste qu'ils avaient adopté pendant la première guerre en Iraq vers une vision plus proche à la pensée libérale internationaliste préoccupée par un changement forcé du régime.

ملخص

تهدف هذه الأطروحة إلى التركيز على مركزية العراق في سياسة الديمقراطية التي تبناها المحافظون الجدد من 1980 حتى حرب العراق في 2003. لطالما ساند المحافظون الجدد نشر الديمقراطية التي تسيطر جنباً إلى جنب مع فكرة نشرها في العراق. في الحقيقة، لقد مرت سياسة الديمقراطية التي تبنتها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بعدة مراحل حسب موقف المحافظون الجدد اتجاه هذا المبدأ. خلال الفترة مباشرة بعد الحرب الباردة، كانت الفروق بين المحافظين الجدد حول هذه الواجهة فروق ناتجة عن اختلافات الأجيال، الأمر الذي زرع الشك حول نجاعة هذا المبدأ عموماً ونجاحه في العراق خصوصاً. خلال السنوات 1990، استمر المحافظون الجدد في مناقشتهم حول ترقية الديمقراطية التي انصب اهتمامها خصوصاً بإطاحة نظام صدام. ففي هذه الفترة، نجحوا في تطوير التعليمات الواجب تبنيها من طرف الولايات المتحدة في علاقاتها الخارجية. بعد هجمات 11 سبتمبر 2001، أعلنت إدارة بوش رسمياً عن استراتيجيتها الرئيسة لمكافحة الإرهاب من أجل نشر ديمقراطية باستعمال السلاح في العراق بعد ان خطط لها المحافظون الجدد. في مساندهم لسياسة الديمقراطية الأمريكية في الفترة الممتدة بين حرب الخليج وحرب العراق في 2003، غير المحافظون الجدد توجههم ازاء نظريات العلاقات الدولية، فبعد أن كان موقفهم متعاطفاً مع التفكير الواقعي خلال حرب العراق الأولى، أضحى موقفهم أقرب من الليبرالية الأممية التي يصب كل اهتمامها حول تغيير النظام باستعمال القوة.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

| | |
|----------------|--|
| AEI | American Enterprise Institute |
| AWACS | American Airborne Warning and Control System |
| BMENA | Broader Middle East North Africa |
| CCC | Commodity Credit Corporation |
| CDM | Coalition for a Democratic Majority |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CPA | Coalition Provisional Authority |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| ILA | Iraqi Liberation Act |
| INA | Iraqi National Accord |
| INC | Iraqi National Congress |
| MENA | Middle East and the Northern African |
| MEPI | Middle East Partnership Initiative |
| NED | National Endowment for Democracy |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| NSCT | National Strategy for Combating Terrorism |
| NSDD | National Security Decision Directive |
| NSS | National Security Strategy |
| PNAC | Project for the New America Century |
| PPI | Democratic Party's Progressive Policy Institute |
| RT | Realignment Tendency |
| SD-USA | Social Democrats-USA |
| SP-SDF | Socialist Party of America- Social Democratic Federation |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCHR | United Nations Commission on Human Rights |
| UNMOVIC | United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| UNSCOM | United Nations Special Commission UNSCOM |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |
| YPSL | Young People's Socialist League |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----------|
| INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| CHAPTER ONE | |
| Neo-conservatism, Realism and Liberal Internationalism | 10 |
| Introduction..... | 10 |
| 1.1 Neo-conservatism | 10 |
| 1.2 Irving Kristol on Neo-conservatism..... | 12 |
| 1.3 Neoconservative Foreign Policy Outlook | 16 |
| 1.3.1 American Hegemony and Unilateralism..... | 16 |
| 1.3.2 Exporting Democracy..... | 18 |
| 1.3.3 Military Power..... | 20 |
| 1.4 Democratic Globalism and Democratic Realism | 21 |
| 1.5 Democracy and the End of History..... | 24 |
| 1.6 Realism and Liberal Internationalism in International Relations | 30 |
| 1.6.1 Realism | 30 |
| 1.6.2 Liberal Internationalism | 34 |
| Conclusion | 40 |
| CHAPTER TWO | |
| Neoconservatives on Democracy: 1980's -1990's | 48 |
| Introduction..... | 48 |
| 2.1 Neoconservatives and Democracy for the Future of American Foreign Policy | 48 |
| 2.1.1 Early Origins of Neoconservative Support for Democracy Promotion | 49 |
| 2.1.1.A The “Realignment Yipsels”: 1964-1973..... | 49 |
| 2.1.1.B Becoming Neoconservatives | 51 |
| 2.1.2 Neoconservatives’ Different Prospects for Democracy Promotion | 53 |
| 2.1.2.A Former Yipsels and Ardent Krauthammer on Democracy | 54 |
| 2.1.2.A.1 Carl Gershman and the National Endowment for Democracy | 54 |

| | |
|---|----|
| 2.1.2.A.2 Joshua Muravchik and the Break with the SD-USA: 1979-1987.. | 55 |
| 2.1.2.A.3 Krauthammer and “The Unipolar Moment” | 57 |
| 2.1.2.B Elder Neoconservative Calls to American Prudent Foreign Policy..... | 59 |
| 2.2 Neoconservatives and the Democratic Peace Theory | 63 |
| 2.3 Vehicles for Democratisation | 68 |
| 2.3.1 Commentary and the Weekly Standard | 68 |
| 2.3.2 The Clean Break Report | 73 |
| 2.3.3 The Project for a New American Century..... | 75 |
| Conclusion | 79 |

CHAPTER THREE

| | |
|---|-----------|
| US-Iraq Relations from “Stability” to the Inevitable Regime Change: 1980’s -1990’s | 88 |
| Introduction..... | 88 |
| 3.1 The Roots of Rollback and Regime Change in Iraq: 1981-1989..... | 89 |
| 3.2 The Gulf War | 94 |
| 3.3 Neoconservatives on the Gulf War | 98 |
| 3.4 US-Iraq Relations: A Failed Coup and a Planned Regime Change: 1993- 1996..... | 104 |
| 3.5 Open Calls for Regime Change among Neoconservatives for the Purpose of Spreading American Values | 111 |
| Conclusion..... | 118 |

CHAPTER FOUR

| | |
|---|------------|
| Bush’s Iraq Democratisation Policy: The Neoconservative Paradigm 2000- 2003 | 127 |
| Introduction..... | 127 |
| 4.1 The 2000 Presidential Election and Bush’s Early Months of Presidency: A Neoconservative Influence? | 127 |
| 4.2 Post 9/11 Crisis and Saddam at the Heart of the American War on Terrorism..... | 133 |
| 4.2.1 Transformative Democracy in Iraq | 133 |
| 4.2.2 The Bush Team: Preparing for War | 138 |
| 4.3 Reasons for War..... | 151 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| 4.3.1 Weapons of Mass Destruction | 151 |
| 4.3.2 Terrorism and Authoritarianism..... | 153 |
| Conclusion | 161 |
| CHAPTER FIVE | |
| From Theory to Practice: Democracy in Iraq 2003-2006 | 175 |
| Introduction..... | 175 |
| 5.1 Armed democratisation is the Cure?..... | 175 |
| 5.1.1 The Universality of Freedom | 177 |
| 5.1.2 Liberal Democratisation | 180 |
| 5.2 Transformative Democracy in Iraq | 187 |
| 5.2.1 The Early Years: 2003-2006..... | 187 |
| 5.2.1.A The Coalition Provisional Authority: The Plan for Democracy | 190 |
| 5.2.1.B The Challenge of Ayatollah Al Sistani | 193 |
| 5.2.2 Democracy and the Increase of Terrorism: 2003-2006..... | 196 |
| 5.2.2.A Sectarian Terrorism | 197 |
| 5.2.2.B Jihadist Terrorism..... | 199 |
| 5.3 Critics on Terrorism..... | 200 |
| 5.4 The Return to Reality..... | 202 |
| Conclusion | 206 |
| CONCLUSION | 213 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 226 |

INTRODUCTION

In the eighteen months between the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the United States invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, American political critics and journalists began focusing increased attention to a group of foreign policy think tank known as the neoconservatives. Some of the neoconservatives held influential positions in the George W. Bush administration. Therefore, critical accounts provided that the neoconservative presence with their ideological commitment to export democracy within the Bush administration has had a pivotal role in the United States verdict to launch a military intervention against Iraq.

Neoconservatives have long articulated a set of ideas concerning the American foreign policy including the need to enhance American hegemonic power, to be cautious about international institutions, the rule of the law, the significance of morality in international affairs, and the burden the United States had held to expand the liberal value of democracy abroad in non-democratic states. The last aspect of the promotion of democracy abroad is regularly associated with the neoconservative thinking more than all others.

In the popular sense, neo-conservatism can be summarised as the belief that America has a duty to make the world a better place through forcible democracy promotion. It is in the interests of the United States, neoconservatives argue, to promote the development of democratic regimes abroad, as much as democracies do not wage war against one another. In this prospect, the United States would help to create democratic liberal governments in place of oppressive regimes they deem threatening to its interests. For them, the entire Middle East should be democratised in the belief that this would eliminate a prime breeding ground for terrorists, starting with Iraq.

Once the 2003 Iraq War began, discussions about neoconservatives and their leading role in US government grew progressively and stated that they were not only responsible for

the Iraq War, but that they had “hijacked” US foreign policy. This study argues for a basic perception that what actually distinguishes a neoconservative foreign policy from other strands is its emphasis on democracy promotion through intervention. Actually, exporting democracy for both American values and interests and through military force if necessary is a shared defining purpose of different neoconservative generations.

Scholars have always mentioned neoconservatives when discussing US decision to overthrow the Iraqi regime to establish a new democratic country, but they actually missed interrelated historical events that explain the evolution of the neoconservative cornerstone principle of democracy promotion and its practice in Iraq. This study notably detects the link between the evolution of democratisation policy within neo-conservatism and Iraq-US controversial relations during a period the American foreign policy was much concerned with crises of the Middle East and particularly Iraq.

The focus is on democratisation policy and on neo-conservatism as an ideology of a small group of intellectuals most of whom locate themselves in think-tanks rather than occupying government positions. Thus, this research focal point is not to analyse party politics and government documents. The most important here is analysing the direct effect that neo-conservatism as a political ideology has had on US policy-making process in Iraq and to explain the linkage between neo-conservatism and US democratisation policies in the country.

It is important here to notice that this study does not seek to explain the development of the idea of promoting democracy within American foreign policy in general. Instead, it focuses closely on the development of advocacy for democracy promotion among a specific group of political activists whose views process towards launching a war against Iraq had dramatically altered from calls to US stability during the 1990 Gulf War to calls to US

intervention in the 2003 Iraq War. This study shows their persistent advocacy of the principle and discusses the different posts neoconservatives held in organizations, institutes, and administrations which were firmly attached to the principle of 'democracy' even before they were named neoconservatives.

This study also argues that the discussion of foreign policy crisis in Iraq is pivotal for revealing the extent to which the neoconservative discourses privileging the forcible promotion of liberal democracy. It also seeks to explore the development of neoconservative support of democracy promotion from 1980 to 2006, and to offer an argument about the centrality of Iraq in this development. As such, this study raises central research questions: How did democracy promotion perspective develop in the neoconservative thinking from 1980 to 2006? And why did any neoconservative discussion on exporting democracy has mostly been coupled with the case of Saddam Hussein's Iraq?

On US intervention to Iraq, neoconservatives dramatically changed their leanings to theories of IR from one that reflected a realist character in the Gulf War in 1990 to one that reflected an international liberalist tone in the 2003 Iraq War. Democracy promotion policy is a key concern of neoconservative thinking and neoconservatives have relentlessly advocated its spreading, but it remains inexplicable to understand the crucial factors of change. Why did neoconservatives change their theoretical orientation on the case of democracy promotion in Iraq between the First and the Second Iraq War?

In the months leading up to the 2003 Iraq War, neoconservatives' foreign policy views on launching a war against Iraq were different of what they provided at the conclusions of the Cold War. Following September attacks, neoconservatives showed something more ambitious and idealist for its foreign policy perspective towards Iraq. By 2001, more boundless neo-conservatism emerged to control the Bush administration and to publicly

discuss the American need to use hard power to topple down the Iraqi regime to establish the new democratic country.

This thesis is not interested in merely describing neoconservative position in the Gulf War and comparing it with that of the 2003 war. The focus is instead on exploring the evolution of democracy principle in their thinking during that period.

Following 9/11 attacks, there has been a surge in works focusing on neoconservatives and their foreign policy views, along with dozens of academic studies and articles which have been published by international relations scholars and political scientists. Most of the post 9/11 works have identified second generation neoconservatives to be the main advocates within neo-conservatism of democracy promotion abroad. Scholars of international relations have only discussed the issue as far back as the late 1980's and they primarily considered the neoconservative support for democracy promotion as a post-Cold War phenomenon. Actually, the debates of the post-Cold War era are important to notice generational differences among neoconservatives, but they did not fully explain the origins of democracy promotion view in the neoconservative discourse. This study adds a new element to this discourse as it provides a number of neoconservative political activists in the Cold War period that covers the years from 1960 to 1991.

This research is of qualitative nature, dealing with accounts of contemporary historical event. It employs different academic methods to examine the emergence and the development of a specific foreign policy perspective among a specific group of neoconservative intellectuals from the 1980 to 2006. This thesis is primarily a work of political history and represents to some extent a combination of political science, international relations, and history. It is difficult here to simply locate the thesis in just one of these academic disciplines. It provides elements of a political history, as it discusses the

successive positions neoconservatives held to develop the principle. In addition to explain the way their interaction with different presidential administrations and how their foreign policies affected the democracy promotion view within neo-conservatism.

This thesis adopts an interdisciplinary approach of study. It utilizes analytical tools of history and political science in making its arguments and reaching its conclusions. An analytical and descriptive route is pursued to achieve the purpose of the study. It follows an analytic foreign policy endorsed by the narrative of events, and also a descriptive way when it deals with the objectives and reasons for the democratisation strategy adopted by neoconservatives. To understand how Iraq-US relations were developed and the neoconservative effect in this development, this work is historically grounded and it is firmly tied to a number of major debates in contemporary international relations theory. Accordingly, this study engages basically with two international theories: liberal international relations and foreign policy realism in its analyses and critiques.

To achieve this study objective, this research depends on primary and secondary data available. In conducting substantially academic research, this study exploited different major sources of primary materials to allow a complete understanding of the centrality of Iraq and democracy promotion policies in the evolution of neo-conservatism.

The controversial debate over democracy promotion in Iraq following 9/11 led many of major members of the Bush administration to write memoirs of their experiences and recollections of the events. These memoirs have proved to be useful as primary sources in advancing this study. Some examples which are used in this thesis played a central role in the development of this thesis. *See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War Against Terrorism* is a 2003 memoir by a former CIA case officer in the Directorate of Operations for two decades (1976-1997) ;Robert Baer. He witnessed the rise of terrorism and

the CIA's inadequate response to it, leading to the attacks of September 11, 2001. This book provides an unprecedented and critical look at the roots of modern terrorism, and the American war on terrorism and its profound implications throughout the Middle East.

Another memoir is written by Douglas Feith ; Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Bush administration "*War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*". Feith presents a history of the beginning of the War on Terrorism and the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is a valuable piece about American intervention in Iraq as it provides a careful documentation of the Pentagon thinking prior to and in the first stages of the Iraq war.

This thesis particularly treats documents produced by US presidential administrations and neoconservatives as primary sources including letters, speeches and government publications. Presidential Addresses are officially recorded in archives, in addition to official documents of some previous administrations and many from the Bush administration which have been used extensively and were made available through the White House Archives and the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) official web sites. Both sites helped extensively to develop a comprehensive understanding of the topic discussed in this research. Public records have offered also, a valuable source of this study. The public statements made by senior administration officials in speeches, interviews, press conferences, and governmental reports.

Most academic literature do not deny the neoconservative influence in the Bush policy making of the 2003 Iraq War, but it is surprising here to notice that there exists academic reluctance to fully engage theoretically with neo-conservatism. This may be due to the fact that they favour governmental careers and they rely mainly on magazine publishing.

They even do not engage in debates with their ideological adversaries. This can be an explanatory factor in the academy's failure to comprehensively study neo-conservatism.

The secondary material utilised for this research is the huge number of neoconservative article archives written mainly on pages of *The Weekly Standard*, *Commentary*, *Wall Street Journal* and *The Washington Post* all available on *Proquest*, *Academic Research Complete* platforms and *the Weekly Standard* online magazine. Francis Fukuyama's '*The End of History and the Last Man*' (1992); is of great importance in this thesis since the book was the source of neoconservative inspiration to adopt new perspectives for American foreign policy. Books by: Bob Woodward, Tony Smith, Gary Dorrien and many others, played a key role in preparing this dissertation. Along with, a wide range of critical books, newspaper articles and news magazines are heavily exploited for this thesis. This work utilizes important element of the ample material produced by foreign policy specialists on American Middle East policy between the post-cold war era and the 2003 Iraq War, as well as many of the major works produced on neo-conservatism over the past years.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides background information necessary for understanding neo-conservatism. It defines the terminology as it has been described by both neoconservatives and academics, in some details with mentioning the specific policy of democracy promotion that was championed by neoconservatives. This chapter also serves to differentiate between variant strands of thought within neo-conservatism; 'Democratic Globalism' and 'Democratic Realism'; that were mainly developed during the Cold War and just after its end they were appeared over the question of promoting democracy in American foreign policy. In order to explain the neoconservative changed position to US intervention in Iraq, a look at both theories of international relations; Realism and Liberal Internationalism; is required. Furthermore, this chapter argues how

Fukuyama's *End of History* provides a key theoretical contribution and a prescription for military democratisation in the neoconservative discourse.

The second chapter discusses the development of democracy promotion perspective in the neoconservative thinking from the 1960s to the 1990s. This includes the early roles of Jeane Kirkpatrick, Joshua Muravchik and Carl Gershman in developing the perspective inside the Socialist Party and YPSL to their integration into the Cold War liberal wing of the Democratic Party in the early 1970's. Then it attempts to discuss the neoconservative critiques of the Democratic Peace Theory and to show their adoption of its new versions to demonstrate the necessity of using military means to the worldwide spread of democracy. The development of the new thinking was acknowledged through the development of important materials and frequent publications in *Commentary*, the *Weekly Standard* and the Project for the New American Century that all worked for distributing neoconservative foreign policy views.

The third chapter demonstrates the centrality of Iraq in the development of democratisation perspective. The discussion of US-Iraq foreign relation is pivotal to understand the evolution of democracy promotion perspective in the neoconservative discourse. It refers to early Iraq-US relations specifically during the Reagan administration and focuses on "regime change" in Iraq as it was first labeled. Then it discusses the neoconservative reaction to the Gulf War which reflected their realist position. Few years later during Clinton's second term, neoconservatives decisively adopted a more radical thinking with Iraq as they demonstrated deep favours for regime change different from earlier limited reactions to US intervention in the country. Paving the way for George W. Bush's foreign policy agenda, strategies of realist stability were replaced by regime change and liberal democracy promotion.

The fourth chapter explains the neoconservative origin of Bush's advocacy of democracy promotion and the need for regime change in Iraq. It assesses the 2000 presidential elections and the possibility of the neoconservative influence in the administration. Then it attempts to explain how the Bush administration brought Saddam at the heart of the war on terrorism following 9/11 attacks and how later it prepared for the invasion. Likewise, this chapter discusses the reasons of war the Bush Doctrine included to justify the armed intervention in Iraq. Owning weapons of mass destruction, sponsoring terrorism and the totalitarian character of Saddam Hussein were key reasons to put Iraq in the front list of American global war on terrorism and promoting democracy through armed intervention.

The last chapter assesses the practice of the Bush administration's assumptions about democratising Iraq and its outcomes. The chapter starts with discussing the reasons that Bush and the policy makers provided to make democracy promotion the lonely possible cure to end terrorism in Iraq. The three main elements he provided are: the universality of freedom, liberalism and the belief that democratisation is the panacea in non-democratic states to solve internal problems. Then it moves to discuss the Coalition Provisional Authority plan to promote democracy in Iraq and the major barriers the United States faced in insecure country. It also analyses critiques on policy failure to end terrorism and its main role to increase jihadist terrorism and sectarian terrorism which caused a high tension of violence in the state. Lastly, the chapter discusses neoconservatives' return to reality and argued how Bush showed sympathy to realist attitudes to solve the complicated situation in the country.

CHAPTER ONE

Neo-conservatism, Realism and Liberal Internationalism

Introduction

Examining both the theoretical and historical influences that contributed to the neoconservative paradigm of democracy promotion is central to understand the policies neoconservatives advocate, and to explain the reasons of change in their relation to the principle. The initial chapter describes neo-conservatism as it has been conceptualized in the existing literature by both neoconservatives and academics. Furthermore, analyzing the neoconservative foreign policy outlook helps to clarify their arguments of armed democratisation. It also discusses Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis which was considered by historians the theoretical groundwork for neo-conservatism. The theoretical section grounds the thesis in a discussion of International Relations theory to add definitional clarity to the key theoretical concepts of the thesis. This thesis mainly argues for a shift in neoconservative position to US intervention in Iraq that reflected theoretical orientation to realism and an international liberalism.

1.1 Neo-conservatism

In the early 1970s, the term "neoconservative" was first labeled by the American socialist leader Michael Harrington. Those associated with neo-conservatism describe their perspective as 'democratic imperialism' (Daalder and Lindsay 15) or 'hard Wilsonianism' (Clarke and Halper 74). Neo-conservatism is commonly known as an ideology or a movement, whereas Irving Kristol, the so called 'god father' of neo-conservatism, describes it as a 'persuasion'(Kristol, Neoconservative Persuasion). Neoconservatives' domestic political interests are issues like labour policy, taxation and education. Concerning its foreign policy approach, and as a political movement it advocates a set of foreign policy actions

based on a particular interpretation of international politics. For Kristol: “there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience”. The foreign policy initial dimension of the neoconservative movement came out in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to a growing dissatisfaction with the government’s management and public response to the Vietnam War. The aftermath of the Vietnam War had created a movement of alien group of both Democrats and Republicans, who wished that the United States power should be used to promote US values and to influence world order.

The term ‘Neo-conservatism’ was not used to refer to a particular school of international relations until the 1990’s (Dorrien 195). Most figures of this group were originally members of the Democratic Party, most originated in New York, and most were Jews who supported America’s war in Vietnam (Sniegowski 25). In the 1960s and the 1970s the Democratic Party moved to the anti-war McGovernite¹ left as it contended that the United States should scale back its overseas forces following the Vietnam War and accept its relative decline in international politics. The group of scholars and academics within the Democratic Party, who would be later called neoconservatives, refused these forms of foreign policy and asserted that the United States should continue its commitments abroad, containing the Soviet Union and then it would be possible to rebuild its military forces. They deeply condemned the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s détente that favoured ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the Soviet Union and considered it a failure to deal with an evil enemy. In Dorrien words: “the neocons stood for a self-confident and militantly interventionist Americanism. [...] To them, good liberalism was expansionist, nationalistic, and fiercely anticommunist” (7).

Those individuals who became neoconservatives were aware enough to see that in the 1960s, the liberals and the left were recognized with issues that were harmful to the

interest of Jewry. They were active and present in the office of Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson who was himself an advocate of anti-communist and anti-Soviet US foreign policy. Two prominent members of this group who began as young trainees with Jackson in 1969 were Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. In the early 1970s, the neoconservatives were still members of the Democratic Party and they sought to combat the leftist who had enabled George McGovern to become the Democratic presidential standard bearer in 1972.

In 1979 this group became disappointed with what they considered the Carter administration’s weak position with the Soviet Union that led to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Carter’s dealing with the scandal of the Iran hostage crisis. According to neoconservatives, the Soviet Union was advancing around the world while Carter appeared to lack the will to resist. In response, many of them moved from the Democratic Party to the Republican where they found refuge to their beliefs in the administration of Ronald Reagan. They were led by Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell and Elvin Hall who were the first generation of neoconservatives².

1.2 Irving Kristol on Neoconservatism

The neoconservative worldview has changed gradually into a set of beliefs about how change can occur in the international system and how America should act. In August 2003, the *Weekly Standard* published ‘*The Neoconservative Persuasion*’ of Irving Kristol in which he claimed that neo-conservatism is simply an evolution that depends on changing landscape of US world affairs; the evolution that made the United States unique in its military and economic strength. He argues that: “it is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you”.

Kristol’s article was an attempt to set out the main principles that constituted the neoconservative world view, particularly after the highly critical spotlight neoconservatives

received as a result of the Bush's administration invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Kristol made a startling claim that: "there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning [neoconservative] foreign policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experiences". In the introduction of his article he noticed: "[J]ournalists, and now even presidential candidates, speak with an enviable confidence on who or what is "neoconservative," and seem to assume the meaning is fully revealed in the name." He claimed that: "Those of us who are designated as "neocons" are amused, flattered, or dismissive, depending on the context. It is reasonable to wonder: Is there any "there" there?". Kristol argued that neo-conservatism did not exist as a "movement" or a school of thought but as a "persuasion". Halper and Clarke in their critical book on neo-conservatism '*America Alone*' referred that: "Whether movement or persuasion, it certainly does not apply an ideological straightjacket on its members or an admittance test" (10).

Kristol continued describing a brief historical outlook of neo-conservatism and then spent more time examining distinctive neoconservative views of American foreign policy. According to Kristol, neoconservatives believed that American power and principles must be one in foreign policy. Neoconservatives, thus, articulated a moralistic foreign policy with a world view, that believe in promoting values of freedom and democracy abroad to be also beneficial to American power and interests. In Kristol's view, there were four common "attitudes" of neoconservatives' foreign policy thinking, together they centered around many aspects of the persuasion:

"First, patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment and should be encouraged by both private and public institutions [...] Second, world government is a terrible idea since it can lead to world tyranny. [...] Third, statesmen should, above all, have the ability to distinguish friends from enemies [...] Finally, for a great power, the "national interest" is not a

geographical term, except for fairly prosaic matters like trade and environmental regulation. A smaller nation might appropriately feel that its national interest begins and ends at its borders, so that its foreign policy is almost always in a defensive mode. A larger nation has more extensive interests. And large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns.”

Kristol competently described a number of aspects of the Neoconservative foreign policy thinking, emphasizing that American foreign policy actions were built behind a domestic context that was influenced by regime type. He went further noting that in relation to other states; neoconservatives believed that a particular state’s foreign policy was primarily determined by its domestic regime type. If a state was authoritarian at home, then it would not be peaceful abroad but moreover, it would externalize the violence inherited in its governmental system to other states. Kristol made it also clear that neoconservatives rejected the meaning of ‘national interest’ that is limited to “geographical borders” to be deemed as a realist conception. Instead, they believed “the United States of today”, as an exceptional nation should have its national interest be extended beyond material matters to include the spread of democratic values abroad. This meant that freedom promotion is a part of advancing American power and interests, since values and interests actually could not be separated from American foreign policy. Hence, neoconservatives consider democracy as the only resolution governments should apply for peace promotion, security insurance, and enhancing American interests.

For the means of promoting democracy, Kristol justified that American military power was important as a tool of foreign policy. Military force could be employed in the service of national interests and even to advance liberal values abroad. The second generation

neoconservatives supported the same tools of interests for promoting democracy. Irving Kristol's son, William Kristol, believed that the United States military superiority was manifest and its intentions were virtuous. He describes it as "Benevolent global hegemony", and saw "[t]he first objective of U.S foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America's security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world" (Kristol W. and Kagan 20).

Like Kristol, Francis Fukuyama in his 2006 book *'America at the Crossroads'* set out four central principles of neo-conservatism. First, "a concern with democracy, human rights, and more generally the internal politics of states"; second, "a belief that U.S. power can be used for moral purposes"; third, "a skepticism about the ability of international law and institutions to solve serious security problems"; and finally, "a view that ambitious social engineering often leads to unexpected consequences and often undermines its own ends" (4-5). For Fukuyama, the problem existed between the neoconservatives' high belief in democracy promotion that needs interference in the domestic politics of other states (114-5).

Joshua Muravchik, the neoconservative who has written a lot on neo-conservatism, also suggests in his article on *Commentary* magazine "The Past, Present, and Future of Neo-conservatism" that following the Cold War four neoconservative central tenets has arisen. Firstly, neoconservatives were "moralists" who "did not hesitate to enter negative moral judgments" towards "the acts of aggression" committed by some dictators like Saddam Hussein. Secondly, "in common with many liberals, neoconservatives were internationalists" who sought to confront international security troubles, "afar than to wait for them to ripen and grow nearer". Thirdly, neoconservatives believed and "trusted in the efficacy of military force" rather than "economic sanctions or UN intervention or diplomacy" as meaningful alternatives in confronting adversaries. Fourthly, "the belief in democracy both at home and abroad" is an effective policy for combating human rights violations.

1.3 Neoconservative Foreign Policy Outlook

Neoconservative foreign policy thinking can be best described as a grand strategy of primacy that emphasizes the Americans exceptional status in the international system which demonstrates the United States' efforts to retain its position of might, mainly its particular military supremacy against challenges to control world order. Thus, in addition to a strong ambition to spread democracy, the Neoconservative foreign policy outlook is characterized by an emphasis on military power and unilateralism.

1.3.1 American Hegemony and Unilateralism

The neoconservative worldview does not depend on the realist balance-of-power; instead it favours a balance of power based on military dominance and the freedom of action in international politics. Subsequently, regimes and international institutions that refuse to obey or challenge US behaviour are damaging and unnecessary (Ritchie and Rogers 144). It supports the view of democratisation abroad to establish an American international order, the aspect it shares with liberal internationalism. Neo-conservatism emphasis on the military power and its necessity as an instrument against international constrains is what diverges it from liberal internationalism. The common view is therefore what is good for America is good for the world, because the United States seeks to create a world to serve its interests based on liberal values for human liberty and democracy.

The overriding principle in neoconservative foreign policy is the support of both; democratic institutions and the continuation of American status as the world's sole superpower. In his article 'Democratic Realism', Krauthammer insisted that what makes the United States unique in history is its overwhelming global power with no imperial ambitions as it has found itself in the position of global hegemony through "pure accident of history". He further described the creation of this unique status following the Cold War saying:

“The most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity. No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for decades. Now is the unipolar moment” (Krauthammer, “The Unipolar” 23-4).

According to neoconservatives, the American global hegemony is “the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order” that depends on “American power and the will to use it [...] to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as possible” (Kagan and Kristol, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite” 23). They added that “the first objective of U.S. foreign policy is to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America’s security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world”. They held that where action is deemed necessary for survival, America had the right to act unilaterally, especially when it is difficult or even impossible to move the rest of the international community to action. For neoconservatives, multilateralism is seen “To reduce American freedom of action by making it subservient to, dependent on, constricted by the will--and interests--of other nations” (Krauthammer, “Democratic Realism” 6).

The end of the Cold War opened an opportunity for the United States to enjoy its unipolar moment to the fullest and reinvent its foreign policy. The unipolar moment, gave the U.S. the chance to exert its power in order to reshape and reconstruct the world to its own preferences. In other words, now it would have a more prominent role in deciding what kind of foreign policy to construct. The United States hegemony needed a military strength as an agent of change abroad as we witnessed the violent nature of the Bush Doctrine³ against Iraq in 2003 through its advocacy to reshape the world with arms.

1.3.2 Exporting Democracy

Neo-conservatism is an approach that evolved from an ideology that supports a status quo to one that advocates change over stability. It contends that the world can only be safe for America through the democratisation of dictatorial regimes and disarmament of hostile states that own Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) like Iraq. These states might be able to threaten American security if they deter U.S. actions to advance and defend its interests abroad. As the neoconservative Krauthammer argued in his article *'Democratic Realism'* that: "the spread of democracy is not just an end but a means, an indispensable means for securing American interests" (15). According to Irving Kristol, the United States would have to defend "a democratic nation under attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal" ("The Neoconservative Persuasion" 2).

According to neoconservatives, the promotion of American values including democracy is overlapped with the pursuit of American interests, since only through promoting American values that the United States can make a safer and a better world. "American foreign policy", Kagan and Kristol insisted: "should be informed with a clear moral purpose, based on the understanding that its moral goals and its fundamental national interests are almost always in harmony" ("Toward A Neo-Reaganite" 27).

Neo-conservatives hold democracy to be 'true' but more importantly universally 'true' to justify its promotion everywhere in the globe. They consider the tradition of democracy promotion to be rooted in the American sense of national identity. According to Paul T. McCartney, American nationalism is founded on two concepts: "universalism and exceptionalism" (402-4). The notion of universalism implies that American nationalism is distinguished by a universalistic commitment to liberal values and the belief that those values are "rooted in qualities and capacities shared by all people, everywhere (402). As Jeane

Kirkpatrick noticed in *'Dictatorships and Double Standards'*, “no idea holds greater sway in the mind of educated Americans than the belief that it is possible to democratise governments, anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances.” (37)

Moreover, the idea of American exceptionalism is a central theme in the neoconservative thinking as it is through U.S. foreign policy as a whole. It is based on a nationalist identity of commitment to a set of universal liberal views and an obligation to support the spread of those views abroad. Different schools of thought diverge on the meaning of exceptionalism and how it should be applied. In 2005 in *'The Roots of the Bush Doctrine'*, Jonathan Monten argued that “Democracy promotion is not just another foreign policy instrument or idealist diversion; it is central to U.S. political identity and sense of national purpose” (113). He further divided the idea of American exceptionalism into two perspectives that have developed with respect to the long-term promotion of democratic change: “exemplarism” and “vindicationism”. Exemplarism suggests that “U.S. institutions and values should be perfected and preserved [...]. The United States exerts influence on the world through the force of its example; an activist foreign policy may even corrupt liberal practices at home, undermining the potency of the U.S model”. Vindicationism argues that “the United States must move beyond example and undertake active measures to spread its universal political values and institutions” (113). Monten argues that neo-conservatism is situated within a long tradition of vindicationism (116). Therefore, Ritchie and Rogers argue that this neoconservative vindicationist view “maintains that democratic change abroad can be achieved through purposeful action” (145).

Neoconservative's foreign policy also concentrates on strengthening ties to democratic states and spreading democracy to other nations under the rule of dictators and tyrants to ensure new alliances. The creation of alliances with the new democratic nation is a key theme in neoconservative thinking. This was argued by Boot for the “need to promote

[American] values, for the simple reason that liberal democracies rarely fight one another, sponsor terrorism, or use weapons of mass destruction” (“What the Heck”). Notably, democratisation and the establishment of democratic nations for neoconservatives, have a sort of domino effect of spreading democracy to neighbor states. Democracy is seen to be almost uniquely American and exporting democracy would be the first step of exporting American values.

It is so manifest now that neoconservatives are linking contradicted meanings to describe their universal mission of spreading democracy. They promote moralities using power, and they ensure national security and interests with spreading values of humanity abroad. It is interesting to refer that Kristol had exposed the key attitudes of neo-conservatism at a time they achieved unprecedented level of international attention. In 2003, a time they received a large critical documentation and comments due to the decision to invade Iraq. Although neoconservatives existed as a sophisticated body of thought only before the election of George W. Bush, the announcement of the Bush Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq took place in American politics and foreign policy decades before. Analyzing and examining the origins and the developments of the neoconservative democratisation foreign policy is a key to understand the policy for armed intervention in Iraq. It is also important to see the overlapping to appreciate the historical relevance of the Bush Doctrine’s democratisation policy that emerged as the core tenet of post-September 11 grand strategy.

1.3.3. Military Power

The overriding concern of neoconservative foreign policy is maintaining the U.S. status of superpower by any means deemed necessary for extending “advantageous position as far into the future as possible” (Donnelly 70). In order to keep America in advanced position, military means were required. The maintenance of military power is considered to

be very essential for the maintenance of US hegemony as a vital instrument of policy.

Neoconservatives believe that the military power and the national interest play pivotal role in international relations and emphasize that US hegemony must base on military dominance of other states. They assert that military power should regain core importance in US foreign policy “to promote American ideals” as well as its interests (Boot, “What the Heck”), including regime change of dictatorial regimes and the spread of liberal democracy in non-democratic states.

From this perspective, any threats to the prevailing international order and the American benevolent hegemony should be treated with military means. This can be achieved only by increasing the defense budget to fulfill the neoconservative will of democratising dictatorial regimes rather than finding acceptable strategies that suit American available military resources. In the neoconservative view, the United States has an unprecedented strategic opportunity and a global leadership position it should seek to preserve and extend only by maintaining the preeminence of U.S. military forces (Donnelly iv). The belief of the utility of military power in states of repression is to remove the restrictions to freedom in such areas to pave the way for democracy to flourish and the best example is intervention in Iraq in 2003.

1.4 Democratic Globalism and Democratic Realism

Just after the end of the Cold War, two apparently different strands within neo-conservatism appeared over the question of democracy promotion in American foreign policy; “democratic realism” and “democratic globalism”. Democratic globalism embraced an extended and optimistic view about the possibilities of democratisation in the post-Cold War world and the ability of the United States to use intervention in authoritarian states to spread democracy. In 1991, one of the early prominent democratic globalists, Joshua

Muravchik, wrote about the need to spread democracy in the post-Cold War era in order to “fulfill America’s mission”, he stated “[p]romoting democracy was desirable for many reasons, but if it had not been advantageous in terms of the cold war, other reasons would have counted little. But if I was right that promoting democracy was a god antidote to communism, is it relevant to the era after communism?”(xii). After the publication of the book, he officially joined the group of democratic globalists among others, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Norman Podhoretz, Michael Ledeen and the most influential , William Kristol and Robert Kagan, who argued for the globalization of democracy at the heart of American foreign Policy with the publication of *‘Toward Neo-Reganite Foreign Policy’*. Kristol and Kagan writings did the most to champion democratic globalism mainly through their publications in the *Weekly Standard* and the Project for a New American Century; they effectively presented democratic globalism as the core of neoconservative thinking, and moreover supporting this view by bringing it into effect in the formulation of the Bush Doctrine.

In the 1990s, it seemed that democratic globalism is the dominant mainstream of the neoconservative persuasion, however, some neoconservative figures adopted new restrictions and hesitation about the centrality of democratisation to American foreign policy in the post Cold War era. Krauthammer was one of these figures who called himself a “democratic realist” or the “unipolar realist” after the collapse of communism⁴. *‘In Defense of Democratic Realism’*, Krauthammer believed of democratisation to be a pillar to American foreign policy but hesitated to support its universality. He held that it must be based on “criteria of selectivity”, mainly the importance of democratisation for the evolvement of domestic interests and national security. Krauthammer argued that while spreading democracy was a noble goal, democratic globalism was “too ambitious and too idealistic” and as an alternative he suggested “Democratic Realism” that need US intervention “not everywhere that freedom

is threatened but only where it counts” otherwise, it would waste its resources in democratising unimportant places. Democratic realists held that interventionist democratisation should be treated with great selectivity and warned against expensive policies that might have weak relationship with “national interest”. He further suggested an alternative to democratic globalism where the commitment of US military might is needed only when it is called for in the defense of its strategic interests. He also contended that the central axiom of democratic realism is to “support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity—meaning, places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom” (20).

Discussion in chapter four of this thesis will make it clear that the assumptions about democratisation that emerged in the Bush Doctrine were derived from democratic globalist’s beliefs. While ‘democratic realism’ occasionally entered subsequent analysis, ‘democratic globalism’ became so dominant as a variant of neo-conservatism, it became possible to speak about ‘neoconservatives’ without referring to the prefix ‘democratic globalists’ when discussing American foreign policy of spreading democracy following the 1990’s Gulf War to the last two years of President George W. Bush presence in the office. Because those neoconservatives who called for armed democratisation in Iraq, most of them belonged to democratic globalist’s variant.

Krauthammer offered a historical perspective of his theory in Germany and Japan when the militant spread of democracy counted in the face of the global threat of fascism during the Second World War. Later, the communist threat provided the enemy that “counts” and was fought during the Cold War. “Today” Krauthammer argues “it is Arab/Islamic radicalism [...] where it really counts today in that Islamic crescent stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan”. So, the case that brings ‘democratic realism’ and ‘democratic

globalism' under the same roof is: Krauthammer's holdings that democracy promotion is the key for democratising and pacifying Iraq in particular and the Middle East in general; it represents the core tenet of the neoconservative foreign policy and the surest way for countering the existential threat in the region.

1.5 Democracy and the End of History

The discussion of historical events of early post-cold war years considers the neoconservatives' embrace of Francis Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis to be the original and the theoretical framework of their American foreign policy outlook (Smith 50). It is argued that Fukuyama's paper represented the intellectual foundation and the guiding groundwork of neo-conservatism during the 1990s. Fukuyama's thesis provided a key theoretical narrative to put the idea of democracy in a central position in the neoconservative discourse. Neoconservatives had always been passionate defenders of American liberal thinking and a number of them interpreted the work as a guide to action, using Fukuyama's conclusions about the globalization of liberalism as basis on which to form an idea for encouraging the spread of liberal democracy through intervention. They had always supported the aspect of democracy but by the end of 1990s, their relationship to democracy had altered from an attachment to the idea to one that considered the promotion of democracy abroad as central to the American foreign policy agenda. Further, Fukuyama in his thesis interpreted liberal democracy as the only remaining legitimate model of organization for all societies and states.

Fukuyama's work has not only been regarded important to provide key contribution to the Western political discourse of the early post-Cold War period, however it played a central role in establishing a foundation for a neoconservative thought. Although, Fukuyama later

declared his withdrawal from the group and accused the George W. Bush administration of misinterpreting his work (Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroad* 55).

In 1989, Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis appeared first as a short article in the *National Interest*. Later in 1992, an extended version in the form of a whole book was published under the title '*The End of History and the Last Man*'. The work does not represent direct policy prescriptions; instead it is seen to be a philosophical discussion of human history. The conclusions of the work occupied important part of liberal internationalist thinking about the spread of liberal democracy. The work is an academic and theoretical piece that discusses the process of liberal thinking into long periods of the entire scope of human history towards the final state of government and "the last man". Fukuyama's work is regularly associated with liberal international relations and the prospects for globalizing liberal democracy. The End of History thesis provided a compelling paper as it theoretically explained how and why a global liberal order was now more possible than ever before. Accordingly many neoconservatives adopted and embraced Fukuyama's thesis.

Fukuyama's 'End of History' was published at a time when fundamental political changes occurred and offered the Western victory over the Soviet Union thus the victory of liberal democracy over communism. Fukuyama highlighted the victory of liberal democracy in the Cold War and the teleological future of humanity. He argues that "History" as conceived in the understanding of the great German philosopher Hegel, eventually would end when mankind would achieve a form of society that satisfy its deepest longings that is the liberal state. Fukuyama contends that "the end of history" "did not mean that the natural cycle of birth, life, and death would end" rather; it meant that "there would be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big questions had been settled" (xii). He continues arguing that "what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but

the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government". He emphasizes that "the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness" it is yet incomplete in the real world, but he believes that there exists "powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world *in the long run*".

In the article, Fukuyama insists that the victory of liberalism has occurred mainly as a result of the "total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western Liberalism". In this regard and following the victory of liberalism over communism the history is moving to an "end" point where the sole form of governments that guides human affairs will be characterized as liberal. He argues that "the state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed".

Accordingly, Fukuyama argues in '*The End of History and the Last Man*' that not only the failure of Marxist-Leninism to stand as an alternative to the ideas of a liberal state would represent the fundamental change in the world, also the global spread of Western goods, culture, ideas and consciousness is increasing. He even went further concluding that the future belongs to a universalized form of western political and economic liberalism (39-50). In '*America at the Crossroads*', Fukuyama holds that the liberal state will come through a modernization process where "what is universal is *initially* not the desire for liberal democracy but rather the desire to live in a modern society, with its technology, high standards of living, healthcare and access to the wider world"(54).

In the book, Fukuyama makes capitalism inevitable as an eventual evolution of both economic and political liberalism for producing democracy (90). He explains the reason why

liberal democratic capitalism represents the final stage in the evolution of human society in two parts. Firstly, the logic of a progressive modern natural science that bring human societies toward capitalism, i.e. all countries that seek to be wealthy and modern states should follow the path of modern capitalist's states to bring wealth to their citizens (90). Secondly, capitalism is necessary but not sufficient alone, another half rooted in human nature's recognition that only liberal democracy fulfils (117). He argues that: "The "logic of modern natural science" has no force of its own, apart from the human beings who want to make use of science to conquer nature so as to satisfy their needs, or to secure themselves against dangers" (131). He exemplified with the democratic revolutions of the United States and France, both took place just as the Industrial Revolution was getting under way in England. Before these countries had "modernized" economically, their democracy had developed and therefore democracy cannot really be resulted as a development related to economic efficiency. Thus, liberal democracy does not emerge necessarily from "Economic Man" but from "a specifically Democratic Man that desires and shapes democracy even as he is shaped by it" (135).

Having established the pillars of liberal democracy and stated why liberal democracy represents the final stage of human evolution, Fukuyama then turns to explain: how democracy itself comes about in a society, and it is here that many arguments were reconsidered and developed by many neoconservatives during the 1990s and leading up to the Iraq War in 2003. According to Fukuyama, although liberal democracy represents the end of history, it does not occur spontaneously in a given society. Rather "Democracy can never enter through the back door; at a certain point, it must arise out of a deliberate political decision to establish democracy. [...] Stable liberal democracy cannot come into being without the existence of wise and effective statesmen who understand the art of politics and are able to convert the underlying inclinations of peoples into durable political institution"

(220). Accordingly, “wise statesmen” has a significant role in the rise up of liberal democracy. In 1991, some neoconservatives called the United States to play just a supporting role to Iraqi uprising against Saddam Hussein following the Gulf War. However, by 2003 neoconservatives developed an approach that involves some ‘wise’ American statesmen to maintain democracy in Iraq, through the introduction of new political institutions and democratic election.

Concerning the neoconservative’s evolution of liberal democracy perspective, a contribution of Fukuyama’s reflections on culture is needed. He argues that the views about certain cultural backgrounds should be taken into consideration before a society will be able to make the transition to democracy, are mistaken. He gives the examples of both German and Japanese authoritarian states which turned quickly into democracies following the Second World War. He also provides the chief example of India that is from a very different political culture from other democracies but it has been able to sustain an effective working democracy since independence in 1947 (221). Here is another theme that reflects neoconservative thinking is the idea that there are no cultural barriers that pose a fundamental challenge to the birth of democracy in a state which can be linked to the run up to the 2003 Iraq War.

In the extended version of *‘The End of History and the Last Man’*, Fukuyama holds that the gradual liberal democracy process will make most of the world’s states belong to “post-historical part” (276). Moreover, he warns of conflicts that will occur among ‘post-historic’ states and the remaining ‘historic’ states for a variety of reasons until the former will overcome the latter (276-77). Fukuyama in his thesis refers regularly that the way to the end of history will not be characterized with smoothness or it will be easily achieved in a short period.

Fukuyama was very offensive to realism in foreign affairs. While realism was “appropriate” to explain events of the Cold War as world politics had operated according to its premises, he argues, in the post-Cold War era, realism had become “reductionist”⁵ and a “theoretical framework beyond its appointed time” (252-4). He emphasized that states are not only motivated by self-preservation as realism maintains, but by *thymos*⁶ and the need for recognition just as individuals do. Fukuyama contends that states need not to maximize their power through traditional ways of military and territorial expansion. It is through economic growth and by putting itself at the head of the struggle for freedom and democracy that a state could guarantee its “struggle for power”. Therefore, states do not simply pursue power; they pursue “a variety of ends that are dictated by concepts of *legitimacy*” (257). According to Fukuyama, realists were wrong when they suggest that domestic political regimes do not necessarily influence their foreign policy behaviour. He believes that domestic behaviour of states matters, for liberal societies have “fundamentally un-warlike character” and it is reflected in the peaceful relations they maintain among one another that results in liberal democracies do not go to war with each other (262).

Therefore, Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis included a number of key themes that influenced the neoconservative thinking in that period. Firstly, the view that liberal democracy was the end point of human development. Secondly, the idea that liberal democracy would not develop automatically and randomly in a given society, instead it needs wise statesman to bring it into reality. Thirdly, there existed no cultural barriers that could prevent a state from becoming democratic. Fourthly, realism was a suitable doctrine during the Cold War and it would not be effective in the post-Cold War era. Finally, the domestic politics of states is very influential as it might affect their foreign policy behaviours, particularly as liberal democracies do not go to war against each other.

In spite of Fukuyama's reservations in matters concerning the military use for exporting democracy, it is clear that his thesis provided democratic globalists with a theoretical set of interests that colored their arguments for interventionist policies of democratisation.

1.6 Realism and Liberal Internationalism in International Relations

As it was discussed before, liberal internationalism had a great impact on the neoconservative framework of democratisation policy and mainly during the years following the Gulf War to the 2003 Iraq War. This paper argues that following the end of the Cold War, neoconservatives' thought about foreign policy with Iraq was sympathetic to realism as they called for a limited American role in the region to settle down the conflict without serious ambitions of ending Saddam's regime and spreading democracy. It was during the 1990's that neoconservatives showed a gradual interest for democracy promotion as a key theme to their foreign policy as they adopted the main aspects of Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis, and founded on its basis a theoretical framework for their argument of interventionist democratisation. For that, a discussion of both ideologies of realism and international liberalism is required.

1.6.1 Realism

Realism is the oldest of the international relations theories. It is also called, *realpolitik* or *power politics* theory, for its principle premise that every state's main goal is to gain power to protect itself from other nations that are living in an international state of anarchy.

In spite of different paradigms of realism, they all share a set of beliefs that help to frame realism thinking. Realists consider the sovereign state as the major actor in international politics. It is often referred to as the *state centric* assumption of realism. They

emphasize the fact that states are the primary actors and the centre of power in world affairs. Internationally these states are living a state of *anarchy*. It does not mean chaos but the absence of central authority in the international arena. Another key feature for a realist international politics is the focus on *power*. Realists defined their enquiries to the study of state power and argued that stability in international politics is crucial. One of the essential tools realists have considered to be important to preserve the liberty and the stability of these states is the *balance of power*. Although many definitions are attributed to the concept of the balance of power the following is the most common definition. It holds that if the survival of a state or a number of weaker states is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of stronger states, they (weaker states) should establish a formal alliance to preserve their own independence and survival balancing against the power of the opposing side. The concept of the balance of power seeks to equilibrate power in which no state or a coalition of states will hold a position to dominate all other states.

For realists, as referred before, the state is the key actor in international relations that should pursue power. It is the duty of statesman to manage the appropriate solutions the state should follow to protect itself in a hostile and threatening environment. For realists of all variables, the state can never guarantee its survival, since the use of force in war is a legitimate tool of statecraft. This theory of Realism that became dominant after the Second World War is related to the classical tradition of thought. The core tenets of realism have roots in some of the classical works in history of political thought. Its founding fathers, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes are the names most usually mentioned. Realism traced its beginning with Thucydides' description of power politics as a law of human behavior. Holding power and the hope for domination seemed to be fundamental aspects of human nature. States' behaviors as self-seeking egoists are better explained to be a reflection of the characteristics of the people who rule the state. *Classical realists* or *biological realists*

(Donnelly 11) believe that human nature explains why international politics is mainly power politics. They believe that human beings are born with an inherited will to power, which actually means that states are ruled by those individuals who held the will to dominate their rivals. The classical realists' core theme of human nature appeared frequently in the works of the post-war realist leader, Hans J. Morgenthau. Classical realists argue that it is from the nature of man that the essential features of international politics, such as competition, fear, and war can be explained. Morgenthau notes, 'politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature' (Morgenthau 4).

Much more than a single theory, realism was criticized by both advocates and opponents, and this led to the emergence of different related branches. The classification of different types of realism is linked to the answer of the important question: *why do states want power?*

Structural realists or *neo-realists* believe that human nature has a little to do with state will to power. They believe that the structure of international system that pushes states to seek for power. Because of the international system states are living with no guarantee that one will attack another, so it is safe for each state to be powerful enough to protect itself if it is attacked. As the fundamental premise of Hans Morgenthau's classical realism is his account of the implication human nature has on foreign policy makers, structural realists instead reject this account arguing that focusing on the character and decision making of actors in International Relations is to misunderstand the real factors in IR. Instead, structural realists attribute security competition and conflicts among states to the lack of an overarching authority and the distribution of power in the international system. This kind of realism is associated with Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Relations* in which he argued that it is simply the structure of the system and not the character of human beings that determine the nature of world politics. Waltz showed that the structure of politics can be defined in terms of

three core elements: organizing principle, differentiation of units, and distribution of capabilities.

For structural realists, the distribution of power in the international system is the key independent variable to understand important international outcomes such as war, peace, and the balance of power. According to Waltz' theory, the distribution of power in world's politics depends on the number of Great Powers that determines the structure of the international system. This means that the system varies to a significant degree when the distribution of capabilities changes from a world that contains a number of powerful states that seek to achieve their goals internationally to one that contains only one or two great powers capable of such actions. In a multi-polar world where there are several great powers, the security competition is going to be different from a bipolar world where there only two great powers. Waltz demonstrates his view of peace and stability with what happened in the Cold War era, which is characterized with two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, constituting a bipolar international system.

An emphasis on maintaining and managing the system or transforming it, is an important differential mark of realism, mainly in relation to explain how neoconsequence developed in the post-Cold War era. Hence, for realists the predominance of American power following the Cold War presents a challenge to international peace as the world lacks the stability of a bipolar system. For realists, the United States universal exporting of its liberal democratic values is reckless. Values are unable to determine the structural characteristics of the international system that promote the balance of power. The United States should, instead, keep on being a status quo power with limited foreign policy goals. The domestic political situation, realists believe, should not be important to the conduct of the United States foreign policy, for it is not the internal characteristics of states that determine their foreign policy behavior but the structure of the international system. If all states are concerned with

power and they attempt to maintain their position in the anarchic world, then whether being a liberal democracy or an authoritarian state it is not the determining aspect in the conduct of their foreign affairs.

1.6.2 Liberal Internationalism

Although Realism is regarded as the dominant theory of international relations, Liberalism is believed to be the historic alternative. Liberal internationalism is a foreign policy doctrine that supports the intervention of liberal states in other states for liberal objectives. It is the concept that is commonly associated with the former US president Woodrow Wilson, for that it is often referred to as ‘Wilsonianism’ (Ikenberry et al. 2). Wilson’s legacy suggests that international instability and wars were a result of the “undemocratic nature of international politics” (Baylis et al. 111), particularly concerning the foreign policy and the balance of power.

The broad tradition of liberalism can be identified with four dimensional aspects. First, all citizens are equal and possess certain basic rights. Second, the state possesses only the authority invested in by its people, whose basic rights it is not permitted to abuse. Third, the key dimension of the liberty of the individual is the right to own property, including productive forces. Fourth, liberalists contend that the effective system of economic exchange is the one that is largely market driven and that is subordinate to bureaucratic regulation, either domestically or internationally (Baylis et al. 110).

On the global scale, liberalism as a political and economic theory embodies a domestic analogy at multiple levels: like individuals, states have different characteristics some are war-prone and others are tolerant and peaceful, in short, the identity of the state determines its outward behaviours. A further parallel between individuals and sovereigns, though basic differences in the character of states, they all share ‘natural rights’ such as the

right to non-intervention in their domestic affairs. Another level lies at the significant role that is played by institutions and the centrality of the rule of law for the extension of ideas that are originated inside liberal states to the international realm. In essence, Tim Dunne contends that “the historical project of liberalism is the domestication of the international” (Baylis et al. 110).

As political realism is defined with reference to power and the anarchic international system, international liberalism instead emphasizes the impact of power and military force on international politics and argues that there is an argument about “systemic constraints on the use of force” (Keohane and Nye 727). In the article of ‘*Power and Interdependence revisited*’ Keohane and Nye suggest that both realism and liberal internationalism have a foundation thought of interdependence but there are areas of divergence. Liberal internationalism emphasizes on: Firstly, military force is one among other variables in international politics. Secondly, for liberal thinkers, economic incentives are important as concerns for security in the international system. Thirdly, liberal internationalists are inattentive to the role of state but they emphasize on the importance of other significant non-state actors and groups in the international system through institutions and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations to avoid the excesses of “power politics” in relations between nations.

Concerning the relationship between liberal internationalism and neo-conservatism, this lies at the Wilsonian vision that occurs at the heart of the American liberal internationalism that ought to be necessarily identified with the promotion of liberal democracy and interventionism abroad, or at a larger extent to make formal multilateral institutions and international law the foundation of the international system

Smith argues that US foreign policy defeat in the Iraq War represents a crisis for liberal internationalism (57). He believes that the neoconservative architects of the war in

Iraq are “neoliberals”, a group of intellectuals on the liberal left who, in his view share the neoconservatives a “Wilsonian” desire to remake the world in their image through American military power if it is needed. He argues that the neoconservatives who support the aspect of the Bush Doctrine that asserts the imperative of the American military supremacy in world’s politics should not be equated with traditional Wilsonianism. Instead, “the Wilsonian tradition contributed fundamentally to the Bush Doctrine was in its *pillar of purpose*, with its assertion that with the expansion of “free democracies”, the United States possessed a blueprint capable of fostering global freedom, prosperity, and peace”⁷. He further contends that the Bush Doctrine’s aspects of the promotion and the spread of liberal democracy are pivotal to liberal internationalist thought (Ikenberry et al. 57).

Accordingly, the neoconservative impact on Bush has been exaggerated. For Smith, the important thing to stress is that “it was not neoconservatism but instead liberal internationalists who are members of the Democratic Party who did the “heavy lifting” for the Bush Doctrine. So, “Leo Strauss who is “the *éminence grise* of the neoconservative movement” (Ikenberry et al. 66) cannot be invoked as the father of the idea that the goal of American foreign policy but they were the Wilsonian fingerprints that characterized the aspects of the Bush Doctrine. According to Smith, all of multilateralism, international law, and institutions are essential Wilsonian themes but the spread of American liberal democratisation values are integral to the identity of the Wilsonian tradition.

According to Smith, the end of the Cold War helped the advancement of three key sets of liberal internationalists’ concepts. The first and the important of these principles is “the democratic peace theory”, with its essential claim that democracies do not go to war with one another (67). The second is concerned with the transition from authoritarian to democratic government that is not necessarily follow a slow process, but with the right actors and conditions, the change can occur rapidly (69). The third argument came from the

redefinition of the meaning of “sovereignty”. A “right to intervene” on the basis of American liberal values became a “duty to intervene” (72). The liberal internationalist mood that characterized the Cold War period entered a form of “progressive imperialism” (73). He exemplified with the neoconservative Project for a New American Century (PNAC) that was established in 1997, and the Democratic Party’s Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) that was founded in 1989. He emphasized that the former was only reflecting the emphases of the latter with a single divergence concerning the PPI that reflects support to multilateralism.

Anne-Marie Slaughter responded to Smith’s claim arguing that he “twists Wilson and his legacy beyond recognition” and that it “fashions a whole intellectual movement- neoliberalism- largely from a semantic desire to create a parallel to neoconservatism” (Ikenberry et al. 90). Anne maintained that in spite of its Wilsonian origins, liberal internationalism today differs from the Bush Doctrine on multiple dimensions (91). Slaughter supports liberal democracy, “but reject[s] the possibility of *democratising* peoples”. The only successful path, she provides, “is to liberalize democratic processes and institutions where they already exist”, and rejects the United States military primacy, preferring instead the maintenance of a balance of power in favour of liberal democracies worldwide (91).

Moreover, in the article entitled *‘For Better, for worse: How America’s Foreign Policy became Wedded to Liberal Universalism’*, Quinn and Cox point to “overlap” between the ideologies of neoconservatism and Wilsonian liberal internationalism, and asserts that expanding liberal democracy abroad and the justification of the “liberal peace” have been the cornerstone of US foreign policy history (513). The basic idea is “the impregnation of belligerent societies with liberal values” as a way for causing peace. They argue that the pursuit of “liberal universalism” in the United States emphasizes that expanding US liberal values as a sample to peace. Even if the reality of Wilsonian liberal internationalism lies among the accounts of Smith, Slaughter, and Quinn and Cox, we can conclude that the

neoconservative democratisation thought was influenced by the aspect of liberal internationalism that is concerned with the widening of liberal democracy abroad.

Despite democratic globalists did not claim or describe their foreign policy outlook as 'liberal', their beliefs clearly embraced liberal characteristics. Critics of neo-conservatism identified democratisation thinking of democratic globalists as liberal. Examining democratic globalism's liberal character, Tony Smith in *'A Pact with the Devil'* wrote that the key element of this school of thought is "the belief that fostering human rights and democratic governments abroad should enjoy a prominent role in the making of American foreign policy." (ix). Democracy was considered to represent many of liberal views about the universal appeal of freedom. Furthermore, many liberals considered democracy promotion to be the last remaining legitimate form of government that would over hold by all societies.⁸

The foreign policy thinking which was adopted by most of neoconservatives was originally liberal and can be demonstrated in three principle ways. First, neoconservatives supported strongly the belief of freedom universality. In a speech shortly before the invasion of Iraq, Paul Wolfowitz addressed Iraqi-Americans in Michigan and he contended that *'U.S. Would Seek to Liberate, Not Occupy, Iraq'*, and insisted that "the time when the world defined itself for the 21st Century. Not in terms of geography or race or religion or culture or language, but in terms of values -- the universal values of freedom and democracy." He added: "the values of freedom and democracy are not just Western values or European values; they are Muslim and Asian values as well. Indeed, they are universal values. They are the bridge that span civilizations." Bowden stated that Wolfowitz held that freedom was the natural right of Iraqi people and the whole Arab world, and he proclaimed that some cultures were incapable of bringing about this universal aspiration. Many neoconservatives described the value of freedom similarly and sometimes identical to that expressed by liberal scholars, emphasizing the liberal character of democratic globalists.

Neoconservatives' foreign policy views were also liberal through championing democracy as the best and final form of government. The Neoconservative Paula Dobriansky argued that the United States "has a moral imperative to advocate that individuals around the world have the freedom to pursue their dreams in a secure, prosperous and peaceful environment.", and "[p]romoting democracy also advances other important interests worldwide." (40). Emphasizing the central role of democracy as a way to promote human rights and approve the freedom, Wolfowitz alike argued that "[n]othing could be less realistic than the version of the 'realist' view of foreign policy that dismisses human rights as an important tool of American foreign policy."(Qtd in. Crock). Moreover, another demonstration to emphasize that the views expressed by democratic globalists were liberal in nature as they argued that it was the duty of democratic states to protect people who lived in authoritarian and abusive governments.

Though neoconservatives differed from liberals in their foreign policy of armed democratisation and they believe that the use of military force could be effective for spreading democracy abroad, some liberals such as Paul Berman, Michael Ignatieff, Peter Beinart, and Christopher Hitchens argued that American military force could and should have a central role in spreading liberal democracy in non-democratic states.

Just before the war on Iraq, an interview with William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan was published arguing strongly humanitarian intervention in the country. When they were asked by the interviewer, Kathryn Jean Lopez, "Is there anyone you can think of (nation, pol, constituency) the Bush administration has not convinced that going into Iraq is necessary who should and can be convinced?" Kaplan and Kristol replied:

"Liberals. Not liberals at *The Nation* or *The American Prospect*, who can always be counted on to favour tyranny over anything that

strengthens American power, however marginally. But liberals who supported the American interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo — humanists, in short. For if ever there was a humanitarian undertaking, it is the liberation of Iraq from a tyrant who has jailed, tortured, gassed, shot, and otherwise murdered tens of thousands of his own citizens.”

A year following the invasion of Iraq, Kristol and Kagan defended and emphasized humanitarian intervention as a legitimate in Iraq. They held: “liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam's brutal, totalitarian dictatorship would by itself have been sufficient reason to remove Saddam”, as, “[f]or the people of Iraq, the war put an end to three decades of terror and suffering.” (Kagan and Kristol, “The Right War”).

Conclusion

The Cold War theoretical and historical experiences decisively influenced the formulation of democratisation policy in neo-conservatism. But neither the liberal international theory roots nor the lessons of the Cold War can fully explain the origins of the neoconservative thinking about democracy promotion. The neoconservative interpretation of Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis also provided a key framework for conceiving the future of the liberal world that offered democracy promotion as the best way for peace.

Neoconservative conclusions of academic theories became prescriptions for the American foreign policy agenda and were guides to policy making towards specific states and issues. Like realism, power is of central concern to neo-conservatism; and like liberal internationalism, the global spread of liberal democracy is a key concept for neoconservatives. However, it is unlike the strict patterns of realism; the balance of power and the national interest, neoconservatives argue that American liberal democratic values

should be driving to American foreign policy. As well as not fully like liberal internationalism, neo-conservatism emphasis on American military force to bring about democracy promotion overseas. According to neoconservatives, the United States should not only work to get up for its principles and interests. Extending or attempting to spread American values of freedom and democracy abroad would also provide US with a sense of purpose.

End Notes

¹ McGovernism is derived from the name of George McGovern, the Democratic Party presidential nominee in 1972. It reflects the sentiment of despair over the ascension of antiwar activism and moralistic idealism in the Democratic Party.

² The standard narrative of neo-conservatism states two generations: the first generation were concerned with the debates of 1960s and 1970s that included figures who were all born before the Second World War (1939) like Nathan Glazer, Donald Kagan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Pipes, Norman Podhoretz. The second generation are the figures who were born during or following the Second World War. Some of its well-known members such as: Max Boot, Elliott Abrams, Thomas Donnelly, Douglas Feith, Francis Fukuyama, Robert kagan, Zalamy Khalilzad, William Kristol, Joshua Muravchik, ect.

³ The Bush Doctrine is a phrase used to describe different foreign policy principles of former United States President George W. Bush. It is the doctrine of the Bush administration as a whole. It contains the views and objectives of the various factions of the administration. It centered around four key pillars: Democracy promotion, Preemption strikes, Unilateralism, and American hegemony.

⁴ In defense of democratic realism. Krauthammer had previously been a strong supporter of bringing democracy to states under communist rule, but in the post-Cold War years, he took a more restrictive view about democratic promotion. Krauthammer believed democratisation must always be tied to American national interests, and could not be carried out simply for humanitarian reasons, or because it was the moral thing to do everywhere.

⁵ Reductionism is the belief that complicated things can be explained by considering them as a combination of simple parts. In realism this is attributed to the nature of human societies that make up the system.

⁶ Thymos is a Greek word that means the part of the soul that demands recognition (how people want to be recognized within their government). Fukuyama believes that the striving for liberal democracy arises out of thymos. (xviii).

⁷ Tony Smith prefers to use “neoliberals” rather than “liberal internationalists” (56).

⁸ For further discussion of this important point, see the examination of Francis Fukuyama's *End of History*. A number of democratic globalists interpreted Fukuyama's arguments about liberal development as a guide to action, utilizing his conclusions about the globalisation of liberalism as a theoretical basis on which to conceive of encouraging the spread of liberal democracy through intervention.

Works Cited

- Baylis, John et al. *The Globalization of World Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Boot, Max. "Think Again: Neocons". *Foreign Policy*. FP, 1 Jan 2004. Web. 24 Sep. 2011.
- Bowden, Mark. "Wolfowitz: The Exit Interviews". *The Atlantic*. Atlantic Unbound, July/Aug. 2005. Web. 5 Aug. 2011.
- Crock, Stan. "Bush's Foreign Policy: Like Father, Like Son?". *Project for the New American Century*. PTNAC, 14 Aug. 2000. Web. 31 July 2011.
- Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
- Dobriansky, Paula J. "Advancing Democracy". *The National Interest*. Ed. John O'Sullivan. 77 (2004): 40-47. The National Interest. Web. 13 Dec. 2011.
- Donnelly, Jack. *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Donnelly, Thomas. "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century". *The Project for the New American Century*. PTNAC, Sep. 2000. Web. 25 Mars 2011.
- Dorrien, Gary. *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Fossedal, Gregory. *The Democratic Imperative: Exporting the American Revolution*. New York: New Republic, 1989.

Friedman, Murray, ed. *Commentary in American Life*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005.

Fukuyama, Francis. *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

---. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press A division of Macmillan, Inc., 1992.

--- "The End of History?". *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989). Web. 21 Oct. 2011.

Halper, Stefan and Jonathan Clarke. *America Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Ikenberry, John G. *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Kagan, Robert and William Kristol. "The Right War for The Right Reasons". *The Weekly Standard*. Weekly Standard, 23 Feb. 2004. Web. 22 Jan. 2012.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Power and Interdependence revisited". *International Organization* 41.4 (Autumn 1987): 725-753. JSTOR. Web. 23 Dec. 2012.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "Dictatorships & Double Standards". *Commentary Magazine*. Commentary, Nov. 1979. Web. 25 Dec. 2011.

Krauthammer, Charles. "*Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World*". Washington, D.C: The AEI Press, 2004.

---. "In Defense of Democratic Realism". *The National Interest* 77 (Fall 2004): 15-25. Web. 12 Feb. 2012.

---. "The Unipolar Moment". *Foreign Affairs* 70.1 (1990/1991): 23-33. *JSTOR*. Web. 24 Sep. 2011.

Kristol, Irving. "The Neoconservative Persuasion". *The Weekly Standard*. *Weekly Standard* 8.47 (Aug. 2003). Web. 24 Apr. 2011.

Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan. "Toward A Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 75.4 (1996): 18-32. *Academic Search Complete*. 21 Sep. 2011.

Lopez, Kathryn Jean. "Closing In: A Conversation with Lawrence Kaplan and Bill Kristol on Iraq". *National Review Online*. An NRO Interview, 24 Feb. 2003. Web. 24 Aug. 2011.

McCartney, Paul T. "American Nationalism and American Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War". *The Academy of Political Science*. *Political Science Quarterly* 119.3 (2004): 399-423. *JSTOR*. Web. 23 Aug. 2011.

Monten, Jonathan. "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy". *International Security* 29.4 (Spring 2005): 112-156. Web. 23 Aug. 2011.

Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Beijing: Peking University Press, 1985.

Muravchik, Joshua. *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny*. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1991.

---. "The Past, Present, and Future of Neoconservatism". *Commentary Magazine*. *Commentary Magazine*, Oct. 2007. Web. 4 Sep. 2011.

- Quinn, Adam and Michael Cox. "For Better, for Worse: How America's Foreign Policy became Wedded to Liberal Universalism". *Global Society* 21.4 (2007): 499-519. Web. 21 Oct. 2012.
- Ritchie, Nick, and Paul Rogers. *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Ryan, Maria. "Neoconservative intellectuals and the limitations of governing the Reagan administration and the demise of the Cold War". *Comparative American Studies* 4.4 (4 December 2006): 409-420. Web 12 May 2012.
- Sniegowski, Stephen J. *The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel*. Norfolk, Virginia: Enigma Editions, 2008.
- Smith, Tony. *A Pact with the Devil*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Massachusetts: Addison- Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.
- "Wolfowitz Says U.S. Would Seek to Liberate, Not Occupy, Iraq". *Free Republic*. U.S. Dept of State "Washington File". 24 Feb. 2003. Web. 31 Jan. 2012.

CHAPTER TWO

Neoconservatives on Democracy 1980's -1990's

Introduction

Neoconservatives steadily supported democracy promotion thinking, but along three decades they had changed their position to the idea, from just an attachment to a belief to boldly backing its promotion in non-democratic states through using military provisions. This chapter begins with a brief argument about the origins and developments of neoconservative support for democracy promotion during the 1960's to the 1980's. They held key positions in central democratic institutes and organizations of the United States to keep an eye open for the government management of the perspective. During the 1990's, their views concerning democracy were reflected in their writings in magazines and newspapers after they were distanced from government. The development of liberal democracy promotion in the neoconservative discourse leapt quickly and in a more organized way among neoconservatives to reach its apex by the beginning of the 21st century. This chapter also discusses the Democratic Peace Theory to show how this theory provided a framework for conceiving the future of neo-conservatism with offering armed democratisation as the best way for peace.

2.1 Neoconservatives and Democracy for the Future of American Foreign Policy:

This section will focus on three second generation neoconservatives: Penn Kemble, Joshua Muravchik, and Carl Gershman. These figures are critical in the way that they helped to develop democracy promotion perspective as leaders of the Socialist Party of America-Social Democratic Federation (SP-SDF) and Young People's Socialist League (YPSL) in the

1960's, and the Social Democrats-USA (SD-USA) in the 1970's, and they mainly maintained an interest on democratisation policy after they joined the group of older neoconservative thinkers in the Democratic Party in the early 1970s. To a certain extent, the journey of democracy promotion in neoconservatism started with these three "yipsels" from early belonging to American political parties to positions of influence as neoconservatives in the 1980's.

2.1.1 Early Origins of Neoconservative Support for Democracy Promotion 60's - 70's

As young members of the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL) ¹; the youth wing of Norman Thomas's Socialist Party of America- Social Democratic Federation (SP-SDF) ²; these young activists developed throughout the early to mid 1960's a democracy centered approach to foreign policy that was based on traditional social democratic concepts of internationalism, support for democracy, and anti-Communism. A group of young American socialists that included future neoconservatives; Penn Kemble and Joshua Muravchik; drew from traditional social democratic thinking new perspectives to help developing a democracy-centered approach to foreign policy.

2.1.1.A The "Realignment yipsels": 1964-1973

All of the main characteristics of the SP-SDF in the early 1960's of internationalism, support for democracy, and intense anti-communism were championed and mainly taken further by the right-wing of the party, known as the Realignment Tendency (RT) ³. The RT was internationalist and democratic anti-communism, which from the early 1960's on it dominated branches throughout the country and began piecing together a new national organization. After its formal reconstitution in September 1966 the "new" YPSL would be led only by Realignment yipsels. In the post-1964, the YPSL party would be led by a new

generation of the RT that would further develop its foreign policy views under the impact of the debate over the Vietnam War. The “new” YPSL’s first two successive national chairmen were two Realignment yipsels who would later bring this view with them into neo-conservatism: Penn Kemble and Joshua Muravchik.

Penn Kemble, a Jewish student who joined the YPSL in the early 1960’s and held its leadership between 1966 and 1968, during which the YPSL was forceful in its opposition to both Communist and right-wing dictatorships, and in its advocacy of an active, pro-democracy foreign policy for the United States. Joshua Muravchik, the young Jewish Socialist, was Kemble’s Successor as leader of the YPSL in 1968. In the same year, the RT won a majority in the leadership of the SP-SDF, with Michal Harrington elected National Chairman, Penn Kemble elected National Secretary; and Joshua Muravchik was elected to replace Kemble as National Chairman at that year’s YPSL convention.

Like in Kamble’s, during Muravchik’s term, the Realignment group remained united in its “Negotiation Now!” stance on Vietnam, based on calling for a cease fire negotiations, and for the U.S. to foster democratisation of the South. In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, a growing anti-war movement brought out hundreds of thousands of people in protest and influenced one of the Realignment group’s central leaders, Michael Harrington, publicly announced his shift from calling for negotiations to calling for an American withdrawal from Vietnam. Hence, the party was divided into two main groups. Figures like Kemble and Muravchik stressed negotiations and urged the U.S. to provide militant support to a program of democratisation in South Vietnam, while Harrington’s group focused on a speedy withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. Yet at December 1972 convention, the time by which the former Realignment tendency had split and the majority had regrouped as the Majority tendency, Harrington’s resolution that called for the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was

defeated by a large majority. By the time Muravchik left his position as YPSL chair in September of 1973, Harrington had resigned from the party.

In 1972, the Party changed its name to “Social Democrats, USA”. Renaming the Party as SD-USA was meant to be “realistic”. Because the Party no longer sponsored candidates in Presidential Elections, the name “Party” had been “misleading”. The name “Socialist” also was replaced by “Social Democrats” because many Americans associated the word “socialism” with Soviet communism. The Party wished to distinguish itself from two small Marxist parties, the Socialist Workers Party and the Socialist Labor Party. Yet, the party’s left-wing, known as the “Debs Caucus” left the party and Michael Harrington’s split off from the RT, there would be no further opposition to the former Realignment group’s control of the newly named SD-USA.

2.1.1.B Becoming Neoconservatives

Among the new who were recruited to the YPSL in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the dominant Jewish figure, Carl Gershman. In 1973, Gershman was elected to succeed Muravchik as chairman of the YPSL. The following year, he was elected Executive Director of the SD-USA, a position he would hold for the rest of the decade. During the détente policy pursued by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the early 1970’s, questions of democracy and “human rights” values were seen to have low priority in US foreign policy goals. At the core of the SD-USA position was the RT’s traditional concern with the ideal of democracy, as in the 1960’s the phrase used by the Realignment yipsels to describe their international approach had simply been “democracy”.

Kemble and Muravchik would bring with them this perspective into the liberal anti-Communist or “neoconservative” wing of the Democratic Party, known as the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), in the 1970's. Both of these former Realignment yipsels

would go on to play key roles in CDM, and would translate their democracy-centered approach into CDM's stance on the role of human rights in American foreign policy. Among this group of predominantly Jewish almost all of whom had been born in the 1920's, were established writers and academics such as Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Jeane Kirkpatrick. Some in this older group had always been liberals, others like Kristol who had relations with Trotskyism in their youth, and still others had been active in the Socialist Party itself.

More than through the SD-USA itself, it was through the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in the Democratic Party that Penn Kemble and Joshua Muravchik began gradually to enter the world of mainstream politics in the 1970's. In both the 1968 and 1972 Democratic elections, while party members and yipsels were free to back the candidates of their choice, RT members actively supported the liberal anti-Communists: Henry Jackson. With the victory of George McGovern and the New Politics forces at that year's Democratic convention, Kemble and Muravchik would shift their energies to the attempt by the remaining liberal anti-Communists to bring the party back to the "vital center" through the CDM. The SD supported Jackson and worked on his 1976 primary campaign because of shared views on international affairs.

After the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, the new president's emphasis on human rights gave the issue even more prominence in broader foreign policy debates. Initially, the CDM had hoped that Carter's approach would be similar to Jackson's. However, by mid-1977, the CDM had become disillusioned by Carter's foreign policy and many of the first-generation neoconservatives began to make the human rights issue, the principle focus of their strategy in world affairs. Yet, among those who were involved in CDM, it was Kemble and Muravchik who had to bring human rights strategy to its centre. The same motivation and energy that had characterized their activism in the YPSL and social

democratic movement was now on display inside the CDM. Crucially, it was the same democracy promotion perspective that they had developed as yipsels that lay behind their foster of “human rights” strategy being put forward by the main organization of “neoconservative” Democrats.

2.1.2 Neoconservatives’ Different Prospects for Democracy Promotion

Certainly, the collapse of the Soviet empire left a huge gap in American foreign policy and the neoconservative movement now confronted a question it had not faced for half a century: What should the basis of American foreign policy be? The neoconservative consensus during the Cold War was facing a serious state of disagreement between those who advocated the “narrower” meaning of American national interest, and those who believed that the United States’ post- Cold War key role should be a democratic crusade. The neoconservative first generation leaders such as: Irving Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Glazer and others, generally argued for a limited role for American foreign policy. Meanwhile, younger neoconservative figures like: Joshua Muravchik, Kemble, Gershman and Krauthammer were more ambitious and called for a transcendental advancement of democracy to be “the touchstone of a new ideological American foreign policy” primarily during the Gulf War (Qtd in. Halper and Clarke 76). For them, the lessons of 1979 were that the United States needed to act more assertively in attempting to democratise dictator countries before it was too late. This question of how the United States should deal with authoritarian regimes would be at the centre of the difference between neoconservative generations, and would in turn rest on differing assessments of the possibility of fostering democracy in the third world.

In 1980, both neoconservative generations were attracted by the candidacy of the Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan. Basically, because of his focus on strong military

and on responding to what neoconservatives saw as the increasing strength and influence of the Soviets around the world. Soon however, it would be Reagan's adoption of democracy promotion policies, the core of differences between the first and Second generations over the formation and implementation of those policies.

2.1.2.A Former Yipsels and Ardent Krauthammer on Democracy

During the 1980's all the three yipsels moved further away from the SD-USA. As with Ronald Reagan now in office, the neoconservatives would take prominent roles in his administration, there would now be opportunities to continue their focus on democracy promotion through a variety of governmental and non-governmental vehicles.

2.1.2.A.1 Carl Gershman and the National Endowment for Democracy

Carl Gershman, after five years as Executive Director of the SD-USA, he resigned to hold the position of a Senior Counselor; the U.S. Representative to the U.N. Committee which deals with human rights. His position in the United Nations (UN) provided him with an opportunity to take the ideological views that the SD had always called against the Soviets. At the same time he was continuing the battle of ideas at the U.N. as the Reagan administration launched its campaign to promote democracy abroad. Reagan first announced the campaign publicly in a speech to the British Parliament on June 8, 1982, in which he stated publically "what we have to consider here today; while time remains; is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries".

After the formation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a non-governmental organization whose primary purpose would be to distribute funds in order to encourage the growth of democracy abroad, Gershman was elected president of the NED in

April 1984. Like that of the SD, his political perspective that supports American democratisation policy since 1960's was empowered to his move into the U.S. Mission at the UN and then the NED.

Gershman also addressed the issue of how the United States should respond to right-wing regimes in the third world. In a 1989 article entitled, "The United States and the World Democratic Revolution" in *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*, he noted that what all needed was to overthrow the authoritarian regimes that had also been discredited, since as long as Communist forces were the most powerful, they would use that situation to seize power. Gershman argued instead for "promoting political development on a long term basis", and in recognizing that, "there were also *democratic* forces of change and that[...]they needed the support of the established democracies" (7).

Throughout the 1980's, as head of the NED, Gershman would remain one of the major proponents of an active attempt by the United States to help fostering democracy around the world. Moreover, Carl Gershman emphasized in his 1991 article; "Freedom Remains the Touchstone"; that democracy promotion should be a central concern for the United States, unless that this could be done with "limited source" for helping those countries who accepted to help themselves, but the U.S. "cannot force others to do what they are not prepared or willing to do for themselves" (40).

2.1.2.A.2 Joshua Muravchik and the Break with the SD-USA: 1979-1987

Even before his term as Executive Director of CDM ended in 1979, Muravchik had already decided that he wanted to develop his skills as an intellectual when he decided to enter Georgetown's Politics Department in 1979 and graduated with his doctorate in 1984.

After graduating, Muravchik for the first time began playing a role in the main American foreign policy debates, not within the Democratic Party but on a national level. He wrote a series of articles that appeared in the *New York Times* and *The New Republic*, and in 1986 turned his dissertation into his first book: *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy*.

Muravchik writings during the beginning of the 80's gave little indication that he was moving away from Social Democrats. In fact, they reflected the same concern with the expansion of democracy that the yipsels had always held. For instance, in a 1984 his article, "Endowing Democracy", in the *New York Times*, Muravchik defended the newly formed NED against its critics. He noted that "The endowment's mandate defies the pessimistic conventional wisdom about the prospects for democracy in the third world and about the ability of the United States to enhance those prospects". He also argued that liberal Democrats should support rather than oppose the NED because it helped strengthening the possibility of a democratic alternative in the third world to that of either Communist or right-wing dictatorships.

Muravchik last activity with the Social Democrats-USA in the 1980's was a major document on foreign policy that was adopted by the group entitled "On Democracy and Foreign Policy". It summed up the evolution of the Realignment yipsels neoconservative thinking on democracy promotion over the past twenty years. In 1987, Muravchik joined the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) as a resident scholar and he broke publicly with the SD-USA. As stated in David Brooks' "Ex-Left Still Can't Get No Satisfaction", Muravchik concluded:

"I urge maximum tolerance and fraternity within the democratic camp.

There are a range of views and legitimate disagreements, but the differences

between liberals and conservatives, between free marketeers, welfare staters and social democrats are all very small gauge compared to the titanic struggle [...] between democracy and communism, and these disagreements ought to be debated in a manner that is mindful of that sense of scale.”

There had in fact been no substantive change in Muravchik views. As second-generation neoconservatives, their assertive democracy promotion perspective would also increasingly differentiate them from first-generation neoconservatives, who in the 1980's were becoming openly critical and wary of “exporting democracy”.

2.1.2.A.3 Krauthammer and “The Unipolar Moment”

The primary challenge of the second neoconservative generation against the American state of normalcy came from Charles Krauthammer who argued that the end of the Cold War provided huge complications for the conduct of American foreign policy. At the time he was developing a gradual political interest, but not a former yipsel, Krauthammer is said that he “has influenced US foreign policy for more than two decades as he coined and developed ‘The Reagan Doctrine’ in 1985 and he defined the US role as sole superpower in his essay ‘The Unipolar Moment’ that was published shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Barber).

The above analysis shows that former Yipsels were very enthusiastic when supporting democracy promotion near the end of the Cold War. But their support seemed to be restrained as it was not coupled with the post-Communist status the United States gained. It was simply described by Krauthammer as “The Unipolar Moment”. For him, the decline of Communism “made the world safe for democracy” and its advancement abroad should be “the touchstone of a new ideological American foreign policy” (Qtd in. Halper and Clarke 76). Concerning the imposition of democracy with force, he explicitly rejected the idea. He believed that America’s purpose should be “to steer the world away from its coming

multipolar future” towards a new “unipolar world whose center is a confederated West”. Its ultimate goal is the creation of a “super-sovereign West” with the integration of “the new Europe with North America and democratic Asia” (11).

He suggested that instead of democratising states individually, the unification of the West with such “nonthreatening confederation of democratic states” would not permit the emergence of “rivals” to compete democratisation (104-12). Actually, his main objective was to realize Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History*’ thesis and of course this can be happen without the American active engagement. He stated that the United States had “to wish and work for a super-sovereign west economically, culturally, and politically hegemonic in the world” (12). In “The Unipolar Moment”, Krauthammer quickly replaced the unipolar super-sovereign West by “[t]he center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies” (23).

According to Krauthammer, two major elements were developed as “reality” of the Post-Cold War: the first, is the death of Communism; and the second is “the revival of American isolationism” (28). But the rise of Iraq as “a hostile power” and “clear threat to American interests as one can imagine- a threat to America’s oil-based economy, to its close allies in the region, and ultimately to American security itself [...] fuelled by endless oil income, building weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them regionally and eventually intercontinentally can hardly be a matter of indifference to the United States” (29).

Krauthammer explicitly supported American post-Soviet world isolationism with the exception of the “Weapon State” that posed a threat to the security that “if the United States were to shed its unique superpower role, its economy would be gravely wounded” (28). Iraq, Krauthammer argued is a state that has developed the ability to create unconventional weaponry whether biological, nuclear, or chemical weapons. These weapons provide and enable marginal states to double their powers quickly. He emphasized that the

factor that permits most Weapon States to sustain its structure is oil (31). He exemplified with Iraq in 1991 contending that: “It was inconceivable that a relatively small Middle Eastern state with an almost entirely imported industrial base could do anything more than threaten its neighbors. [It] will be able to emerge rapidly as threats not only to regional, but to world, security.” (30) Likely, he claimed that the post-Cold War world is best to be called “the era of weapons of mass destruction”. He stated that the greatest threat to world’s security would come from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (31-2).

He neither provided the means of how to deal with the Iraqi regime neither he mentioned democracy to be the tool in the post-Soviet world. His article was just written to glorify the American “unipolarist” status that it gained after the end of the Cold War.

Krauthammer’s idea, in fact, was the manifesto for second generation neoconservatives to preserve a powerful future of American hegemony internationally and to control the direction of neoconservative foreign policy thought. Most neoconservatives argued that maintaining international stability required the United States to give up the burdens of the past, but to preserve its powerful posture on the global stage to counter new threats like Saddam Hussein in the Gulf region, but they did not mention yet military interventionism.

2.1.2.B Elder Neoconservative Calls to American Prudent Foreign Policy

While the former yipsels and other second-generation neoconservatives actively supported promoting democracy throughout the 1980's, first-generation neoconservatives responded with varying degrees of wariness and opposition. The response of the first generation could be seen most clearly in the writings of Irving Kristol, who opposed to democracy promotion as an immediate foreign policy goal, and in the approach adopted

by Jeane Kirkpatrick, who while not opposed to the idea in principle but she was very skeptical of promoting democracy abroad in practice.

A long-time Democrat, Kirkpatrick received her doctorate from Columbia University in 1967 and taught comparative politics at Georgetown University. She was a member of the executive committee of the CDM from its founding in 1972, and like most neoconservatives, had by the late 1970's grown thoroughly disillusioned with the policies of the Carter administration and the state of the Democratic Party. In November of 1979, *Commentary* published her seminal article "Dictatorships and Double Standards", in which she criticized what she saw as the administration's role in the foreign policy failures in Iran and Nicaragua earlier that year.

In 1980, the President Reagan called her to sign on as a foreign policy adviser in mid-1980, and after the election she was appointed United Nations' ambassador, a post she held until 1985. Kirkpatrick's starting point in "Dictatorships and Double Standards" was her analysis that democracy rested on a necessary combination of the right political culture and the right institutions. For Kirkpatrick, this meant that democracy required a great deal of time to develop, and was inherently difficult to achieve (37). Her emphasis was thus on the conditions, difficulties, and length of time needed, for democratisation process.

Throughout the 1970's, Kemble, Muravchik and Gershman had continued to argue that the United States should support the democratisation of authoritarian regimes, both for moral and strategic reasons. However, for Kirkpatrick such a course was at best a difficult option to be attempted with great caution, and at worst a total danger to American national security. She argued that the idea of democracy promotion was already predominant in

American thinking about the world (37). Nevertheless, American ability to promote democratisation within authoritarian regimes was in fact minimal and filled with risk (44).

Failure to exercise sufficient caution in such a situation would lead to a scenario in which an even worse government would come to power, and in which U.S. interests would be gravely threatened. Although liberal democracy, she contended, was the best strategy for the improvement of human rights and their societies and it was the duty of the United States to spread it wherever possible, it threatened to “put the U.S. once more on the side of history’s “losers” as history “gives no better grounds for believing that democracy comes easily, quickly, or for the asking” (44).

In ‘*A Normal Country in a Normal Time*’, Jeane Kirkpatrick emphasized the idea stating that “it is not the American purpose to establish ‘Universal dominance’ [...] not even the universal dominance of democracy”, even if it is enormously desirable for the U.S. to encourage democratic institutions everywhere after the Soviet demise. The United States, she argues, has to “return to ‘normal’ times [to] become a normal nation” (40-43).

In 1968, in an article entitled, “We Can’t Resign as the World’s Policeman”, Kristol argued that the U.S. should maintain an active role in the world, since, “the world *does* need a measure of policing- the world *does* rely on American power, does count on American power, does look to American power for the preservation of a decent level of international law and order”. Yet for Kristol, having an active world role was simply the responsibility of a “great power”. In America’s case, its role as a “world policeman” had nothing to do with ideals of democracy and freedom, or with an ideological battle against Communism. As Kristol saw it, the real struggle was one not of values but of interests.

Kristol was also explicit in rejecting the idea of democracy promotion as a U.S. foreign policy goal. In a 1971 article in the *New York Times Magazine*, he wrote that while

he was “aware of the merits of representative government [...] these merits do not automatically commend themselves to all nations, at all times, everywhere”. Even if unhappy with the internal workings of a given regime, American foreign policy “must of necessity be more concerned with the external policies of any particular nation than with its internal form of government” (“A Foolish American”).

In the early 1980's, Kristol changed his mind and nominally accepted the notion that there was an ideological element in the struggle with the Soviet Union. He recommended instead the notion of an American “national interest” as he argued in *Defining Our National Interest* in O. Harries book that “the Futility of a foreign policy whose purpose is to “enhance democracy” abroad is apparent to most Americans, and so the end of the Cold War has led to resurgence of an isolationist temper” (63). It is clear that Kristol urged a form of realism for the United States foreign policy that would focus mainly on American self-interest, rather than the American democratisation missions overseas.

Among neoconservatives of the second generation who supported the state of normalcy was Eliot Cohen who was not keen for a democratic crusade but he reflected the caution of the first generation. Eliot Cohen, who was amongst early neoconservatives that advocated regime change in Iraq, argued that the collapse of Communism was a rationale for the decline of military importance to solve frustrations among governments (6-8). He suggested that with few threats facing the United States following the decline of the USSR, history would be more “normal”, even if these threats might not be insignificant. Cohen mentioned that democracy would not necessarily lead to peace (“The Future of Force”)

Glazer Nathan was also the one who echoed the American return to ‘normalcy’ as he argued against American continued military commitments abroad for the expansion of democracy and freedom as it is not a part of American crusade against the threat of

Communism. He asserted rather, for “promoting and recommending those universal principles to which [Americans] are attached, it is now time to *withdraw* to something closer to the modest role that the Founding Fathers intended”. In Glazer view, it was not part of American job “to be the policeman of the world” (“A Time for Modesty”, 133-141).

2.2 Neoconservatives and the Democratic Peace Theory

The neoconservative foreign policy paradigm of democracy promotion was strongly influenced by a simplified version of the democratic peace theory. During the 1990s, the theory was revisited by liberal scholars to imply a strong need for democracy promotion policies and its conclusions of peace in international sphere. The neoconservative democratic peace version is a simplified form of the theory in which democracy by definition equaled to peace.

The Democratic Peace Theory argues for a clear connection that exists between democratic states and the absence of war among them. Accordingly, democratic regimes rarely go to war with one another basically because of the domestic nature of democratic governments; the value shared by democracies, and the tendency of such regimes towards negotiations and compromise at crisis. Early forms of democratic peace theory did not provide implications for interventionist foreign policy; instead it was rather concerned with explaining a theoretical understanding of the importance of peace among democracies.

One of the first arguments about democratic peace theory was offered by Michael Doyle in 1983 in two articles entitled “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”. In summer 1983, Doyle wrote that “even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another.”(213). This claim is on the basic fact that “preliminary evidence appear[s] to indicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between

liberal states going to war” (213), as history illustrates very few cases of two or more democratic states going to war. According to Doyle, what explains the pacification among democratic states was best described in Kant’s work *Perpetual Peace* in which he argued that republican governments would establish among themselves a “perpetual peace” that would be guaranteed by the “ever-widening acceptance of [...] definitive articles of peace” in a “metaphorical treaty” of peace among democratic nations (Doyle Part I, 225). While Kant suggested that the process of fostering a perpetual peace would be difficult and it might face significant challenges, Doyle believed that a “pacific union” would be developed among states over time.

Doyle description of democratic peace is restricted to his claims and conclusions he developed in both parts of the article. In part two of the article, he asserted the evidence that democratic states, the members of “the pacific union”, can “exacerbate intervention against weak nonliberal” states (337), and they are likely to prone to imprudent actions in attempts of expanding the theme of democratic peace by force. Doyle argued that “[t]he very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and non-liberal societies” (324-5). In part one of the article he clearly confessed that “liberal states are as aggressive and war prone as any other form of government or society in their relations with nonliberal states” (225).

Indeed, Doyle’s discussions of the nature and causes of democratic peace helped to encourage the development of modern democratic peace theory in liberal academia. In seeking to further understand Doyle’s democratic peace theory, two versions of the overarching theory were developed over the question of why democracies did not go to war with each other. In “The Civilization of Clashes” article, Piki Ish Shalom emphasized the identification of two major theories that were developed over the debate of the cause behind

peaceful existence among democratic states. According to one version, it was domestic structures of the constraints of checks and balances, division of power, and the need for public debate to enlist widespread support will slow decisions to use violence amongst liberal democratic states that best explains the case of pacifism. The other version, on the contrary, holds that normative factors are most significant and calls for the norms of tolerance and openness within democratic states (544).

Early studies of Yale University professor, Bruce Russett, exemplified this development as he provided statistical information on historical interstate conflicts that aimed to provide concrete data about the near absence of war among democracies. In the article '*Why Democratic Peace?*' he argued that democracy played a significant independent explanatory role beyond other factors like: stability, wealth, and economic growth. Russett emphasized democratic norms and democratic structures to be critical in explaining peace among democratic states. In democracies, a key rule to solve domestic disputes is through dialogue and the democratic process without need to violence. For that, pacific existence among democracies reflects their domestic behaviours in their interstate relationships. Structurally, the reason for rare war occurrence among democratic states laid on the fact that popular support is needed for wars the case that object to the same norms in other democratic societies to recognize that other democracies are similarly constrained. Nevertheless, when faced with threats from non-democratic states, democracies are going to use the same democratic norms and structures in their foreign policy making decision. Consequently, these can be the same ideas that "prod these states into war with illiberal states" (Owen 117).

Despite its scholarly nature, some activist circles of liberal internationalism interpreted democratic theory as a piece that includes clear implications for interventionist foreign policy. Furthermore, the activist elements of liberal internationalist thinking

introduced a “scientific” analysis of the connection between democracy and peace that resulted in the fact that democracies do not go to war (Ish-Shalom, “Theory” 585).

Larry Diamond, the leading contemporary scholar in the field of democracy studies, wrote in *The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World Order* in 1994 that “democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new order of international security and prosperity can be built” (1). He also held that “democratic countries do not go to war with one another” but rather they call for peace and foster an enlightened order than any other regime’s type. Larry argued that following the Cold War the United States was living a “decisive moment” for its international status. The only choice, he believed, to confront the fundamental threats to democratic global order and thus offers hope of enhancing international peace and security is “the path of democratic globalism”. It is through the combination of “a global strategy for promoting democracy with new and strengthened international institutions and alliances for collective security” that the United States could build up a successful foreign policy that can “reconcile America’s vital interests, ideals, and resources in the post-cold war world” (2). Diamond added that in the democratic world where countries “do not sponsor terrorism against one another” and “do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on one another or threaten each other”, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, all pose a potential military threat to the United States and the security of its allies in their regions (2). This sentiment was echoed by a number of influential liberal scholars in their studies that were published during the later 1990’s by figures like: Andrew Moravcsik, Spencer Weart and others.

Proponents of this democratic peace orientation argue that since democracy always promote peace, its worldwide spread is imperative. In “Democracies and Intervention: Is There a Danger Zone in the Democratic Peace?”, Margaret G. Hermann, professor of politics at Syracuse University, and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. of University of South Carolina asserted

that: “promoting the spread of liberal democratic institutions [is] consistent with the underlying logic of the democratic peace” (237). It is by spreading democratic values that liberal world can assure its security and to make sure that the increasing states belong to the same zone of peace. Hermann and Kegley mentioned that “[i]nterventions by democracies intended to protect or promote democracy have generally led to an increase in the democraticness of those targets’ political regime” (242). These conclusions “provide support for intervention as a tool of democratisation” and consequently the promotion of peace as increasing the number of democracies all around the world would logically decrease interstate conflicts. Thus, activist scholars emphasized the importance of liberal support of democratic globalism that must be accompanied with an approval to use state power, including military force in order to realize the democratic peace theory.

The version of democratic peace that was articulated and embraced by neoconservatives during the 1990’s was clearly originated in activist liberals’ interpretation of the theory as leading neoconservative figures had always been asserting that democracy resulted to peace and the possibility of military intervention to do so. In 2001, the neoconservative Natan Sharansky maintained in his “What Are We Fighting For?” that: “only when the world is free will the world be safe”, and therefore the encouragement of the spread of democratic governments was very important as it was theoretically proved its effectiveness to bring about peace between states. Sharansky also contended that: “[t]he logic of why democracies do not go to war with each other is ironclad. When political power is a function of popular will, the incentive system works towards maintaining peace and providing prosperity”. These views were deeply influential since they evidently coloured President George W. Bush’s attitudes of peace and democracy. Assertively, the president distributed Sharansky’s book, *The Case for Democracy*, among his top officials and recommended its reading. Likewise, other neoconservative figures asserted that democratic peace was a law of

international relations. Joshua Muravchik argued that: “the more democratic the world becomes, the more peaceful it is likely to be. Various researchers have shown war between democracies has almost never occurred in the modern world” (Qtd in. Ish-Shalom, “Civilization of Clashes” 536).

2.3 Vehicles for Democratisation

During last years of the 1990’s, neoconservatives decisively started to show the new course in American foreign policy. It was at that time that a number of neoconservative think tanks, study groups and publications officially started to produce a variety of policy prescriptions for interventionist democracy promotion in Iraq and the broad Middle East. In addition to their publications in each of the *Commentary*, *the National Interest*, *the Weekly Standard* and the Project for the New American Century that they basically relied on to spread their democratisation policy thinking.

From the paradigm of democratisation strategy, neoconservatives envisaged the policy of regime change in Iraq at the heart of a strategy to reinforce freedom, peace, security, and American interests in the region. The hope for the transformation of the whole Arab world provide the neoconservatives with additional motives to develop the prescriptions to challenge what they recognize as the failure of the Clinton administration’s policies toward Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict and the growth of terrorism. These new strategies aimed to bring change in Iraq through the application of American military power.

2.3.1 Commentary and the Weekly Standard

The second half of the 1990’s proved to be critical years in the contribution of democratisation policies in neoconservatism. The critical ideas of American hegemony and

the purpose of promoting US values of democratisation abroad appeared on the pages of *Commentary* and the *Weekly Standard*.

An important vehicle that helped the evolution of neoconservatism and so their democratisation perspective emerged in 1995 when William Kristol, David Brooks and John Podhoretz developed an idea for a new conservative magazine. The *Weekly Standard* has played a central role in dispersing neoconservative views on both domestic and foreign affairs. With a weekly circulation of just 60.000 and frequently longer pieces than those published on *Commentary*, the *Weekly Standard* brought Kristol and other neoconservatives a greater level of influence in the political arena⁴. William Kristol became the editor of the magazine, a position he holds to this day. An important turning point in the evolution of the magazine concerning its discussion of foreign affairs was the appointment of Robert Kagan to the position of contributing editor. According to Heilbrunn John, before the coming of Robert Kagan; the “idealist” and the “crusader”; Kristol’s political ideas were more cautious and semi-isolationist. After his arrival, Kristol’s views gravitated towards Kagan’s basically in concern to kagan’s developing themes of American hegemony and democracy promotion (216-7).

The neoconservative contributors to the *Weekly Standard* began to build up a foreign policy that was in conflict with the foreign policy of their own political party. Ideas of democracy promotion, the use of American power to promote US national interest and benevolent hegemony; which emerged by the beginning of the 1990’s, now began to be confirmed and to be stated with less caution. Indeed, the *Weekly Standard* offered an ideal way for expressing neoconservative perspectives of American foreign policy to spread their approach to the wider audience to help to discover new allies that might help to realize their foreign policy views.

Likely, *Commentary* Magazine was described by neoconservatives as “the most influential magazine in Jewish history” (Wisse). It was founded by the American Jewish Committee and edited by Norman Podhoretz from 1960 to 1995. It played an influential role for the contribution of neoconservative views of American foreign policy and mainly their democracy promotion strategy.

Despite their frequent writings in the *Weekly Standard*, Kristol and Kagan’s most significant article that represents the seminal neoconservative piece ‘*Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy*’, was published in *Foreign Affairs*. They argued a necessity for the United States to embrace Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy (19), and mainly to refuse both the liberal internationalism of Bill Clinton and Henry Kissinger’s realism that grasped the Republican Party (27). They held that the United States should pursue “benevolent global hegemony” as the “only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order” (23). They argued that the two most successful Republican presidents of the twentieth century; Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan; were the most comfortable ones to adopt such a mission for the United States foreign policy. Kristol and Kagan also pointed to moral goals that American Hegemony was intended to serve. They stated that “[A]merican foreign policy should be informed with a clear moral purpose, based on the understanding that its moral goals and its fundamental national interests are almost always in harmony”. For that the U.S. should achieve a position of strengths that requires “actively promoting American principles of governance abroad—democracy, free markets, respect for liberty” (27).

Kagan contended in *Commentary* magazine’s article ‘*American Power: A Guide for the Perplexed*’ that military strength alone will not be important if it will not be used to maintain a world order which both “supports and rests upon American hegemony” (30). Aside from democracy promotion, other special principles of today’s American unipolar hegemonic system should be its “commitment against genocide, against aggression, against

the widespread violation of individual rights and freedoms” (31). If the United States will not be prepared to flout these norms, rogue states will raise doubts about the United States willingness to maintain its principles and even its hegemony. However, Podhoretz would later claim in his *‘Strange Bedfellows’* that neoconservative’s main political idea was “that the United States should do everything it can to encourage and support the spread of democracy” (29)

The same arguments for American hegemony and the necessity of democracy promotion principles were featured in Joshua Muravchik’s 1996 book *The Imperative of American Leadership*. Muravchik argued that the United States needed to be the world leader, more than simply being the world’s policeman. He suggested putting an end to differences between what was moral thing and interest for the United States to do in foreign policy (1, 22-33). The more important purpose for US in the international system, for Muravchik, was not only seeking power, but power and US leadership for a purpose. He urged the United States not to succumb to “the isolationist temptation” that characterized the post-Cold War era. Muravchik insists that the exercise of American power remains essential in the making of a more peaceful and democratic world. Muravchik provided moral justification for the use of American force abroad and argued that the Roman Catholic doctrine of ‘just war’ is needed for the consideration of when force should be used (153). He justified an American military intervention abroad for both self –defense where its interests and values combined.

Francis Fukuyama argues in *‘American Power –For What?’* that these typical arguments that coloured neoconservatives views in the latter half of the 1990s is problematic and ambiguous “concerning the exact mix of “interest” and “value” that should define American foreign policy”(26). On democracy he asserts “The United States as Agent of Democracy” plays a key role in the spread of democracy that “serves [American] interests in

the most powerful ways” (173, 180). He argued that “Democracy, many of the purposes for which we must consider the use of force will advance our values as well as our interests”. The United States should support its fostering as “democracy embodies [American] values” and also “conduces to [American] interest [...] since democratic countries tend to be more peaceful and more friendly to America” (164). He noted approvingly Winston Churchill’s advice to David Lloyd-George in 1918 that the United Kingdom should use military force for the imposition of democracy in Russia and finish the budding Communist revolution. In the case of Iraq, he disagrees with the judgment that Iraq was incapable of democracy and argues instead that the United States could have ousted Saddam within a year. Even if the result “might have been something imperfect but considerably more palatable than Saddam’s continued rule.” (182).

On the topic of democracy, Robert Kagan in his 1997 article in *Commentary*, ‘*Democracies and Double Standards*’, praised the U. S. universal pattern of democratic government and its “indispensable part” in supporting the democratic transition wave between the late 1970’s and early 1990’s in more than 30 nations all over the world in countries like Taiwan, Nicaragua, Romania and South Africa (19). Although that democracy is altogether too dangerous to support in areas like the Islamic world (24), Kagan argues that: “clearly it is in [American] interest to prevent radical fundamentalist regimes from taking power there” (26). Indeed, it was an American battle to finish the radicals in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, and it should be more careful than it has been before. Even it risks instability in some places in the Middle East; the United States should be holding authoritarian regimes there to “higher standards of democracy” and encouraging democratic voices within these societies. He further contends that the real question the United States is facing is the same question Samuel P. Huntington posed in his book *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Twentieth Century*, “How long can an increasingly interdependent

world survive part-democratic and part- authoritarian?" (29). Huntington's point was that the world must move to one direction; whether toward greater liberty or toward greater tyranny. Since the United States is the premier democratic country of the modern world (30), according to Kagan, it had to act quickly before it loses something even more than its relative security (26).

2.3.2 The Clean Break Report

One of the earlier arguments the neoconservatives used was the 1996 report entitled '*A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm*'. The Clean Break report was produced for the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu by a study group at the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. The report included important contributions from Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser, Meyrav Wurmser and others. The report was prepared for the purpose of finding solutions to the constraints imposed upon Israel's freedom of action against its enemies by Oslo Accords and the Clinton administration's peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its major conclusion was that authoritarian Arab regimes must be rolled back by military intervention in order to bring about a democratic and peaceful Middle East (Elliot et al. "A Clean Break").

The Report talked over the importance of both the United States and Israel in the rollback of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. The idea of rollback was brought from the lessons of the Reagan Doctrine that offered overthrowing hostile regimes. In relation to Iraq, rollback strategy in the Clean Break depended basically on using direct military force, rather than proxy forces to ensure favourable outcomes. The report argued that the regime in Baghdad, as a friendly force to America and Israel, would allow the liberated Shia of Iraq to pressure their co-religionists in Lebanon away from Hezbollah Iran, and Syria. This would lessen for Israel the threat of Hezbollah, and would provide the Israeli leaders with a chance to overcome the constraints of the Oslo peace process and to impose a solution on the

Palestinians. So, a pro-American and democratic Iraq would refuse terrorism as an instrument and would be no longer a hostile regime at the heart of the Middle East.

The Clean Break report also, emphasized on the idea of rolling back the Baathist regime in Syria and changing the government in Lebanon. The authors of the report argued that Israel should hold the initiative of “engaging Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, as the principle agents of aggression in Lebanon”. They added that as it had during the 1980’s, Israel should employ the proxies to intervene in Lebanon, but with new intentions of regime change in Damascus. They recommended that the United States should support Israel in this operation as a part of the strategy that aimed at rolling back hostile Arab regimes and maintaining freedom and peace in the region. As with Iraq, the Clean Break report held that the Baathist regime of Syria should be replaced with a pro-American and pro-Israeli democratic state, herewith it would help to undermine the violent forces in the region that devoted their powers against both Israel and the United States.

Some of key figures who contributed to the Clean Break report are neoconservative leaders like: Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser. Each gained influential positions of policy making in the Bush administration where they employed many of the Clean Break report ideas and called for armed democratisation as a key strategy to win the war on terrorism. According to Bamford, Feith was the Undersecretary of Defense for policy from 2001 to mid-2005, and he was pragmatic in planning the invasion of Iraq and democratisation of the state. While Perle was until 2004 the head of the influential Defence Policy Board that advised Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld on foreign policy and defense matters (267). Meanwhile, David Wurmser was Vice President Dick Cheney’s Middle East policy advisor until mid-2007, and he held the office to boost the attitudes of those in the report toward Iraq, the Israel- Palestine issue, and Syria.

Actually, the Clean Break report offered an expensive strategy for regime change that was not acceptable as a practical option before the September 11 attacks. However, and after the 2001 attacks the report became core concept for activist democracy promotion in the Arab world. At the time it was published in 1996, the Clean Break report adopted a series of pre-emptive wars and hoping at 'rolling back' the enemies of the United States and Israel was nonnegotiable question, as it would not be acceptable by the Americans to undermine the Oslo peace process to which the Clinton administration remained highly committed. Following September attacks, rollback, preemption and regime change concepts gained a considerable importance within the Bush administration as it formulated the grand strategy to fight terrorism in the Middle East. As it will be discussed in the following chapters, key concepts of the Clean Break report served as an important thinking of the Bush's Doctrine's assumptions about democracy promotion through intervention in Iraq.

2.3.3 The Project for a New American Century

A year following the publication of the Clean Break report, a group of neoconservative intellectuals and policy makers prepared an influential think tank at the American Enterprise Institute called the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). The Clean Break report presented the first neoconservative argument which support regime change and coercive democratisation policies in Iraq and the whole Middle East. The Project for a New American Century established a number of interventionist arguments similar to those of the Clean Break report, but strongly supported a foreign policy of armed intervention for democracy promotion that began with regime change in Iraq.

The Project for a New American Century was established in 1997 by its writers, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Gary Schmitt, and Thomas Donnelly. Its contributors were neoconservative significant figures who later they would hold influential positions in the

Bush administration such as Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis Libby, Zalmay Khalilzad, Eliot Abrams, Paula Dobriansky, John Bolton and James Woolsey, who signed some of its letters and policy papers. Others who shared a foreign policy view that is similar to neo-conservatism, like Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, also signed a number of PNAC's public statement that called for regime change in Iraq. The PNAC was the major neoconservative organization that provided the most influential policy prescriptions for regime change in Iraq and a costing policy of military democratisation in the Middle East. It succeeded in transforming the broad general thinking of the neoconservative policy of democratisation into decisive guidelines to launch a war against the Iraqi Regime.

The Project for a New American Century's Statement of Principles represented the outlook of the think tank and shaped its support of interventionist foreign policies in the Middle East. The Statement of Principles was published in 3 June 1997 and confirmed the need for an American foreign policy "that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities". It also maintained that the United States needed to "strengthen [American] ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to [American] interests and values" (Elliott et al.).

Additionally, the PNAC emphasized that the United States must "promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad" assertively through a "neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military strength and moral clarity" that would "accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to [American] security, [American] prosperity, and [American] principles". In 1996, and before establishing the PNAC, William Kristol and Robert Kagan asserted the importance of a "neo-Reaganite" foreign policy article that was sharply critical of the Clinton administration's reactive policy in the Middle East. As it was articulated in the Statement of Principles, the "neo-Reaganite"

foreign policy arguments contributed by Kristol and Kagan provided the basic guidelines for the Project for a New American Century's thought.

Moreover, the PNAC applied some of its Statement of Principles' aspects to its key concept that the United States must overthrow Saddam Hussein to democratise Iraq. In January 1998, the PNAC sent a letter to President Clinton calling the United States to adopt new policies of regime change. The letter argued that "current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and [...] we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War". The letter of PNAC contended that the United States had only one lasting solution to overcome the Iraqi threat through armed intervention and the promotion of democracy. The Project for a New American Century also stated that the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power should: "become the aim of American foreign policy" with the neoconservative "full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor". It also held that replacing the Ba'athist dictatorship with a pro-American democratic regime would ensure neighbors and American values and interests' safety.

During the Clinton administration's second term, the PNAC leading member frequently repeated the argument for regime change in Iraq. In January 1998, William Kristol and Robert Kagan published an article in *the New York Times* entitled "Bombing Iraq isn't enough", and they began the paper announcing sharply that "Saddam Hussein must go". Robert and Kagan wrote that removing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein needed "using air power and ground forces, and finishing the task left undone in 1991". Achieving this goal, they argued, would easily be done with the capabilities the United States possessed and combating tyrants is a rational responsibility of the global hegemony. Kagan and Kristol warned that "unless [the United States] act, Saddam Hussein will prevail, the Middle East will be destabilized, other aggressors around the world will follow his example, and

American soldiers will have to pay a far heavier price when the international peace sustained by American leadership begins to collapse”. So, it was American duty to topple Saddam’s regime in Iraq and to replace it with a democracy. Another argument was produced by Ruel Marc Gerecht, a PNAC member, and through their advocacy, the PNAC played a key role in adopting the Iraq Liberation Act that reflected toppling Saddam as an official goal of American foreign policy.

Another dependent recommendation made in the PNAC’s advocacy for regime change and maintaining democracy in Iraq was that the Iraqi government adopted a violent characteristic inherently and it was very prone to aggression since it was authoritarian (Fukuyama, *America* 41). Kristol and Kagan argued in “The Right War for the Right Reasons” article, concerning the Iraqi regime violent nature that “as is so often the case in international affairs, there was no separating the nature of Saddam’s rule at home from the kinds of policies he conducted abroad. Saddam’s regime terrorized his own people, but it also posed a threat to the region, and to us”. They continued contending that went to war against Iran for eight years, invaded Kuwait in 1990 and he launched attacks against coalition forces in the no-fly zones. Kristol and Kagan held the possibility of reflecting Saddam’s brutality and tyranny within Iraq to engage in wars of aggression abroad. Thereby, it is mainly noticed that the broad views of the neoconservative foreign policy understanding were used as the basis on which the Bush administration’s policy concepts were made and applied specifically in the case of Iraq. This view is advocated when linking the ideas of regime change that were articulated by President Bush after September 2001 and the neoconservative paradigm of democratisation.

The PNAC members and basically Kristol and Kagan were great believers in the efficacy that regime change and democratisation would help to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The unchallengeable military supremacy of the United States and the unexpected

collapse of communism after the Cold-War validated the concept of regime change as an approach to international relations that was entirely within American power to overthrow a hostile regime in the heart of the Arab world (Fukuyama, *America* 52). It would be good for America to protect its interests in the region and to remove a destabilizing force to allow the Iraqi people to enhance American handmade freedom and democracy.

Conclusion

The beginning of the 1980's marked differences within neoconservatism between the older and younger generations of neoconservatives on the question of democracy promotion. The positions that were taken by both generations of neoconservatives had certainly a direct impact on the United States foreign policy through their participation and support for the Reagan administration. Actually, first and second-generation neoconservatives drew different lessons from the events of 1979. For the first generation, as represented by Irving Kristol and Jeane Kirkpatrick, the lesson was that America should not destabilize dictators, and that democracy promotion was neither a differential matter nor simply the core of opposition. In contrast, for second-generation neoconservatives, the lessons of 1979 were that the United States needed to act more assertively in attempting to democratise countries before it would be too late to deal with particularly Third World dictators. This position was held by neoconservatives during the Gulf War and it was sympathetic to 'realism' and the state of 'stability' rather than enthusiasm to foster democracy.

The past chapter has demonstrated that the collapse of bipolarity restraints had freed the United States foreign policy to pursue a more radical agenda. This agenda was helped by neoconservatives belief in American power and its utility to realize their foreign policy objectives of promoting freedoms. Factors of Fukuyama's 'End of History' and the democratic peace theory also had a stimulating impact on the ambitious change in the

development of democratisation paradigm as the guiding liberal theoretical frameworks in the neoconservative discourse of the United States foreign policy agenda. Neoconservatives primarily encountered these liberal theories and implied their conclusions for arguing democracy promotion through the use of power at the heart of American interest. They actually exploited the End of History widespread academic influence to publicly claim democracy promotion advantages in the post-communist world. While that the democratic peace theory influence embodies in its support for the use of military power to achieve democratisation and its emphasis on peaceful coexistence among democratic governments. The institutional developments of the *Weekly Standard* and other magazines also provided neoconservatives with a good regular platform for foreign policy debate and the opportunity to spread their ideas amongst key Washington policy-makers. The PNAC and the Break Clean Report represent the best neoconservative prescription to regime change in Iraq.

End Notes

- 1 The Young People's Socialist League (YPSL) was the official youth arm of the Socialist Party of America. Its political activities tend to concentrate on increasing the voter turnout of young democratic socialists and affecting the issues impacting that demographic group.
- 2 In 1957, the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Federation merged to form the Socialist Party- Social Democratic Federation (SP-SDF). For the possibility of cooperation with communists on certain specific matters and in efforts to make the Socialist party inclusive of all socialist elements and not bound by communist discipline.
- 3 Unlike “SP-SDF” and “YPSL”, the initials “RT” were never used in the Socialist party to refer to the Realignment tendency. I am using them just for simplicity.
- 4 With the exception of Jeane Kirkpatrick, nearly all of the prominent neoconservatives have written articles for the *Weekly Standard* including David Brooks, Robert Kagan, William Kristol, Elliott Abrams, Max Boot, Michael Ledeen, Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, William Bennett, Joshua Muravchik; Eliot Cohen, Max Boot, Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Charles Krauthammer, Gary Schmitt, Thomas Donnelly and Gertrude Himmelfarb.

Works Cited

- Abrams, Elliott, et al. "American Power--for what?: A Symposium." *Commentary* 01 2000: 21-47. *ProQuest*. Web. 11 July 2012.
- . "Letter to Gingrich and Lott on Iraq". *Project for the New American Century*. PNAC, 29 May 1998. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.
- . "Letter to President Clinton on Iraq". *Project for The New American Century*. PNAC, 26 Jan. 1998. Web. 24 Jan.2011.
- . "Statement of Principles". *Project for the New American Century*. PNAC, 3 June 1997. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.
- "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm". *The Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies*. IASPS.org. 21 June 2011.
- Bamford, James. *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies*. New York: Doubleday, 2004.
- Brooks, David. "Ex-Left Still can't Get no Satisfaction." *Wall Street Journal*: 1. Oct 23 1987. *ProQuest*. Web. 22 Jan. 2012
- Bush, George W. H. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit". *George Bush Presidential Library and Museum. Public Papers*, 11 Sep. 1990. Web. 13 Jan. 2012.
- Clinton, Bill. "American Foreign Policy and the Democratic Ideal." *Orbis* 37.4 (1993): 651. *Academic Search Premier*. Web. 13 Dec. 2012.
- Cohen, Eliot A. "How to Fight Iraq". *Commentary* 90.5 (1990):21. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 12 Jan. 2012.
- . "The Future of Force". *The National Interest* 21 (1990): 3-15. Web 12 Feb 2012.
- Cox, Michael et al., eds. *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

- Diamond, Sara. *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States*. New York: Guilford, 1995.
- Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs". *Wiley* 12.3 (Summer, 1983): 205-235. JSTOR. Web. 23 Mar. 2011.
- . "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part2". *Wiley* 12.4 (Autumn, 1983): 323-353. JSTOR. Web. 23 Mar. 2011.
- Ehrman, John. *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Policy 1945-1994*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.
- Freedman, Lawrence. *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
- . *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press A division of Macmillan, Inc., 1992.
- "The End of History?". *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989). Web. 21 Oct. 2011.
- Gershman, Carl. "Freedom Remains the Touchstone". *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco: ICS, 1991:35-42.
- Glazer, Nathan. "A Time for Modesty". *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco: ICS, 1991: 133-41.
- Halper, Stefan and Jonathan Clarke. *America Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Hermann, Margaret G., and Charles W. Kegley. "Democracies and Intervention: Is there a Danger Zone in the Democratic Peace?". *Journal of Peace Research* 38.2 (2001): 237-245. SAGE Pub. Web 12 Jan. 2012.

- Harries, Owen, ed. *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991.
- Heilbrunn, Jacob. (2008) *They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons*. New York: Doubleday, 2008.
- Himmelfarb, Gertrude. "Responses to Fukuyama: Gertrude Himmelfarb". *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 24-26. Web 12 Feb. 2012. Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Twentieth Century*. Oklahoma : Oklahoma Press, 1993.
- Ish-Shalom, Piki. "The Civilization Of Clashes: Misapplying The Democratic Peace In The Middle East." *Political Science Quarterly* 122.4 (2007): 533-554. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Jan. 2012..
- . "Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic-Peace Thesis and the Politics of Democratisation". *European Journal of International Relations* 12.4 (2006): 565-598. SAGE Pub. Web 12 Jan. 2012.
- Kagan, Robert. "American power--a guide for the perplexed." *Commentary* Apr. 1996: 21. Academic Search Premier. Web. 19 June 2012.
- . "Democracies And Double Standards. (Cover Story)." *Commentary* 104.2 (1997): 19. Academic Search Premier. Web. 19 June 2012.
- King, William F. "Neocoservatives and Trotskyism". *American Communist History* 3.2 (2004): 247-266. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 22 Sep. 2011
- Kirkpatrick, Jane. "A Normal Country in a Normal Time." *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco, CA: ICS, 1991. 155-63.
- . "Dictatorships Double Standards." *Commentary (pre-1986)* 1979: 34-. *ProQuest*. Web. 2 Jan. 2012.
- Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment". *Foreign Affairs* 70.1 (1990/1991): 23-33. *JSTOR*. Web. 24. Sep. 2011.

- . "The Unipolar Moment Revisited." *The National Interest* 02 2003: 5-17. *ProQuest*. Web. 3 May 2012.
- . "Universal Dominion" *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco, CA: ICS, 1991. 1-13.77
- Kristol, Irving. "A Foolish American Ism-Utopianism". *New York Times*: SM31. 14 Nov. 1971. *ProQuest*. Web. 15 Sep. 2012.
- "Defining Our National Interest". *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco: ICS, 1991. 53-73.
- . "Toward a Moral Foreign Policy". *Wall Street Journal*: 15 Nov. 1983. *Academic Search Complete*. Web 15 Sep. 2012.
- Kristol, William. "Morality in Foreign Policy." *The Weekly Standard* Feb 10 2003: 7-. *ProQuest*. Web. 5 Jan. 2012.
- Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan. "Bombing Iraq Isn't Enough". *The New York Times*. Nytimes, 30 Jan. 1998. Web. 25 Dec. 2011.
- . "The Right War for the Right Reasons". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 9.23 (23 Feb. 2004). Web 12 Apr. 2011.
- . "Toward A Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 75.4 (1996): 18-32. *Academic Search Complete*. 21 Sep. 2011.
- Ledeen, Michael. *Freedom Betrayed: How America Led a Global Democratic Revolution, Won the Cold War, and Walked Away*. Washington D. C. :AEI Press, 1996.
- Levy, Jack S. "Domestic Politics and War". *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18.4 (Spring 1988): 653-673. JSTOR. Web. 23 Apr. 2012.
- Lionel, Barber. "Views of the World." *Financial Times*. FT.com/life & Arts, 19 May 2006. Web. 26 Aug. 2011.

- Muravchik, Joshua. "Endowing Democracy." *New York Times*: A.19. Jun 18 1984. *ProQuest*. Web. 2 Jan. 2012.
- . "Kennedy's Foreign Policy: What the Record shows." *Commentary (pre-1986)* 1979: 31-. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Feb. 2012.
- . *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge To Neo- Isolationism*. Washington, D.C. : The AEI Press, 1996.
- Owen, John M. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace". *The MIT Press* 19.2 (Fall, 1994): 7-125. JSTOR. Web. 5 June 2012.
- Padhoretz, Norman. "Strange Bedfellows: A Guide To The New Foreign-Policy Debates." *Commentary* 108.5 (1999): 19. Literary Reference Center. Web. 10 July 2012.
- Perle, Richard. "Statement of Richard Perle: Fellow, American Enterprise Institute". *United States Senate Committee on Armed Services*. United States Senate, 28 Sep. 2000. Web. 26 July 2011.
- Reagan, Ronald. "Promoting Democracy and Peace." *National Endowment for Democracy*. United States Department of State - Bureau of Public Affairs, 8 June 1982. Web. 25 Jan. 2012.
- Roberts, Brad, ed. *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*. Washington DC: MIT, 1990.
- Rosen, Jane. "The Kirkpatrick Factor." *New York Times*: A.48. Apr 28 1985. *ProQuest*. Web. 2 Feb. 2012.
- Russett, Bruce. "Why Democratic Peace?". *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996: 82-115.
- Russett, Bruce et al. "The Democratic Peace". *The MIT Press* 19.4 (Spring, 1995): 164-184. JSTOR. Web. 5 June 2012.

Russett, Bruce, William Antholis, Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Zeev Maoz. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1993. *Questia*. Web. 4 June 2012.

Shachtman, Max. "The Case for Unity : New Perspectives for American Socialism." *Archives.org*. Independent Socialist League, July 1957. Web. 22 Feb. 2012.

Sharansky, Natan . "What are we Fighting for? --- Spread Freedom in the Mideast." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Oct 10 2001. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 June 2012.

Wisse, Ruth, R. "Ruth R. Wisse on COMMENTARY". *The Commentary*. Commentary, 26 December 2005. Web 5 Apr. 2011.

Wolfowitz, Paul. "Statement before the House National Security Committee". *Project for the New American Century*. PNAC, 18 September 1998. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.

CHAPTER THREE

US-Iraq Relations from “Stability” to the Inevitable Regime Change 1980’s -1990’s

Introduction

The discussion of foreign policy crisis in Iraq is pivotal for revealing the extent to which neoconservative discourse privileging the aggressive promotion of liberal democracy, through the use of US hard power and regime change which had replaced early arguments of stability and limited self interest. During the Reagan Era, US-Iraq relations primarily depended on containment policy. The U.S. tilt towards Iraq during early years of Saddam’s reign was a guarantee of a vital interest in the Gulf region. ‘Rollback’ and ‘regime change’ policies were also first discussed in the Reagan’s administration as the best strategies US should adopt against Third World authoritarian countries.

The Gulf war reflected neoconservative leaning to realism at the time. Their reactions argued for a call to US isolation in international affairs and considered that US intervention is not of its interest. Actually, while US government had planned for a coup in Iraq, neoconservatives prepared for regime change in the country and wrote letters to President Clinton. Through their vehicles for democratisation, they glorified the authoritarian character of Saddam Hussein in particular and the threat Iraq pose to the security of the World in general and US in particular.

3.1 The Roots of Rollback and Regime Change in Iraq (1981-1989):

The end of Carter administration was marked by the accession to power of the Islamic revolution in Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. In this regard, the year 1979 was particularly critical to US-Iraq foreign relations as the pro-American dictator was brought down in revolution that seemed to symbolize the decline of American power in the Gulf region.

In January, the Shah of Iran was overthrown by an Islamic revolution that eventually placed the intensely anti-American Ayatollah Khomeini in command. This year, simultaneously, marked Saddam Hussein's coming to power in Iraq. Saddam Hussein's regime was no more to be retained to balance Iranian power for stability in the region; instead the United States needed to create a pro-regime by toppling the old governor in Baghdad. Consequently, the United States relationship with Iran ended and with it the Nixon Doctrine which relied mainly on American foreign policy that was dependent on its 'twin pillars' to manage its interests in the Gulf region: Iran and the Royal Saudi Arabia. So, without proxies support in the region, it became difficult for the United States to maintain hegemony, balance of power, or stability there. It was clear that the emergence of new revolutionary regimes would not please the United States as well as toppling its friendly regimes. With the collapse of the Nixon Doctrine and the 'Twin Pillars' concept, the U.S. foreign policy became hardly involved in the politics of the region. Actually, it was living a serious period when the Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran was not an advantage to its interests in the region.

As tension escalated and the situation worsened between Iran and Iraq leading to the invasion of Iran by Iraq in 1980, the U.S. response seemed to be weird. At the beginning of the Iran Iraq war the United States declared neutrality and showed no interest sides (Khadduri 93). Former Carter official Gary Sick denies that Washington directly encouraged Iraq's

attack, but instead let “Saddam assume there was a U.S. green light because there was no explicit red light.”(Qtd in. Everest, “Four”). The U.S. attitude of this policy was to avoid and contain new revolutionaries in Iran and to weaken Iraq, i.e. “Keeping Either Side From Winning”. This sentiment is reflected as Kissinger coldly put it “too bad they can’t both lose”. (Qtd in. Everest, “Fueling”).

The United Nations Security Council resolution 479 was passed on September 1980 and reflected the idea of neutrality as it considered the war to be “the situation between Iran and Iraq”. This notion of the so-called neutrality is an intelligent policy to weaken both states engaged in the war. It was a policy to check the power of both Iran and Iraq by their involvement in a costly war. The U.S. neutrality continued until Iran seemed to have the upper hand in the war in mid 1982. Thus, in midst of growing fear that Iranian victory would damage American interests in the region, the U.S. began supporting Iraq.

Measures already underway to develop US-Iraq relations were accelerated, high- level officials exchanged visits, and in February 1982 the State Department removed Iraq from its list of states supporting international terrorism (Battle). Secretary of State George Shultz described this support to Iraq as “a limited form of balance-of-power policy” (239). Apparently, American policy helped to manage a balance of power between Iraq and Iran to maintain an eight year long war. Donald Rumsfeld visited Iraq twice, once in December 1983 and the other in March 1984 to ensure the resumption of full diplomatic relations with Iraq.

Clearly, the situation brought with it the U.S. opportunity to end Iraq alliance with the Soviet Union and to divert it to its own. In addition, the U.S. opportunity had come to replace the missing alliance with Iran and to maintain new relations with Iraq to guarantee a new friend who can serve its interest in the region.

Although the Reagan administration awareness of Iraqi use of technological advancements in chemical production, little mention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was made during Rumsfeld's visit to Bagdad in 1983. The United States decided on a private approach to warn the Iraqis of the damage that this issue could do to their developing relationship. This helps explain why Reagan's November 26, 1983, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, on policy towards the war, made no mention of chemical weapons to defend oil facilities in the Gulf. Similarly, Rumsfeld only mentioned to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarek Aziz that the United States was interested and concerned of chemical weapons as part of a list of issues concerning America (Freedman 162-63).

The failure of the Iran Contra procedures and its non-required results was Reagan administration's occasion to intensify US tilt towards Iraq. Iraq persuaded USA to support its war with Iran by providing it with developed war efforts. American assistance to Iraq was not in the delivery of weaponry, but in other means such as the purchase of nonmilitary technology and the sharing of secret military information about the movements of Iranian forces picked up by American Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) (Khadduri 94). Hoping to reach a friendly influence on Saddam's regime, the State of Department continued a policy of supporting Iraq. It even went as far as linking: "human rights and chemical weapons aside, in many respects our political and economic interests run parallel with those of Iraq" (Power 221).

However, at the culmination of the Iraq-Iran war and oil tankers that was targeted in the Gulf region, the Security Council adopted a mandatory resolution on July 20, 1987; as a result a cease fire was imposed on both countries to bring the war to an end (Khadduri 94). On 20 August 1988, Iran and Iraq signed an armistice to end their struggle. During this period the United States believed that Saddam's behaviour could be moderated. As stated by Haywood Rankin, a US embassy official in Bagdad, who stressed that the U.S. believed that if Saddam

no longer had to fight Iran, he could become the “man [the United States] wished he could be” (Qtd in. Power 200).

Later on, some figures of Reagan’s administration argued that strategies of détente had failed and that the United States risked losing the Cold War struggle if it would not adopt new policies, not to contain the USSR gains, but instead it would aim at reversing their home rule and to challenge their legitimacy. In the early 1980’s, President Reagan and his administration members, whether neoconservatives or otherwise, knew the fact that the United States was at a crossroads facing a serious conflict against communism. This view was adopted from the core of neoconservative thinking of American foreign policy during the Cold War which reflected a strong belief in anti-totalitarianism (Fukuyama, *America* 15).

During the Reagan administration, rollback and regime change were first emerged as central strategies of American foreign policy in the 1980’s. A number of neoconservatives like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Robert Kagan held different positions of policy making in the Reagan administration, and their views became very influential for the Reagan administration’s struggle against communism (Dorrien 10). The lessons neoconservatives learned to put the ideas of rollback and regime change into effect influenced largely their optimism about the efficacy of regime change as a way to bring about democracy to authoritarian states.

Neoconservative strong anti-totalitarian view resulted in adopting new strategies of ‘rollback’ and ‘regime change’ as best solutions to deal with the threat of the Soviet Union. So, notions of ‘rollback’ and ‘regime change’ expressed in the Bush Doctrine have their roots in neoconservative attitudes of interventionist policies during the Cold War. According to neoconservatives, containment policy of the Cold War was not enough and the ‘rollback’ and ‘regime change’ of communist regimes were required, holding the goal of the collapse of the

Soviet regime. Both notions were used against hostile totalitarian regimes twice in the history of American foreign policy led by neoconservatives, the first occasion was during the Reagan government and the second was during the Bush administration's time in office in 2003.

In addition to containment policy, the Reagan administration during its first year in power formulated new strategies to pave the way for enacting rollback and regime change policies against the Soviet Union's allies in the third world. According to Halper and Clarke, the Reagan Doctrine based on two themes, one of these is the rollback of Soviet influence across the Third World which sought to provide American assistance to anticommunist guerillas and governments with arms, finance, training, and facilities in Latin America, Asia and Africa (163). The United States chose these plans to bring down ruling communist regimes.

The Reagan administration anticommunist battle became more systematic with the publication of National Security Decision Directive number 75 (NSDD 75) that was regarded as the Reagan administration's most significant and detailed statement on which the rollback policies of the Reagan Doctrine was implemented to win its conflict against the USSR. In this document the administration contended that the United States should "contain and over time reverse soviet expansionism by competing on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas," including "geographical regions of priority concern to the United States" (1). In the NSDD it was also referred that the United States should "support effectively those third world states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures," (4) in order to "weaken, and where possible undermine the existing links" (5) between third world communist communities and the USSR.

The concepts of democracy and freedom also existed and played a central role in managing the interventionist strategies pronounced by President Reagan. Of course, this

pleased the neoconservatives and was very important to their notions of rollback and regime change that were linked to the idea of democracy promotion in the post-Cold War era. In an address to the British parliament in 1982, the President Reagan stated that the west “must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings”.

Reagan concluded the speech contending that “for the sake of peace and justice, let us move towards a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny”. So, he believed that only through the principles of freedom and individual liberty that were enjoyed by states of the non-communist world, peace and justice can be achieved. The emergence of the new language of freedom and democracy marked a turning point in American foreign policy as the neoconservative linkage was made between regime change and democratisation. This relationship played a key role in the neoconservative attitude of democratisation in the 1990’s and supplied a central pillar to the Bush Doctrine.

3.2 The Gulf War

As he took the office for the United States presidency, George H.W. Bush’s focus principle was foreign affairs, in which he would be well prepared due to the extensive preceded experiment in foreign policy. The collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War left America trying to define a new mission for itself (Davis 15). When Iraq was concerned, Bush the senior initially signed a National Security Directive 26 (NSD26) in October 1989 declaring “normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve [American] longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East”. He also emphasized that Iraq could “moderate its behavior” if it would be provided with sufficient incentives. For Tyler it was going to be difficult to get too enthusiastic about peace

when *The Washington Post* was calling Saddam's invasion of Kuwait the "first major crisis of the post-Cold War era" (353).

According to Power: "Guidelines for U.S Iraq Policy" report was prepared in January 1989 by President George H.W. Bush foreign policy team which considered Iraq as potentially a helpful ally to contain Iran and to help in advancing American relations in the Middle East. While April Glaspie, US Ambassador to Iraq in 1989, believed in assumptions to extend both cultural and commercial contacts with Iraq in hopes of "civilizing" it.

From 1983 to 1988 the United States supplied Iraq with annual credit of 500 million US dollars (USD) under the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) program, and when Bush came to office, he doubled the CCC to over to one billion (Power 233). Nevertheless, in 1990 US congressional attempts to impose sanctions against the Iraqi regime failed in response to Saddam's threats to use chemical weapons against Israel. Furthermore, and despite of strong opposition from the George W.H Bush administration, a bill of 'Iraq International Law Compliance Act' was passed to stop financial and military assistance to Iraq until the president could provide evidence that Iraq was in "substantial compliance" with the provisions of human rights conventions .

Afterward, and with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Bush policy was shifted and the President made the U.S. government position clear in an address on the Persian Gulf Crisis in September 1990: "An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbours --neighbours who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't."

Saddam's miscalculated decision to invade Kuwait based on a number of assumptions. The first was the U.S. dependence on the Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil, and the second was Saddam's thought that he was the leading Arab nation as it was of its duty to oppose revolutionary states in the region. The situation became more difficult for Iraq as the UN Security Council passed the 661 Resolution in August 1990 with the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was followed by a US military campaign presence in Kuwait to eject the Iraqi army from the country.

The President Bush also made a clear call on February for the Iraqi people and military to overthrow Saddam's regime. However, after the liberation of Kuwait the US preferred policy to topple the regime was no more supported due to the American fear of the instability it could create in the region. Thus, the senior Bush signed a 'lethal finding' in October 1991 to permit the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to put conditions for regime change. Patrick Tyler in his article "Congress Notified of Iraq Coup Plan" mentioned that the lethal finding stated that the United States would undertake efforts to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein. According to Myroie, it was for this reason that the U.S. refused to interact with the Iraqi opposition even after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, hoping Saddam's overthrow would come through a coup. It was only when the ban on official US contacts with the Iraqi opposition became publicly known in late March 1991, three weeks after the Iraqi uprising had started that it was reversed the next day. The reversal was too late and the White House took the decision to let Saddam crush the post-war rebellions.

Reports in 1992 talked about a critical coup attempt that might lastly succeed. Kenneth Katzman; a specialist in Middle Eastern and Foreign Affairs at the Congressional Research Service; asserted a disappointment within the George H. W. Bush administration that the coup had failed but a new decision was made to alter the US policy from promotion of a coup to supporting the diverse opposition groups that had led the post-war rebellion. Gareth Stansfield

in his article "*Can the Iraqi Opposition Unite?*" stated that: "following the ineffective strategy to shake Saddam's grip from power and the failed coup in Iraq, the CIA helped to create a united Iraqi front that supported and sponsored Iraqi oppositionists in Vienna in 1992 which lead to the creation of the Iraqi National Congress (INC).

It seemed that the US objective was to create a fertile united Iraqi opposition basically as many conferences took place on the Iraqi soil in 1992. However, there was no evidence to suggest that the U.S. felt it could rely on such a weak divided opposition and a coup was always deemed the most appropriate answer to Saddam's regime (Woodward, *Plan of Attack* 70). Moreover, the administration worked with the United Nations to secure passage of Resolution 687, which gave the UN Special Commission wide access to different sites in Iraq in search of and destroy weapons of mass destruction. For Ritter, the disarmament was only a vehicle to destabilize Saddam and achieve the US objective of regime change (4).

The Security Council also passed Resolution 688 to allow international relief operations for the Kurds which for his policy advocates , these actions demonstrated restraint in his dealings with Iraq that allowed a combination of military and humanitarian programs to severely limit Iraq's ability to cause further harm to its citizens or neighbors (Davis 16).

After, in 1991 the Gulf War Allied and the Iraqi military leaders met on the battlefield and agreed the terms of a ceasefire in which Iraq agreed to abide by all UN Security Council resolutions that had been passed against it. This included demands that Iraq would destroy all of its chemical and biological weapons and its ballistic missiles and dismantle its nuclear weapons programs (collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction or WMD). To ensure this, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established to monitor and insure Iraq's compliance with policies concerning its production and use of weapons of mass destruction.

George H. W. Bush hoped that Saddam Hussein's regime would collapse with the end of the Gulf War. Later, it became clear that the Iraqi leader was going to keep his grip on power and the policy of containment is the best strategy the administration had to follow to keep the regime in check. The President Bush always asserted that the war had accomplished its mandate, despite some critics who have charged its policies that he left too much unsettled with Iraq. He said that the important mission that must be approved was to expel Iraq from Kuwait (Davis 17).

3.3 Neoconservatives on the Gulf War

The neoconservative reaction to the 1991 Gulf War, deeply reflected their thought at the end of the Cold war, and offered a clear opposite state of their thinking with the approach they would later be associated with in the late 1990s. Benevolent hegemony and interventionist democracy promotion were not the hallmarks of the neoconservative approach with Iraq in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1. Instead, the neoconservative primary concern of their approach was limited policy aims of the Bush administration of removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and stopping short of advocating regime change in Iraq. Indeed, neoconservatives feared the consequences of a more radical policy and were content to play the stability card.

In the years leading up to the Gulf War a group of neoconservatives had outlined the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Daniel Pipes in "The Scourge of Suicide Terrorism", argued that Iran, Iraq, and Syria were all sponsoring suicide terrorism as they were driven by "religious fanaticism and political extremism". He argued that the United States efforts of deterring terrorism from launching their operations was futile, but instead it should seek to punish their state sponsors : "It is futile to mount a defense by concentrating on the terrorist actor himself; even if one falls, he can be easily and quickly replaced with another. The way

to combat the scourge of suicide terrorism is by punishing the states that sponsor this violence”.

Iraq was also a key concern for Zalmay Khalilzad, working then as a senior State Department official, argued that “Iraq had replaced Iran as the foremost threat to American interests in the region.” as “Iran had emerged from the war so weak that it could no longer balance Iraq”. For that, Iraq now posed a graver menace to the stability and peace of the region and to American interests. The neoconservative consensus that was reflected at the time was that with the end of the Iran Iraq War, the United States missed an opportunity of changing its posture towards the Middle East (Gigot).

In 1977, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs in the Carter Administration, started working on the Limited Contingency Study that represented the Pentagon’s first detailed analysis of the need to protect the Persian Gulf and the first attempt to examine American interests in the region. Although the study was first concerned with the possibility of the Soviet Union to seize the oilfields of the Middle East, Wolfowitz extended the discussion to include a measurement of the Iraqi regime capacity to present a threat, mainly after its invasion of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The report concluded that Iraq posed a direct threat to other states in the region and also a more “implicit” threat causing other states “to accommodate themselves to Iraq without being overtly coerced.” Consequently, the United States should balance the Iraqi power with an increased visibility of US power in the region (Solomon 25).

During the Reagan administration Wolfowitz worked as Director of Policy Planning at the State Department followed by a period as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, then another period as US ambassador to Indonesia. In 1988, Wolfowitz returned to the Pentagon to Washington as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in George H. W. Bush

administration, a role he held for the whole period of Bush's term in office. He was responsible for arms control in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Solomon argued that Wolfowitz played a key role in shifting the Pentagon away from a "myopic" focus on the Soviet Union and in fall of 1989 he ordered a review of U.S. defense policy towards the Persian Gulf with an emphasis on defending the Saudi oil fields (27).

Though Wolfowitz primary focus was on the threat posed by Iraq, he was also largely concerned with the impact of Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti oilfields that fell in the hands of the Iraqi regime after sending Saddam Hussein's military forces over the border into Kuwait on 2 August 1990. For the conduct of the Gulf War, Wolfowitz was not a supporter of regime change or indeed of Iraq being the best ground for fostering liberal democracy, both of which he would later be closely associated with.

For the neoconservatives what was important, is not the question of whether the United States should use its military force to remove Iraq's military from Kuwait, but instead they were united for arguing that it was the appropriate response to do so as it could easily be justified on both realist and liberal grounds and additionally to neoconservative concerns.

Iraq had violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighboring states with its intervention, so it was a clear violation of international law and the United Nation had approved for using force to remove the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The most interesting question for the conduct of the Gulf War then was: what the US- led coalition would do after the ejection of Iraq's army from Kuwait? Should the coalition forces continue its way to Baghdad and topple Hussein's regime or essentially stop at the Kuwait-Iraq border to subject to the UN Security Council resolutions?

Discussions of neoconservative views of those who had positions in the Bush administration during the Gulf War in this section centers basically on: Wolfowitz himself

and William Kristol who served as Chief of Staff to Vice-President Dan Quayle; a position from which he was at arms-length from the foreign policy making process. Other neoconservatives such as Khalilzad were in junior positions. However, there were no records from Bush's decisions to retain the Iraqi regime from any neoconservatives in the administration.

Indeed, there existed two main issues that dominated the decision by Bush to keep Saddam Hussein in power by the end of the Gulf War. The first was the question of the legality of forcing regime change in Iraq, and the second was Bush's national security team fear of the consequences of leaving a power vacuum in Iraq mainly the imminent threat from Iran since the Khomeini's 1979 revolution. For then, the Bush administration reflected a realist approach that ultimately concluded the cause of stability in the Middle East that would be damaged if the United States removed Saddam from power.

Wolfowitz position on the Gulf War is an illuminating perspective of the state of neo-conservatism during the early years of the post-Cold War period. On one hand, he did not hesitate to boldly adhere a military strategy which argued that the United States could have done more to prevent Saddam's human rights abuses against the Kurdish minority in Iraq. Yet on the other, he argued with the argument that toppling the regime in Iraq would leave an unstable vacuum at the heart of the Middle East. His position represented an opposed form of neoconservatism that would a decade later advocate a more radical prescriptions.

Outside the administration, neoconservative figures who were not led by the necessity to support the administration's policies showed a reluctance to push for regime change in Iraq. In "What Kind of Peace?", Daniel Pipes contended: "[t]he overriding American interest in the Persian Gulf is to achieve stability", and other factors which prompted the U.S. engagement such as democracy, low oil prices and human rights were secondary in the region as "[o]nce

stability is achieved, other desirable goals [...]can be addressed”. Actually, further from ending Saddam’s regime in Iraq, Daniel Pipes suggested an explicit presidential announcement that US would not be seeking to topple the Iraqi regime. For him, an American extended military occupation of Iraq would probably lead “to one of the great disasters in American foreign policy”.

Support for Bush’s Gulf War policy was also found among first generation neoconservatives. In 1990, Norman Podhoretz published ‘Statement on the Gulf War Crisis’ on Commentary in which he claimed that a war to liberate Kuwait was necessary to prevent oil resources from falling into Saddam Hussein’s hands and to discourage other states “from engaging in such aggression”. Podhoretz later spent part of the Gulf War in Israel where he had a conversation with an Israeli official who claimed that it was a complete folly for the United States to leave Saddam Hussein in power at the conclusion of the Gulf War and suggested that the United States should “smash Iraq the way [it] smashed Germany in World War II” and to launch a project similar to the Marshall Plan allowing democracy to spread across the Middle East. However, Podhoretz showed his disapproval with the man’s judgments when he proclaimed that: “With this he loses me, I see no chance that the United States today will either wish or be able to do such thing”.

Indeed, Podhoretz did not suggest that Bush was mistaken in leaving Saddam Hussein in power. Instead he argued that liberating Kuwait was the best way for restoring American confidence and prestige. Irving Kristol also shared this position. For Kristol, the elder Bush decision to leave Saddam in power was right, and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East was certainly not a key national interest for the United States. He later stated: “no civilized person in his right mind wants to govern Iraq”, though combating aggression was not always in the interest of US (Qtd. In Dorrien 16).

Eliot Cohen also agreed with the realist perspective that suggested that toppling Saddam Hussein would lead to the destabilization of the Middle East rather than increasing the prospects for peace. In his article “How to Fight Iraq”, Cohen argued that the stated objectives of the Gulf War were to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait and to maintain security of the Gulf region, while the other unstated objectives of destroying Iraqi’s weapons and removing Hussein from power had the possibility of breeding new threats for the security of the region by removing Iran’s “traditional foe”. Writing before the war began, Cohen offered three strategies for the United States military to follow during the conflict. But he neither mentioned the idea of regime change in Iraq itself, nor the imposition of democracy as a part of the United States military mission there.

Richard Perle, the neoconservative who earned the reputation as the most warlike figure did not criticize Bush’s decision to retain Saddam in power in 1991. In “No Magnanimity yet for Iraq”, he stated that with the existence of “compelling reasons” toppling the Iraqi regime due to his aggression with the Iraqi civilians and support of terrorism. Nonetheless, for the United States to actually invade Iraq “could prove costly, and would probably be unnecessary”. Perle was a strong supporter of tough United Nations sanctions that would create enough pressure among Iraqis to overthrow Saddam.

Although the majority of neoconservatives supported the policies of the elder Bush administration in the Gulf War, there was early dissent most notably from Joshua Muravchik. In April 1991, Muravchik released his article “Right to Intervene” in which he suggested that the only successful withdrawal for the United States from the Gulf War was through “the ouster of Saddam Hussein”. As a prominent supporter of democratisation policy, Muravchik also referred to the possibility of democracy promotion in Iraq, “even if democracy is too much to hope for in Iraq, there are degrees of unfreedom less brutal, more human, than the Baath regime”. Nevertheless, Muravchik would later support the central feature of realist

thinking as he stated that: “It is more likely to be served by a balance of power” due to “no single Arab state [would] gain supremacy, much like Britain’s interests on the European continent before World War I”. Yet, the United States would not topple aggressively the Iraqi regime, but instead it would aid a domestic uprising against Saddam.

Most neoconservatives were content to lend their support to the Bush administration’s conduct of the Gulf War and satisfied with the outcome of the war.. Even those like Muravchik who wanted Saddam Hussein to be removed from power, had a relatively limited aim with doing so, and certainly were not calling for the United States to impose democracy on Iraq. In 1991, there was very little appetite among the neoconservatives for a wide-ranging, ambitious policy of regime change and democratisation in Iraq.

3.4 US- Iraq Relations: A Failed Coup and a Planned Regime Change: 1993-1996

In 1993 Bill Clinton was elected to the White House and continued his predecessor’s strategies against Iraqi regime. As he took the office Clinton considered Iraq a significant threat to US vital interests and regional security in the Middle East. The threat came primarily from Iraqi suspected possession of biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and ongoing programs for further production. The Clinton administration implemented the containment strategy and continued until it left the office at the end of 2000 although the emergence of “regime change” policy was first declared openly in its last few years of governing. It considered this approach to be the most effective solution to solve the problems posed by Saddam Hussein and Iraqi’s WMD.

The neoconservative advocates of regime change showed great attention to the Iraqi opposition groups as the key to their strategy. They spoke of their importance as key to regime change and the democratic future of Iraq. Moreover, a number of them developed a strong connection between the London-based Iraq National Congress and its leaders, Ahmed

Chalabi. According to Dorrien: during the 1980's "Chalabi's friendship with Perle and Wolfowitz and his energetic lobbying in Washington gave him another political lifeline after he alienated the CIA" and in the 1990's he developed links with other neoconservatives like James Woolsey and Douglas Feith (62). Wolfowitz contented that supporting the Iraqi National Congress represented the best solution for the United States. In September 2000, before the Committee on Armed Services Richard Perle held that:

"To finance an opposition coalition the United States could use some of the billions in blocked Iraqi funds. Then we should announce a readiness to lift the sanctions on any territory not under Saddam's control. As it happens, much of Iraq's oil lies in areas he cannot now control or over which he would quickly lose control if an opposition government were established within them. This would trigger significant economic growth and attract defectors, especially among the military, from within Iraq".

Thus, regime change would require little direct American involvement.

By mid-1992, Ahmed Chalabi who had been active anti- Saddam efforts since the early 1970's started working with the INC agency with other leaders. They accepted a covert support which would eventually grow to 326,000 USD a month. According to Hoagland, in 1994 Senate Intelligence Committee Staff cleared the agency to establish a secret, semi-permanent team in north Iraq aiming at strengthening a "liberated" zone in the country's Kurdish north. Robert Baer, the CIA chief responsible for this attempt, with three other CIA officers had arrived in Iraqi Kurdistan to establish the secret base in northern Iraq. For Baer setting up the base was mainly to assist Iraqi dissidents overthrow Saddam (260).

Moreover and a coincidence with the coup plan Ahmed Chalabi had developed an 'End Game' plan to be accomplished on 3 March 1995. The 'End Game' was planned to launch a Kurdish attack on Iraqi lines in the north, accompanied with a Kurdish creating some disturbances in both Kirkuk and Mosul. Additionally, the Shiite groups would attack the Iraqi army that would cause its revolt against the system leading to the end of Saddam's regime in Iraq (285-6). Ultimately, the US preferred to maintain a status quo and Washington refused to concede neither the diversion nor the coup and recalled Robert Baer for a criminal investigation (307). This result demonstrates American weak faith in the Iraqi opposition to bring change and also explains the administration realization of the difficulties these operations would bring.

Jalal Talabani, the Kurdish leader, in an interview with the Middle East Quarterly stated that "the INC started with great potential. It could have brought together all the major and minor parties in Iraq. But this did not happen and the opposition did not remain unified within the INC". For him this was due to two main reasons. The first was the ambiguous American policy. The Iraqi had initially believed that establishing the INC meant the United States would take a more active step to bring change to Iraq. But they discovered that the United States wanted the INC just to be a propaganda organization. Secondly, opposition groups could not find consensus within the INC. Mainly, they had different ideas about how to change the regime.

Inside Iraq, some were focusing on a military coup while others were focusing on armed acts. And others believed in coordination between officers inside the army and those struggling on the ground. Finally, the Americans were widely mistaken as they played the game of encouraging one group against the other within the INC. Talabani exemplified with Ahmed Chalabi and asserted that he was not in complete compliance with the CIA policy. The United States proposed that Chalabi was to be the main actor not the leader in the INC.

He had favoured an armed struggle inside Iraq, and to do this, he wanted to establish an INC army. Meanwhile the CIA wanted the INC to organize a military coup and not to develop any kind of military forces to fight against the Iraqi army. Consequently, the US government changed its mind about Chalabi and began to loathe him. According to Talabani: “first he had been beloved inside the CIA, then he was hated there”.

For Hoagland, within the Clinton administration pressure was intensified to get on with overthrowing Saddam when John Deutch moved from the Defense Department to become CIA director in May 1995, and accelerated more as the 1996 presidential election campaign deemed nearer. The CIA did not give up and it had been very busy plotting a coup against Saddam Hussein. With the help of Iyad Alawi, the leader of the Iraqi National Accord (INA) and Al-Shawani, the former commander of Iraqi Special Forces who had convinced the CIA that they had resources and fantastic contacts inside Iraq that were in a position to pull off a coup and to remove Saddam Hussein from power (Ritter 162-3).

The White House was leaving a political pressure on what was being called the ‘Silver Bullet’ coup. The CIA was linking the timing of the coup with the United Nations Special Commission weapons inspection planned to execute the coup during the third week in June 1996. In spite of its great secrecy Saddam infiltrated the operation, since many of the defectors being used by the INA and CIA were actually Mukhabarat double agents (164). Ritter argues that “the UNSCOM inspection would be used to trigger a crisis with Iraq, and serve as a justification for a military attack by the USA, which would be used as a cover for the plotters to remove Saddam Hussein from power”(164).

In August 1996, Iraq launched a military campaign in Kurdistan against the city of Irbil that was not allowed by the UN Security Council Resolution 688. Neoconservatives were concerned with the 1996 operation in Irbil particularly both for what it could reveal about

Saddam Hussein's regime and the limited misplaced American response. While the Iraqi attacks took place in the north of the country, Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks on a range of radar and anti-aircraft targets in southern Iraq. This operation was also of great significance for neoconservatives as it confirmed that the United States' secret attempts to undermine the Iraqi regime through its funding of INC in Kurdistan had failed as key neoconservative ally Ahmed Chalabi was taken out of Iraq. Former Defense Department official Paul Wolfowitz before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee described the debacle as "Clinton's 'Bay of Pigs' with key allies in the region in an attempt to subvert the Iraqi Regime (Qtd in. Ledeen, "Bill Clinton's Bay"). Zalmay Khalilzad argued in 1966 in "Six Steps against Terror" that Iraq is among states that sponsor, promote, and facilitate terrorism against the United States and it was necessary for US to find new options at facilitating regime change in these governments that threatened its interests.

During this time, the UN inspections in Iraq were in process. Scott Ritter, a senior weapons inspector, believed that the Americans had reservations about any inspection designed to 'close the file' on missile disarmament issues in Iraq and many in Washington doubted UNSCOM's ability to effectively carry out such a technically demanding inspection. As UNSCOM 45 left Iraq, Ritter was very satisfied of its success and the new information garnered about Iraq's ballistic missile program: Iraq had been disarmed of ballistic missiles (73). However, Washington did not support these assessments and regarded those flawed (62). The CIA was trying to maintain the notion that Iraq was not telling the truth. Actually, the US refused to permit Iraq to be disarmed of weapons to continue its policy of economic sanctions.

In fact, it became clear that coups would not succeed and it was of a best result to the Clinton administration to change its policy toward Iraq mainly as neoconservative voices of discontent were raising in this respect. It was a Washington duty to uphold its posture in Iraq as the last seemed to win the war. Additionally, "economic sanctions were crumbling" and

Iraq was illegally exporting petroleum through Jordan and Turkey to elevate its fundamental revenues. “International support for continuing aggressive weapons inspections was faltering” (Ritter 163) with the Russian and Chinese interests opposed to American’s. Furthermore, due to the situation of the Iraqi population and by the risk of a further deterioration, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 986 on 14 April 1995. It addresses a mechanism whereby Iraqi oil exports would finance humanitarian aid to the country which later it became known as the Oil-for-Food-Programme.

Concerning the Iraqi National Congress under Bill Presidency, the CIA scaled back the program from more than a 40 million USD during George W. H. Bush presidency to less than 20 million USD a year (Hoagland); this according to Sciolino was a result of “the limits of the intelligence operations in pursuing the INC goals”. From a governmental point of view and a CIA source “The question was a matter of ‘How much do you need?’. After Clinton and the coming of Anthony Lake the National Security Adviser, the question was changed to ‘How much can you get along on?’, the Clinton White House refusal to come up with a few million dollars jeopardized or stymied the whole operation”(Hoagland).

It seemed that “divide to rule” strategy is still outstanding under Clinton but instead the US administration that time found no evidence to suggest that it could rely on such a weak and unworkable policy. Kenneth Katzman announced additional steps the U.S. should follow as it recognized its ineffective plans:

“[T]he Administration should look beyond the immediate crisis and consider steps including: recognizing a coalition of opposition groups as the legitimate government of Iraq; releasing Iraqi frozen assets to those groups; granting export licenses for the purchase of arms by those groups; lifting sanctions for those portions of Iraq controlled by the

opposition; establishing an opposition Radio Free Iraq; extending no fly zones to cover the entire country; and barring Iraq from moving armor in all or parts of Iraq. The Administration has said it would continue to have ties to the opposition and look for ways to support it more effectively but that some of the above ideas are impractical”.

Many of neoconservative intellectuals such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz supported the idea of helping the Iraqi opposition groups to launch a coup against the Iraqi dictatorship, liberate territories inside Iraq, and consequently cause the regime to collapse to establish a democratic one. The neoconservative advocates of opposition groups’ effectiveness argued that there are a number of steps; the United States government should follow in order to maintain the rebellion in Iraq. In a statement to the Committee on Armed services in September 2000, Richard Perle generally framed a proxy war policy as he stated:

“The United States, alone if necessary, with our friends if possible, should aggressively support the nascent opposition to Saddam’s regime. We should organize, finance, equip, train and protect an Iraqi opposition broadly representative of all the people of Iraq. Such a program would be neither quick nor certain. It would certainly not be easy. But it has a better chance, and is a more worthy contender, than a new round of inconclusive air strikes or yet another abortive effort to organize an anti-Saddam conspiracy among retired Iraqi generals.”

Perle believed that following the three steps is the way to ensure the effectiveness of the Iraqi opposition to bring about regime change. Firstly, the United States needed to allocate Iraqi funds to finance the activities, training, and to protect the opposition groups; secondly, it needed to commit to the Iraq Liberation Act that the Clinton administration offered “to give logistical support and military equipment to the opposition”; and thirdly the United States

needed to “stand ready to use air power to defend the opposition in any territory over which it achieved control” (3). This strategy would help to bring regime change and to assert that the opposition would establish a democratic government.

Actually, Washington was looking for a strong support to launch a military action basically for the poor favour domestically. It exploited Richard Butler’s, Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, failed visit to Baghdad in January 1998 and the special protocols imposed by the Iraqi government for what were considered ‘visits’ by inspectors to presidential palaces, the Clinton administration had embarked on a bipartisan effort to gain Congressional support for a military strike against Iraq (Ritter 267).

3.5 Open Calls for Regime Change among Neoconservatives for the Purpose of Spreading American Values

By the end the year 1997, neoconservatives began to openly demand that the United States should support a policy of regime change in Iraq for the first time. David Wurmser’s article entitled “Iraq Needs a Revolution” appeared on the front page of the *Wall Street Journal* in which he called for the United States to prepare for an uprising, to bring back the INC, and abandon the idea of a coup or possible containment of Saddam. He asserted “the erosion of Saddam’s containment [and] highlights the importance of ousting his regime” because “efforts to encourage a change in Baghdad have reached a dead end, largely because the U.S. has relied on a narrow clique of military officers to launch a coup rather than challenging the regime more broadly and *aggressively*”.

Wurmser’s article was published the same day the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1137, which demands that Iraq have to cooperate fully and immediately and without conditions or restrictions with the Special Commission in accordance with the

relevant previous resolutions. It was the third Security Council resolution of 1997, after resolutions 1115 and 1134 that echoed the same points.

A month later in “Overthrow Him”, Wolfowitz and Khalilzad openly advocated regime change in Iraq in the pages of the *Weekly Standard*. They argued that Saddam Hussein would not comply with UNSCOM and this would mean that WMD would not be found. They maintained that only the substantial use of military force which is coupled with a political strategy that the United States seriously can settle down the problem in Iraq and reverse the slow collapse of the international coalition. Their six-point plan for US- Iraq relations represents the basis for the neoconservative Iraq policy during Clinton’s second term that set the goals of not merely the containment of Saddam but “the liberation of Iraq from his tyranny”.

Firstly, the United States needed serious coordination with regional allies, especially Turkey. Secondly, US needed to encourage the revival of the Iraqi opposition that should not only be a matter of organized coup plots, or CIA manipulation of exile groups. but what is really needed is the assurance of “economic, military, and political support of those Iraqis prepared to take charge of their own future” and the removal of sanctions from Iraqi areas that were not under the control of Saddam Hussein. Thirdly, the United States must seek to delegitimize Saddam and his regime by indicting him as a war criminal. Fourthly, the opposition groups should be armed and trained. Fifthly, the restoration of Radio Free Iraq, which dried up in 1996, to support Iraqi opposition radio programming. Lastly, US should be prepared to provide military protection for Iraqi units defecting from Saddam to the resistance movement.

An interesting feature of neoconservatives arguments used for regime change in Iraq that is instead of leading to increased calls for Iraqi compliance, they were satisfied with

Saddam's continued breaking of UN resolutions and defying UNSCOM that seemed to affect the wider international community. Sanctions were finally seemed to be harmful to the Iraqi opposition but not the rest. They emphasized that Saddam Hussein was a serious threat to American security but he was "weak". Their contradictory arguments for regime change in Iraq can be concluded in their beliefs in the ineffectiveness of containment and military presence is needed before Saddam would be able to develop more weapons which might make his ouster impossible.

On 5 August 1998, Iraq stopped cooperation with UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and waiting for the Security Council agreement to lift the oil embargo. Nevertheless, on 9 September 1998 Security Council resolution 1194 condemned Iraq's decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM, terming Iraq's actions a totally unacceptable and the Commission reports to the Council that it is satisfied that it has been able to exercise its full range of activities including inspections. According to a UNSCOM report of chronological events that is published in the UN official website it states that: On 31 October 1998 Iraq announced that it will cease all forms of interaction with UNSCOM and its Chairman and to halt all UNSCOM's activities inside Iraq, including monitoring.

Saddam Hussein insisted that Iraq no longer possessed WMD or WMD programs and after a series of crises in late 1997 and 1998 UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq. The United States and the UK responded in December 1998 with Operation Desert Fox, a four day bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD sites. After the Desert Fox operation Saddam Hussein refused to submit to any further UN inspections. The United States now had to rely on economic sanctions and enforcements of the no-fly zones to contain the Iraqi regime. The sanctions Clinton administration adopted were widely regarded as a major cause of the suffering borne by the Iraqi people (Davis, 21).

The U.S. government did not engage in serious efforts to remove Saddam's regime until late 1998 and following the passage of the Iraqi Liberation Act (ILA) by Congress and a growing acceptance that the return of UN inspections was extremely improbable after Operation Desert Fox. The ILA called for regime change in Iraq and to take it as a formal part of its policy by supporting Iraqi opposition groups within and outside Iraq and authorized 97\$ million to do so. On 31 October 1998, the US President Bill Clinton signed the bill into law explaining: "Today I am signing into law H.R. 4655, the "Iraq Liberation Act of 1998." This Act makes clear that it is the sense of the Congress that the United States should support those elements of the Iraqi opposition that advocate a very different future for Iraq than the bitter reality of internal repression and external aggression that the current regime in Baghdad now offers."

On the 7th of February 1998, in his Saturday Radio Address the President Clinton warned that regime change would not be a simple task as he stated that: "[Americans] must not harbor illusions, however, that change will come easily or quickly". So, he made it clear that regime change is a long-term ambition rather than a serious objective the US would choose above all. It is clear that the administration was not prepared to commit to regime change in the manner conceived in the ILA. The act remained a source of hope for regime change at unidentified future time rather than a decisive action to change the regime in the short term.

Even Krauthammer who showed hesitation to advocate the use of military force during Clinton's first term crisis, he became basically supportive of Saddam's Hussein removal. In 1998 in his article in the *Weekly Standard*, "Let's Hope He's Lying", Krauthammer argued that Saddam represented the more threat to the U.S. interest than any other dictator. He argued that what the United States needed in Iraq is "a massive, continuous, relentless air assault"

aimed not at weapons of mass destruction but at “the pillars of Saddam’s power” including the secret police, the republican guards, the army, and the presidential palaces.

The February 1998 agreement in Baghdad that was arranged by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan increased neoconservatives’ disappointments and fears of Iraqi regime. This feeling was reflected in Kagan and Kristol’s “A ‘Great Victory’ for Iraq”, in which they accused Annan of being “the new advocate” of Saddam Hussein and against the United States. In addition to Kofi Annan’s position with Saddam, Iraq is now permitted to sell more of its oil, sanctions had been weakened and the Iraqi regime had been given four months without inspections of WMD.

The consequences of the agreements were highlighted in a “Letter to Gingrich and Lott on Iraq” that was addressed to the Speaker of the Republican Party Newt Gingrich on Capitol Hill and Majority Leader Trent Lott. Neoconservatives argued in the letter that Saddam Hussein would within a year be liberated from the containment regime. US policy on Iraq was described as a “capitulation to Saddam” with the limited efficacy of the UNSCOM inspections and Clinton’s approval on the maneuvering of the agreement. In the letter, neoconservatives addressed Republicans in congress to press for regime change in Iraq through challenging Saddam Hussein’s claim to be Iraq’s legitimate ruler and indicting him as a war criminal, support a provisional representative and free government of Iraq in areas of Iraq not under Saddam’s control, maintaining a strong U.S. military presence in the region to protect American vital interests in the Gulf and if necessary to help remove Saddam from power, and removing Saddam Hussein’s regime from power and “establishing a peaceful and *democratic* Iraq in its place”. The neoconservative idea that called for installing an authoritarian man instead of Saddam’s regime to balance the power of Iran was changed and replaced by the use of US power to depose the Iraqi ruler and introduce democracy to Iraq.

The U.S. government did not engage in serious efforts to remove Saddam's regime until in September 1998 and following the passage of the Iraqi Liberation Act (ILA) by Congress a growing acceptance among policy makers that the return of UN inspections was extremely improbable after Operation Desert Fox. The ILA called for regime change in Iraq and to take it as a formal part of its policy by supporting Iraqi opposition groups within and outside Iraq and authorized 100\$ million seeking to help the opposition for toppling the regime . On 31 October 1998, the US President Bill Clinton signed the bill into law explaining: "Today I am signing into law H.R. 4655, the "Iraq Liberation Act of 1998." This Act makes clear that it is the sense of the Congress that the United States should support those elements of the Iraqi opposition that advocate a very different future for Iraq than the bitter reality of internal repression and external aggression that the current regime in Baghdad now offers." (Qtd in. Davis 31).

Two weeks before Wolfowitz delivered in a statement before the House National Security Committee hearings on Iraq. He was mainly critical of Clinton's administration policy with Iraq, which he described to be "a muddle of confusion and pretence". The administration is engaged in a game of pretending that everything is fine and that Saddam remained within a "strategic box" and if he would try to break out their "response will be swift and strong". He contended the necessity of the United States to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam's "tyrannical grasp" and eliminate a terrible threat to neighbouring states of Iraq in the Middle East. Again, he argued a need of American military power to invade Baghdad and offered a plan for Iraq.

The strategy of enormous latent opposition to Saddam, for Wolfowitz, is possible for a "country that possesses the overwhelming power that the United States has in the Gulf". The heart of his plan is the creation of a liberated zone in Southern Iraq and similar to what the United States and its allies created in the North in 1991. US military protection then would

help to establish “a safe protected zone” in the south where opposition to Saddam could ally and organize a provisional government “for free Iraq” to begin to gain international recognition and legitimacy as an alternative to Saddam’s regime. The provisional government would control the largest oil field in Iraq under international supervision. Also, the provision of a “safe area” for Iraqi Army units who would defect to the opposition and that would help the gradual liberation of the country and the unraveling of the regime. Wolfowitz crucially argued that the United States should not insist on maintaining the unity of the UN Security council. But once it decided against Saddam it needed the use of direct hard military power. The U.S. military force should be used to create suitable circumstances that are ought to create an opportunity to the Iraqi people to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime.

The neoconservative position on Iraq during 1997-1998 period was rationally discussed in David Wurmser’s book *Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein*. He justified regime change in Iraq not only on the basis of American national interest but rather on the purpose of spreading American values in addition to geostrategic consideration as well. He argued that the cause of Saddam’s regime removal is not restricted to his character but instead it is the challenging of tyrannical inherited ideas in the region: “Not the tyrant alone, but tyranny itself must be challenged”. Wurmser contended that the crisis over Iraq is not simply a policy to settle down the debate with this government alone but rather it “presents an urgent opportunity for the United States to signal a new policy message to the Middle East region” (8). This idea would be explained later by Mearsheimer in his 2005 article as the neoconservative adoption of domino theory in reverse; toppling the Iraqi regime will be a warning that the United States will no more be tolerated with dictatorships in other countries of the Middle East.

Richard Perle in the foreword of the book asserted the failure of US traditional assumptions to deal with tyranny in the Middle East and suggested to embrace the politics of

democratic liberty and to reject “totalitarian tyranny” in all its forms. He described what happened in Iraq during and after the Gulf War is not an isolated policy failure; it rather reflects “the failure of the reigning assumptions in Western (first British, then U.S.) policy toward the region since the early 1920s” (131). For Wurmser, Iraq represented a good opportunity for the United States to continuously assert the supremacy of American Revolution with its concerns of liberal democracy (137). For neoconservatives, the Soviet Union’s demise and the victory of democracy over communism in the ideological conflict between the U.S. and the USSR should be extended from Eastern Europe to other regions of the world, particularly the Middle East where tyrannical regimes like Iraq existed and ultimately threatened American ideals and interests (xiv).

Conclusion

The different positions held by both neoconservative generations on democracy promotion were very cautious in their initial response to the ending of the Cold War as they preferred a neo-isolationist, and a realist foreign policy for the United States. Their approach to the Gulf War demonstrated fundamental changes in the policies that would be taken by neoconservatives in the late 1990s. Some called for regime change in Iraq in 1991, although not an American invasion. But most neoconservatives favoured a realist form of stability prioritization, a position which by 2003 had fundamentally altered. For them, the United States should enjoy the fruits of its Cold War victory, by focusing more on its national problems. Meanwhile, the Gulf War confirmed that while neoconservatives were steady supporters of anti-totalitarianism, there was little appetite for a radical policy of regime change and the imposition of democracy on Iraq.

Breaking a twelve-year period of Republicans in power with the election of Bill Clinton to presidency distanced neoconservatives from executive power and made them less

frequently supportive of his foreign policy, particularly in the region of the Middle East.

During Clinton's second term, neoconservatives decisively planned for a regime change in Iraq which was reflected in their offensive writings in magazines and newspapers against the character of Saddam Hussein and the threat he poses to the security of USA with owning WMD. The rest of the 1990's witnessed neoconservatives in opposition, criticizing Clinton's conduct of American foreign policy and working to build their own alternative foreign policy platform. By the time of the 2000 presidential campaign, it had become clear that neoconservatives had developed groundwork for action during Bill Clinton's eight years in office. Neoconservatives who had begun the 1990s calling for a return to normality and supporting the limited war aims of George H. W. Bush concluded the decade arguing for regime change in Baghdad with the imposition of liberal democracy to replace tyranny. Ultimately, regime change strategy for the purpose of democracy promotion was neoconservatives' key concern in their relations with Iraq.

Works Cited

- Abrams, Elliott, et al. "Letter to Gingrich and Lott on Iraq". *Project for the New American Century*. PNAC, 29 May 1998. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.
- . "Letter to President Clinton on Iraq". *Project for The New American Century*. PNAC, 26 Jan. 1998. Web. 24 Jan.2011.
- Allawi, Ali A. *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
- Baer, Robert. *See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism*. New York : Three Rivers Press, 2003.
- Battle, Joyce. "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984". *The George Washington University*. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 82 (2003). Web. 20 Jan. 2011.
- Brooks, David. "A Return to National Greatness: A Manifesto for a Lost Creed". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 2.24 (3 Mar. 1997). Web 22 July 2011.
- . "Bully for America". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 2.40 (23 June 1997). Web 12 May 2011.
- Bush, George H.W. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit". *The American Presidency Project*. americanpresidency.org, 11 Sep. 1998. Web. 22 Feb. 2011.
- Clinton, William J. "Statement on Signing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998". *The American Presidency Project*. americanpresidency.org, 31 Oct. 1998. Web 24. Jan 2011.

---. "The President's Radio Address". *The American Presidency Project*.

americanpresidency.org, 19 Dec. 1998. Web. 24 Jan 2011.

Davis, John. *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War: From Forty One to Forty Three*. Burlington: Ashgate, 2006.

Diamond, Larry. "The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World Order." *Current History* 93.579 (1994): 1-7. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Jan. 2012.

Dorrien, Gary. *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana*. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Dumbrell, John. *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992-2000*. London: Routledge, 2009.

Everest, Larry. "Four Questions for Saddam—and the U.S.," *New America Media*. Commentary, 17 Dec. 2003. Web. 24 May 2011.

---. "Fueling the Iran-Iraq Slaughter". *Z Communications*. Z Net, 5 Sep. 2002. Web. 22 Sep. 2011.

Fukuyama, Francis. *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Gerecht, Reuel Mark. "Liberate Iraq". *Project for The New American Century*. The Weekly Standard, 14 May 2001. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.

Gigot, Paul A. "A Great American Screw-Up: The U.S. and Iraq." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Dec 18 1990. *ProQuest*. Web. 5 Apr. 2011.

Halper, Stefan and Jonathan Clarke. *America Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Hoagland, Jim. "How CIA's Secret War on Saddam Collapsed". *Washington Post*.

ShiaChat.com , 26 June 1997. Web 24 Jan 2014.

---. "How to Attack Iraq". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (16 Nov. 1998). Web. 15 Feb. 2011.

Judis, John. "On the Home Front: The Gulf War's Strangest Bedfellows; Will the

AIPAC/Bandar/Defense Industry Alliance Survive the Peace?" *The Washington Post*

(pre-1997 Fulltext): 0. Jun 23 1991. *ProQuest*. Web. 5 Jan. 2012.

Khadduri, Majid, and Edmund Ghareeb. *War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Kagan, Robert. "American power--a guide for the perplexed." *Commentary* Apr. 1996:

21. *Academic Search Premier*. Web. 19 June 2012.

---. "A Way to Oust Saddam". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (28 Sep. 1998). Web 22 July 2011.

---. "Lieberman's Dissents." *The Washington Post*: 0. Aug 13 2000. *ProQuest*. Web. 15 July 2012..

---. "Most Favoured Nation – or Most Appeased?". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 1.37 (3 June 1996). Web 21 March 2011.

---. "Saddam Wins --Again". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (4 Jan. 1999). Web 12 March 2011.

---. "THE "INEVITABILITY" COP-OUT". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (9 Feb. 1997). Web 12 March 2011.

---. "What China Knows That We Don't: The Case for a New Strategy of Containment". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (20 Jan. 1997). Web 18 Aug. 2011.

- Kant, Immanuel. *Perpetual Peace*. New York: Columbia UP, 1939. *Questia*. Web. 4 June 2012..
- Katzman, Kenneth. "Iraq's Opposition Movements". *Federation of American Scientists*. CRS Report, 26 March 1998. Web. 14 Feb. 2011.
- Khalilzad, Zalmay M. "Six Steps Against Terror". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (5 Aug. 1996). Web 18 Aug. 2011.
- Krauthammer, Charles. "LET'S HOPE HE'S LYING". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 3.24 (2 Mar. 1998). Web 12 March 2011.
- Kristol, William. "A Party of Appeasement?". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 5.4 (11 Oct. 1999). Web. 21 June 2011.
- . "Honoring Democracy". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 10.18 (24 Jan. 2005). Web 12 March 2011.
- Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan. "A 'Great Victory' for Iraq." *The Washington Post*: 0. Feb 26 1998. ProQuest. Web. 15 July 2012. .
- Ledeen, Michael. "Bill Clinton's Bay of Pigs". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (7 Oct. 1996). Web 22 July 2011.
- Levy, Jack S. "Domestic Politics and War". *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18.4 (Spring 1988): 653-673. JSTOR. Web. 23 Apr. 2012.
- Muravchik, Joshua, and Lawrence F. Kaplan. "Right to Intervene." *The Washington Post (pre-1997 Fulltext)*: 0. Apr 23 1991. ProQuest. Web. 5 Jan. 2012.
- ."The Anti-Defense League." *Commentary* 102.5 (1996): 42. Academic Search Premier. Web. 19 June 2012.

“National Security Decision Directive 75”. *Federation of American Scientists*. The White House Washington, 17 Jan. 1983. Web. 25 May 2012.

“National Security Directive 26”. *Federation of American Scientists*. The White House Washington, 2 October 1989. Web. 25 May 2012.

Myroie, Laurie. “The method to Saddam’s madness”. *The Washington Times*. lauriemyroie.com, 13 Jan. 1999. Web 12 March 2011.

Perle, Richard. "No Magnanimity Yet for Iraq." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Feb 28 1991. *ProQuest*. Web. 5 Feb. 2012.

---. “Statement of Richard Perle: Fellow, American Enterprise Institute”. *United States Senate Committee on Armed Services*. United States Senate, 28 Sep. 2000. Web. 26 July 2011.

Pipes, Daniel. "The Scourge of Suicide Terrorism." *Daniel Pipes.org*. National Interest, Summer 1986. Web. 13 Feb. 2012.

---. "What Kind of Peace [to Follow the Kuwait War]?" *Daniel Pipes.org*. National Interest, 1991. Web. 13 Jan. 2012.

Podhoretz, Norman. "A Statement on the Persian Gulf Crisis." *Commentary* 1990: 17-. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Feb. 2012.

---. “In Israel, With Scuds and Patriots” *Commentary* 91.4 (1991): 19. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 7 Jan. 2012.

Power, Samantha. “*A problem from Hell*”: *America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Reagan, Ronald. "Promoting Democracy and Peace." *National Endowment for Democracy*.

United States Department of State - Bureau of Public Affairs, 8 June 1982. Web. 25 Jan. 2012.

Ritter, Scott W. *Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of America's Intelligence Conspiracy*.

London: I.B. Tauris, 2005.

Sciolino, Elaine. "C.I.A. Asks Congress for Money to Rein in Iraq and Iran". *The New York*

Times. New York Times, 12 April 1995. Web. 14 Feb. 2011.

Shultz, George P. *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* .New York: Charles

Scribner's Sons, 1993.

Solarz, Stephen J.et al. "Letters To The Editor." *Foreign Affairs* 78.2 (1999): 160-

168. MasterFILE Elite. Web. 15 Jan 2012.

Solomon, Lewis D. *Visionary Intellectual, Policymaker, and Strategist*. Westport, CT:

Praeger Security International, 2007.

Stansfield, Gareth. "Can the Iraqi Opposition Unite?". *The Guardian*. Theguardian, 23 March

2003. Web. 15 May 2012.

Talabani, Jalal. "Jalal Talabani: No Grounds for a Relationship with Baghdad". *Middle East*

Forum. *Middle East Quarterly* IX.1 (Winter 2002). Web. 18 Feb. 2011.

Tyler, Patrick E. "Congress Notified of Iraq Coup Plan". *The New York Times*. New York

Times, 9 Feb. 1992. Web. 31 August 2011.

Wolfowitz, Paul. "Statement before the House National Security Committee". *Project for the*

New American Century. PNAC, 18 September 1998. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.

Wolfowitz, Paul, and Zalmay M. Khalilzad. "Overthrow Him". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 3.12 (1 Dec. 1997). Web 18 Aug. 2011.

Woodward, Bob. *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

Wurmser, David. "Iraq Needs a Revolution." *Wall Street Journal*: 1. (Nov 12 1997). *ProQuest*. Web. 15 July 2012..

---. *Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein*. Washington D.C. The AEI Press: 1999.

Zalmay, Khalilzad. "Why the West Needs Turkey." *Wall Street Journal*: 1. Dec 22 1997. *ProQuest*. Web. 15 July 2012.

CHAPTER FOUR

Bush's Democratisation Policy in Iraq: A Neoconservative Paradigm?

Introduction

The neoconservative origin of the Bush Doctrine has been frequently asserted by scholars, with an emphasis on the positions influential neoconservatives held in the Bush administration and US military presence in the Middle East for the case of democracy promotion. This chapter offers two important phases in neoconservative position on democracy in the lead up to the Iraq War. Firstly before the 2001 September attacks, as many neoconservatives were far from being persistent supporters of President Bush's foreign policy approach and little was mentioned for the case of military democratisation in Iraq. Secondly, it was until after 9/11 that some neoconservatives started open calls for armed regime change in Iraq and the broader Middle East for the case of democracy promotion, and most aggressively asserted a need of American military presence to bring peace to Iraq.

4.1 The 2000 Presidential Election and Bush's Early Months of Presidency: A Neoconservative Influence?

Throughout his campaign, George W. Bush followed a highly discursive formation strategy. There was no clear paradigm shift from the Clinton administration, and it became clear that the new President was charting a policy without a quality of an overarching foreign policy rationale. Instead, domestic policy was prioritized with tax cuts process at home.

President Bush's first term in office was considered to be heavily influenced by neoconservative thought. It might be surprising to mention that most neoconservatives were not enthusiastically supporters of Bush during his primary electoral battles with Senator McCain for the Republican nomination in 2000. This feeling continued against Bush even in

his general election campaign against Vice President Gore. This position was not shared by all neoconservatives as some had worked on the Bush campaign and their names were listed among figures that support him. After his victory for the nomination, neoconservatives support for Bush distinguished from advocate to disapproval depending upon Bush's speeches and policy positions.

From pages of the *Weekly Standard*, Ronald Kagan praised him for making missile defence a "central plank" of the Republican Party's foreign policy platform ("Bush's Missile"). Yet, in October, William Kristol criticized President Bush for his suggestion for a quick US withdrawal from the Balkans while Milosevic was still in power and so the United States mission remained unfinished (Kristol and Kagan, "Present Dangers" 3).

Despite neoconservative critiques from pages of the *Weekly Standard*, other key figures of the neoconservative movement were working directly for the Bush election campaign. In 1998, Paul Wolfowitz was conscripted into the Bush campaign to be Bush's principal foreign policy advisor alongside Condoleezza Rice. At the beginning of 1999, Richard Perle followed Bush's foreign policy team. Later, Wolfowitz described Bush to be "another Scoop Jackson" and commented that George W. Bush differed from his father in that he was not experienced in foreign affairs, but had the ability to get to the heart of a matter (Qtd in. Heilbrunn 230). Generally, the themes that characterized the neoconservative worldview was absent in the Bush's campaign. This can only be the fact that neoconservatives were only one part of Bush's foreign policy advisory group with figures like Paul Wolfowitz or Richard Perle. In the first presidential debate with Gore, Bush notably declared "I don't want to be the world's policeman" and showed his disapproval of a nation-building agenda for US troops ("The first Gore-Bush Presidential Debate").

Kagan and Kristol released *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* a week before the election. The book is a collection of essays written by mostly neoconservatives on states of thematic threats to American security. The book is of great significance since it concludes the neoconservative foreign policy worldview that had developed during Clinton's second term. It discusses the themes of morality and regime change along with the hard edged American internationalism.

In the book, neoconservatives argued that the new task for America was obvious to "guard the international system from any threats that might challenge it". This means the reinforcement of Americans benevolent global hegemony which interpreted what President George Bush described as a "new world order" and what Charles Krauthammer called "a unipolar moment" "into a "unipolar era"(6). However, it is striking to notice that even in less than three years before American intervention in Iraq, the idea of using US military force to directly remove Saddam Hussein from power was still not advocated. Kagan and Kristol suggested tactics for pursuing a strategy of regime change in Iraq that might need variations of the Reagan Doctrine approach of supporting dissidents by either overt or covert means, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation (20).

Perle criticized Clinton for not doing more to support the Iraqi opposition and not attempting to cause a rebellion inside Iraq and argued that an insurgency with US help might be successful given the fact that most Iraqis opposed the regime (99-110). Actually, they did not argue for an American military invasion of Iraq.

On democracy, Wolfowitz argued the necessity to view human rights as an important tool of American foreign policy. He exemplified with the case of the Philippines in the 1980s in which he was directly involved and contended that it was better to have functioning democracy without US military bases, than a closed military presence with no liberal

democracy. He argued that there must be limitations of using US military and that US goal that should not be the imposition of democracy. The United States “must proceed by interaction and indirection not imposition” (320-21).

Most neoconservative discussions provide as an evidence of neoconservatives takeover of the American government. However, it cannot be neglected that alongside neoconservative persistent advocates of regime change and democratisation in Iraq and the wider Middle East, it had gained influential positions in the Bush administration when it came to power in 2001 (Dorrien 141-3, Halper and Clarke 116).

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee Richard Perle; Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith; Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and later the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad; Vice Presidential Middle East Advisor David Wurmser; Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff, National Security Advisor, and Assistant to the President, I. Lewis Libby, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs and Democracy Paula Dobriansky; National Security Council Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations Elliot Abrams. Joining these figures were Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, all shared much of the neoconservative perspective.

Indeed, neoconservative members who were appointed to the new administration, such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney, were among the few who advocated regime change before coming into office. This was reflected in Paul Wolfowitz announcement concerning overthrowing Saddam Hussein to be “worthwhile”, but he conditioned that he had not seen a “plausible plan” (Katzman 2003 7). Although, Iraq policy was largely ran by Colin Powell's State Department which promised a ‘new purpose’ throughout the 2000 campaign in a commitment to ‘smart sanctions’ that tried to change the conditions of the United Nations

led oil-for-food program. According to Bush, Clinton's Iraq policy was considered a failure and Saddam Hussein was "a danger". In the Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate, he argued a necessity to rebuild the "coalition to keep the pressure on him [Saddam Hussein]", and "absolutely not" abandon sanctions, but make them "tougher". Ultimately, neoconservatives existed within Bush's administration lacked rational or any clear plan to launch a military presence in Iraq.

Another evidence that Iraq was not a central interest for Bush in his early months of Presidency. His announcements which promised to place more emphasis on some issues. Particularly was the case of the Clinton administration that had been mocked its supposed regular funding of the military, the new President informed Congress that "there will be no new money for defense this year". Yet, many in the military noted that 'it sounds like campaign No. 1 being broken' (Daalder and Lindsay 63).

US-Middle East relations also seemed not to be a key concern for Bush in his campaign. This demonstrates the lack of a precise American foreign policy rationale. Nevertheless, the Bush administration took few months to formulate its Middle East policy through the National Security Council (NSC) process. But its lack of focus on the region at the time was symbolized by the administration taking three months to appoint a senior director for Middle Eastern affairs to the NSC staff (Daalder and Lindsay 66). The change occurred in US-Middle Eastern relations within the first eight months, came in the form of an alteration from the Palestinian-Israeli as a core conflict to the need to focus on Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.

Ten days following his inauguration, on January 30, 2001 President Bush called for the first meeting of the NSC. The meeting focused on Middle East Policy. It was at this meeting that Bush declared the intention of his administration to abandon Clinton's efforts at

peace talks in the region. Notably, this meant that peace process support was declining, whilst violence in the region was possibly coming. The Palestinian Second Intifada in 2000 resulted with placing Israeli security concerns first and Bush emphasized on containing the conflict rather than finding solutions. Effectively, the case did not take precedence of resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; instead, the administration was prioritizing a harder approach on Iraq. As Scott McClellan, the former White House Press Secretary has argued that: “Iraq an early priority of the policy formulation process. As for that first day, with no new policy yet firmly in place, we simply told the press that the president expected Saddam Hussein to live up to his agreement with the United Nations that his regime not produce weapons of mass destruction”(89).

The absence of a consensus on the US-Iraq policy made the Bush administration very careful and seemed drifting to be tougher with Iraq. The prevailing arguments made by President Bush in the third Gore Presidential debate were that “our coalition against Saddam is unraveling. Sanctions are loosened. The man who may be developing weapons of mass destruction, we don’t know because inspectors aren’t in”. The most significant event the United States took to appear more decisive with Iraq was on February 16, 2001 and without a build up, the U.S. bombed close to the Iraqi capital. This might be “a clear message” to Iraq of the new administration’s willingness to use force (Asser). Moreover, another significant warning was made by the Bush administration after just a month in office. The U. S. military launched strikes in Iraq over Chinese workers helping the Iraqi military to install a fiber optic communication network in the Iraqi air defense system (Ricks 26-27). These attacks had a dual effect; they represented a clear warning to Chinese presence in the region and Iraq particularly, as they were a clear caution to the Iraqi regime itself. So, the new administration became more readily to use military power as means of deterrence, and this marked a clear

alteration in US-Iraqi policy. Basically, Bush's strategy of regime change and spreading democracy in the region continued conspicuously silent.

4.2 Post 9/11 Crisis and Saddam at the Heart of the American War on Terrorism

The Clinton administration held the view that securing Israel and ensuring the flow of oil from the region required active engagement in the peace process. However, the Bush administration continued Israeli's center focus of seeing peace as desirable but not vital for maintaining long term security interests. This meant that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was regarded to be less destabilizing to the region than it was perceived by preceding American administrations. Instead, Iraq was seen as the greatest threat to US national interests because of its destabilizing effect in the region. Yet, and following September 11, 2001 events the United States increasingly evolved strategic construction of a war on terror that was introduced as democratisation and freedom promotion policies to realize a transformative liberal grand strategy for Iraq.

4.2.1 Transformative Democracy in Iraq

The position neoconservatives held during Clinton administration did not know any alteration during the Bush government eight months period before 9/11 attacks. With the exception of Kagan and Kristol's accusation of President Bush in March in "Clinton's Foreign Policy (cont.)" of following Clinton's "feckless approach to Iraq", and supporting a continued containment strategy instead of regime change. In "Liberate Iraq" the neoconservative Gerech Reuel restated regime change in Iraq along the lines of the Wolfowitz Plan that suggested establishing protected zones in Iraq from which the Iraqi opposition might be able to overthrow the regime.

Following the end of the Cold War, several factors brought neoconservatives to the verge of advocating direct US military force to bring about regime change in Iraq for the purpose of spreading democracy. One can consider the period following September attacks to be the peak in the evolution of neoconservative thinking and the best opportunity to apply democratisation policies. After 9/11 attacks, neoconservatives had quickly condemned Saddam Hussein's regime and concluded that it could no more be tolerated. The United States would no more be able to afford to Iraqi opposition groups to secure its policy goals in Iraq.

On 20 September 2001, neoconservatives sent a letter to President Bush in which they continually supported the limited Wolfowitz plan rather than a more ambitious invasion of Iraq. However, the letter asserted Saddam Hussein's close connection with terrorism and the evidence that Iraq was directly linked to the attacks. But it openly called for a US need to remove him from power with the help of Iraqi opposition due to his assistance of terrorism.

On 28 September, Krauthammer published "The War: A Road Map" and argued that following the attacks the United States main objective is to bring down terrorist networks. The first aim must begin in Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban regime; stage two of the map is a planned effort to convince Syria to cut links to terrorist groups; stage three is toppling the regimes in Iran and Iraq which are "obviously the most difficult and dangerous". He contended that while change might come from within in Iran, it is unlikely to occur in Iraq. Regime change in Iraq should be provided with powerful forces to end "the most dangerous terrorist regime in the world".

By the beginning of October, neoconservatives began discussing the case of regime change in Iraq as a result of American purpose of supporting the Iraqi opposition. In "What Our Enemies Want", Schmitt and Donnelly argued that the first target the U.S. should go after

is Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, but “the larger campaign must also go after Saddam Hussein [...] to preempt and strike first”. The United States must first topple the Iraqi regime, then “the larger challenge will be occupying Iraq after the fighting is over”. In “the Right War” Kagan and Kristol restated the U.S. duty to help the Iraqi opposition to topple Saddam and then they crucially added the necessity of “using American military force to complete the unfinished task begun in Operation Desert Storm”.

In “World War IV” Eliot Cohen maintained that the U.S. “must mobilize in earnest” to effectively destroy the Taliban state, smash part of al-Qaeda, and target other regimes that sponsored terrorism; most notably Iraq. Saddam was the obvious candidate because of ; the links which were proved to exist between Al-Qaeda and Iraq that went beyond helping to reach a higher level of attacking Americans directly in the attempt to assassinate the last President Bush , and the development of weapons of mass destruction.

In “Iraq Can’t Resist Us”, Cohen argued for three reasons of US capacity to end the Iraqi regime. First, Iraq’s defense budget is less than one half of one percent that of the United States. Second, Iraq’s army is about a third the size it was during the Gulf War. Third, the Iraqi’s weapons are much less technologically advanced than that of US possession. For that, it was beneficial for US to best “plan on a substantial American ground component, although nothing like the size that was required for Desert Storm”.

The case of an American invasion of Iraq, however, knew consistent appeals among neoconservatives to the need for American foreign policy to promote liberal democratic norms in Iraq. Justification for this was based on solidarity with victims of Saddam’s brutality coupled with the transformative power of liberal democracy. US power could be used to topple Saddam Hussein and in doing so, helping to create a new order in the Middle East which would be more helpful to American interests.

Neoconservatives spent the period between the attacks and the Iraq War making the case for US military to remove Saddam Hussein from power and replace it with a democratic regime that prepare for a wider democratic transformation across the Middle East. Of course, this was framed for the reason of national security and self-defense of the United States. The issue of Iraq was rarely treated by neoconservatives in isolation. Whether it was mentioned in the front list of American war on terrorism that is coming at the next stage after Afghanistan, or it was mentioned as the first step in the American wider democratic transformation of the Middle East.

Given their contributory role in the evolution of democratisation policies in the neoconservative thinking, Robert Kagan and William Kristol were the first who discussed the possible effects of liberal democracy in Iraq after 9/11. In “The Gathering Storm” they argued that in this past decade the United States missed a great opportunity to press for democratic change in the Arab world as it has done successfully elsewhere “when the end of the Cold War lowered the risk of promoting reform”. They added that if the acquisition of WMD was proved in Iraq, “the Bush administration will have no choice but to embark on an effort to remove the man [...] the world’s most dangerous dictator”.

According to Eliot Cohen, overthrowing Saddam Hussein is the U.S. opportunity to remove a “monster” and to replace his old regime with a “moderate influence on the region”. He didn’t hope only for regime change in Iraq but further to “begin a transformation of the Middle East that could provide many benefits to the populations of an unfree region” and “make us infinitely more secure at home” (“Iraq Can’t Resist Us”). Cohen’s perspective is essential for considering regime change in Baghdad as a significant step for democracy promotion in Iraq and the wider region for the purpose of making a safer region for US interests.

For neoconservatives, the root of terrorism was tyranny and it was only by democratising Iraqi population that people would be able to embrace moderation. This view mirrors Bush arguments against Saddam Hussein's 'authoritarian' characteristics.

Neoconservatives concluded 2001 arguing that the United States should obtain a strategy of political transformation in the Middle East beginning with Iraq, through military measures.

In "How to Win World War IV", Norman Podhoretz called for a radical change in the Middle East and asserted that US war on terror could not be won while Saddam Hussein remained in power. Although warned that capitalist democracies cannot be established overnight in the region by the force of American arms. He nonetheless cautioned to expect "huge changes" in the Middle East but in turn, it "would finally give adherents of Islam a chance to set their feet on the path to greater freedom and greater prosperity". The United States military might be needed to directly topple up to seven regimes in the Muslim world, beginning with Afghanistan and Iraq.

In addition of the transformation of Middle Eastern tyrannies plan, neoconservatives added new issues that might be incentives enough to President Bush to consider removing Saddam Hussein from power necessary. In "What to Do About Iraq", Robert Kagan and William Kristol suggested that what the U.S. would do in Iraq, would basically "shape the contours of the emerging world order, perhaps for decades to come". What was at stake for neoconservatives, is the twenty first world order whether "it will be a world order conducive to [American] liberal democratic principles and [American] safety, or it will be one where brutal, well-armed tyrants are allowed to hold democracy and international security hostage".

Like Kristol and Kagan, Charles Krauthammer also was sympathetic to US armed mission across the Middle East. In "We Can't Blow It Again", he discussed the opportunity the United States missed to democratise the region of the Middle East in the early 1990s. If

US had invaded Iraq at the time, he argued, it could have been “the first example of an Arab democracy, spreading its influence and planting seeds in neighboring dictatorships”. He cautioned that US should not miss the opportunity again. In “Peace Through Democracy”, Krauthammer explicitly endorsed the theory of liberal democratic peace in his discussion of the Israel-Palestine issue. In this case, he argued that there is “never any guarantee of peace, but democracy”. He asserted that Bush’s plan of democratisation in the Middle East should not exclude Palestine.

In general, neoconservatives necessitated the elimination of radical Islamist terrorists and their state sponsors for US national security. They also argued that both peace and prosperity in the Middle East and the wider world can best be served by replacing tyrannical dictatorships mainly in Baghdad by a liberal democracy to be an attractive model for non-democratic states. In “Heart, minds, and the war against terror”, Joshua Muravchik suggested that the terrorist character of Islamic countries was due to the political culture of the Muslim Middle East that is mired in “tyranny, violence, fanaticism, bigotry, and fantasy”. For him, the solution was a combination of hard and soft power to apply democracy promotion strategy beginning with Iraq.

4.2.2 The Bush Team: Preparing for War

Addressing the problem of the Iraqi regime was an important foreign policy issue for the Bush administration. For neoconservatives within the government, Iraq was an urgent priority. Following 9/11 attacks the administration adopted a new national security thinking. The first part of the new thinking was based on attacking al Qaeda in Afghanistan to destroy its network of training camps. The second part included the expansion of the new war on terrorism to states that harbored terrorist’ organizations. It explicitly linked terrorist groups that threatened the United States with the governments that supported them. The targets of the

new paradigm for democratisation were further clarified in the 2002 State of the Union Address, in which Bush declared that the U.S. would bring terrorists to justice and it would prevent them and regimes that seek Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) from threatening the world. In particular, he explicitly targeted Iran, Iraq, and North Korea referring to them as an ‘axis of evil’ that assisted terrorism and sought to obtain WMD. Ultimately, it was clear that Iraq existed at the heart of American war on terror.

State of the Union Speech was significant as the United States would regard state sponsors of terrorism and terrorists themselves as legitimate targets, although there was no mention of the promotion of liberal democracy in Iraq or grand strategies of Middle East transformation. Neoconservatives supported the speech for its preemption approach against international threats of US security and continued to press President Bush to pursue a transformative agenda for the Middle East. Despite the whole speech did not include a single word of “democracy”, some neoconservatives acted if it already existed there.

Immediately following the speech, Schmidt and Donnelly in *‘The Bush Doctrine’* considered promoting liberal democratic principles to be one of key central features of the Bush doctrine and the only path to peace was through the maintenance of US power and political perspectives abroad. The State of the Union speech was viewed by neoconservatives as the most important shift in American foreign policy since Reagan’s “détente” strategy that favoured confrontation with the USSR. According to Kagan and Kristol, the war on terrorism has been transformed to “uproot dangerous tyrannies and encourage democracy”, to make the world much safer for “free peoples” (“The Bush Era”).

Within the White House, discussion to launch a war against Iraq began the first day following the attacks when Bush’s war cabinet came together at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, Rumsfeld raised the question of whether the US should go after Iraq as part

of its response to the attacks (Qtd in. Ritchie and Rogers 72). Collin Powell asserted that any action required public approval and therefore any action against Iraq before defeating Afghanistan would not please public domestically as well as it would not meet support internationally (Woodward, *Bush at War* 49).

On September 13, 2001 Bush in another NSC meeting raised the possibility of Iraqi involvement in the attacks and he insisted that any military action against Iraq would have to bring about regime change (Feith 15). In search of convincing reasons to attack Iraq, Rumsfeld sent a short memo to his Pentagon staff known internally as a 'snowflake', asking for the previous Iraq plan to be revisited. At the same meeting he asserted that Iraq posed a major threat to the U.S. and the region. He stated that Saddam supported terrorism and that Iraq processed WMD that could be provided to terrorists to use them against the U.S. He noted that inflicting costly damage terrorist-supporting regimes could cause around the world make them rethink their policies (Feith 15).

At the Camp David meeting on September 15-16, 2001, a possible attack against Iraq was mentioned again but the President Bush chose to defer Iraq and focus on Afghanistan (Feith 52). At the meeting Condoleezza Rice had devised a three-option proposal to confront the new threat from the region. Its third option considered eliminating the Iraq threat in addition to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. At the Deputies' Committee meeting to discuss Rice's proposal, Wolfowitz showed dissatisfaction of the idea and he argued that US military action should not be designed to punish 9/11 perpetrators but rather was to attack those who could launch the next 9/11 (Feith 48-9).

On 13 September in press briefing Paul Wolfowitz stated that the new war on terror would be a campaign rather than a 'single action'. He asserted that the administration would punish the perpetrators and the 'people who support them until this stops'. The new policy

would not be a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable; instead it would involve removing the support systems, and ‘ending states that sponsor terrorism’. It seemed that the Bush administration was maintaining a broad and long-term campaign.

The Bush administration announcement of a 38 billion dollars increase of the Pentagon’s budget seemed to feed neoconservatives persistent requests to boost the budget that the government had turned a blind eye to it before 9/11. George Bush’s early announcements before the attacks promised to place more emphasis on some issues. Particularly was the case of the Clinton administration that had been mocked its supposed regular funding of the military, the new President informed members of Congress that “there will be no new money for defense this year”. Yet, many in the military noted that ‘it sounds like campaign No. 1 being broken’ (Daalder and Lindsay 63).

Bush’s claims seemed to be very supportive of the neoconservative strategy for Iraq and how it should look like after the United States would remove Saddam from power. Even though, neoconservatives were very doubtful and uncertain about the strategic direction of the State Department.

On the verge of making a huge commitment in Iraq, Robert Kagan in “Iraq: The Day After” suggested that US should not be nothing less than what it did in Japan post 1945. In the Japanese case, the American goal was not simply to remove a dangerously aggressive imperial government, but to “rebuild Japanese politics and society, roughly in the American Image”. Kagan approved that the American model in Iraq should not be different of that of Japan, even if it witnessed the existence of American troops on Japanese soil for more than six decades. Wolfowitz contends that whatever the better form of democracy that Iraq would reach, he was not “completely convinced yet that a military liberation of Baghdad is worth risk”. He argued for the reason that the threat coming from Iraq’s weapons of mass

destruction alone, was not justification enough for sending American soldiers to battle there (Qtd. in Keller).

Perle explicitly maintained that there was “very little we can do” to make the world more peaceful than “promoting democracy”. He clearly endorsed democratic peace theory. Even it might bring short term instability and chaos, toppling the Iraqi regime was in the United States’ long run interest in the region. It also represented an excellent test case of whether democracy could flourish in the Arab world (“The Making of a Neoconservative”).

On November 20, 2001, Bush released his intention to invade Iraq and to remove Saddam Hussein from power. After a NSC meeting he asked Rumsfeld “what kind of a war plan do you have for Iraq? How do you feel about the war plan for Iraq?” Bush asked Rumsfeld to update him of plans for future military action in the region and recalled him saying: “Let’s get started on this” (Woodward *Plan of Attack*, 1-2).

By the beginning of 2002, the U.S. mission to Afghanistan showed to be victorious, having seemingly achieved its objectives of defeating al Qaeda and the Taliban. This sentiment was reflected in the 2002 President Bush State of the Union speech. Following the address, the Secretary of State Colin Powell stated before a House Committee that they “still believe strongly in regime change in Iraq”.(Qtd.in Clark). He also stressed the United States desire for a democratic Iraq, representative and at peace with its neighbors and prepared to rejoin the family of democratic nations. Afterwards, on a second hearing in the Senate, Powell said that with respect to Iraq it has “*long been, for several years now*”, the United States’ policy of regime change in Iraq would be in the best interest of the Iraqi people and the region (Borger).

After a meeting with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush announced publicly his objective of regime change in Iraq stating that: “I explained to the Prime minister that, you

know, that the policy of my government is the removal of Saddam, and that all options are on the table”. On May 26, 2002 at Press Conference with the French President Chirac, Bush asserted: “Let me start with the Iraqi regime. The stated policy of my government is that we have a regime change. And as I told President Chirac, I have no war plans on my desk. And I will continue to consult closely with him. We do view Saddam Hussein as a serious, significant- serious threat to stability and peace”.

On 6 August, Rice contributed a paper called “Liberation Strategy for Iraq” for discussion for the Principals Committee meeting. The paper reflected her strong support for democracy promotion in Iraq through “liberation, not occupation” which according to Feith expressed blending and conflicting ideas. Rumsfeld believed that the United States should not undertake to create democracy in Iraq but instead it should clarify the measure of regime change policy (Feith 283-4-5). A few days later, Rice submitted a paper entitled “Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy” which had been drafted by interagency committees and reviewed by the Deputies. The paper began with a section called “U.S. Goals”:

“Free Iraq in order to:

- Eliminate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and associate programs, to prevent Iraq from breaking out of containment and become a more dangerous threat to the region and beyond;
- End Iraqi threats to its neighbors;
- Stop the Iraqi government’s tyrannizing of its own population;
- Cut Iraqi links to and sponsorship of international terrorism;
- Maintain Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity; and

- Liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny and assist them in creating a society based on moderation, pluralism, and democracy.” (Feith 288).

According to Feith, the language of democracy that was used in the first proposal was sober and ambitious. He supported the use of modest, influential, and sensible words such as; *assisting Iraqis to create a society based on democracy*, rather than promising outright that the United States *would create democracy* in Iraq. Due to the Pentagon’s and Rumsfeld’s misgivings about the paper, another version was presented on 29 October. It replaced US goals in Iraq from a *‘society based on moderation, pluralism, and democracy’* to one that *‘encourages the building of democratic intuitions’*. It replaced also *‘establish a broad-based democratic government’* with *‘establishes an interim administration in Iraq that prepares for the transition to an elected Iraqi government as quickly as practicable’*. In this manner, the neoconservatives worked hard to develop morality skills to convince the Iraqi people and the whole world of their noble democratisation policy.

The White House claimed that the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 provided full authority to the administration to use military force in Iraq. Rumsfeld also, necessitated on a memo he sent to the President the uselessness of a new resolution for a military confrontation with Iraq. He argued that the United States had the right to use ‘all necessary means’ including military force against Saddam since it had the right of both self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter as well as its right to respond to Saddam’s multiple breaches of the post-Gulf War Security Council resolutions that had been the basis for the 1991 ceasefire with Iraq (Feith 313).

In March 2003, President Bush noted to a group of members from congress that it would not be possible to get a second UN resolution authorizing military action due to the French, Russian and German opposition, and referred to the congressionally mandated 1998

Iraq Liberation Act (Woodward, *Plan of Attack* 368-9). On September 4, 2002 Bush invited key Senate and House leaders to mandate support and willingness for war. A month after, both the House and Senate voted and gave full backing to the President George W. Bush if he took the decision to attack Iraq unilaterally (Woodward 169-351). Bush noticed that he practiced the 1998 congressional law for regime change in Iraq in light of 9/11 attacks.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002 has been commonly seen as the defining document of the Bush Doctrine as it consolidated ideas of preemption and the democratic peace that Bush had already expressed. Both of Joshua Muravchik's "The Bush manifesto" and Norman Podhoretz's "In praise of the Bush Doctrine", were published on pages of the *Commentary* represented the best examples of the neoconservative assessment of the Bush Doctrine.

Podhoretz argued that the September attacks had transformed Bush from being a realist to a democratic idealist ("In Praise of the Bush Doctrine"). He mentioned that following the end of the Cold War the debate in the United States foreign policy existed between Francis Fukuyama's *End of History* and Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations". According to Podhoretz, Bush had clearly endorsed Fukuyama's views and "brushed off Huntington's rival theory". He argued that: "When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilization". The requirements of freedom apply for the entire Islamic world where people "want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation". Aside from Iraq, US needed "the stomach to impose a new political culture" in regimes like Egypt, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Palestine; all deserved to be overthrown. The tyrannical political culture in countries of the Middle East had led to abuses of human rights and this had appeared in external aggression and terrorism. The Bush Doctrine, nevertheless, revived Wilsonianism and revealed "an

enlightened self interest”. Ultimately, the safety and security of Americans required the safety and well- being of citizens of the Middle East which was directly linked to democratisation.

For Muravchik this needed to be done militarily through force against the aggressor. He contended that the aim behind the assumption that America would go to war after Iraq was not only to overthrow Saddam but “to leave behind a democratised country”. The transformation of Iraq, if successful, could “prove to be as large as anything that has happened in the Middle East since the fall of the Ottoman Empire”.

Following the summer of 2002, neoconservatives were convinced that Bush was planning regime change in Iraq through military force in spite of potential opposition from the Left and members on the UN Security Council, mainly France. Resistance from the Left was partly solved by wide bipartisan support for Bush’s Iraq policy. In October, two-fifths of Democrats in the House voted for the joint resolution ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002’, which was signed into law on 16 October, and were joined in doing so by over half the Democratic Party members in the Senate. Long running neoconservatives’ accusation of the lack of moral legitimacy of the United Nations emerged in Krauthammer’s articles “Is This the Way to Decide on Iraq” and “The Obsolescence of Deterrence”.

Concerning French-led opposition on the UN Security Council he questioned “There can be no Security Council approval without the French”? and explained that “ [i]f the French come on board it will be because they see an Anglo-American train headed for Baghdad and they don’t want to be left at the station”. For him, UN-based theories of deterrence could not keep Saddam Hussein contained. Accordingly, the clear choice left for the United States was preemptive war or choosing to live with Saddam’s weapons of mass destructions. “President

Bush has made it clear that if left with this choice, he will see to it that Saddam is forcibly disarmed by the American military and whatever allies join us”.

There was deep skepticism among neoconservatives concerning the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1441, which passed following President Bush’s decision to support Tony Blair’s request that UN approval was required before military action would take place in Iraq. Krauthammer stated that despite resolution 1441 had created a “window of legitimacy for the war option” the inevitable delays would give the Iraqi regime time to hide its WMD and prepare for war. Other neoconservatives described the UN resolution as a “trap”, since it could not remove the threat. The real danger, they contended, was not WMD *per se* but the Iraqi Regime, as Kagan and Kristol explained: “The problem is not just Saddam’s weapons. The problem is Saddam”. By embracing Resolution 1441, they argued that Bush had dangerously undermined this logic.

Tony Smith argued that Jeane Kirkpatrick supported the cautious realism during Bush’s first term as they “refused to sign on at all the belief that America’s security needs could be served by fostering democracy abroad” (49). Yet, in the run-up to the Iraq War she held a substantively different perspective. She signed PNAC’s letter to President Bush in the immediate aftermath of 11 September attacks; supported military intervention to end the Taliban and Al Qaeda and build up a democratic country in Afghanistan; and enthusiastically backed regime change in Iraq. Shortly before the Iraq War began, she led a US delegation to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and announced her commitment to universal human rights, urging the UNCHR to do all it could to help those seeking transformation from non-democracies to democratic governments (Address to the UNHRC). Indeed, it was a long way from their early post-Cold War calls for a return to normalcy and hesitation to support ambitious aims of the Gulf War to the state of readiness for war.

Jeane Kirkpatrick was even more directly involved in the lead up to the Iraq War than any other neoconservative. Later, it was argued by Tim Weiner that it was tasked by President Bush while working at the UNCHR, to participate in secret diplomacy with Arab leaders to seek to persuade them to support President Bush's policy in Iraq, or at least to not publicly to protest. Because of the limited published articles between 9/11 and the Iraq War period, Irving Kristol's precise views remained less well known. His silence has been interpreted as a suggested disapproval of the foreign policy direction his son was partially leading. Certainly his writings in the late 1990s showed his awareness of the new foreign policy direction neoconservatives were taking but offered no reluctance.

In 1996, he published "A Post-Wilsonian Foreign Policy", in which he argued the case to be "ingenious effort to wed realism to idealism". In his 2003 "The Neoconservative Persuasion", Kristol again offered no criticism of either the Bush Doctrine or neoconservative support of it after the invasion of Iraq. He, instead, argued as all neoconservatives in that period had done, that the American national interest was an ideological one, and that the unsurpassed power of the United States had the responsibility of securing democratisation abroad.

In the few weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom, neoconservatives continued to call for regime change in Iraq and repeated their justifications that coloured their discourse since September attacks. Krauthammer argued that regime change in Iraq provided the opportunity since decolonization for a "real birth of freedom" and that the U.S. was "in a race against time" to resist obtaining WMD in Iraq and other hostile states before it was too late ("No Turning Back"). Max Boot also described the case of Iraq as Bush's opportunity to redeem America's past failures in the Middle East. He urged US to topple the Iraqi regime and in doing so it will introduce "the powerful antibiotic known as democracy" into the diseased environment of the region. He added that now was the time for the United States to provide

the Middle East with “effective imperial oversight” (“The End of Appeasement”). Other neoconservatives argued that the United States had a responsibility to invade Iraq to save human lives from Saddam Hussein’s brutality, and pointed out to the wider effects on countries like Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian territories to replace Baathist dictatorship in Baghdad with democracy (“War Sooner”).

Most neoconservative arguments in favour of a US invasion of Iraq were collated in Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol’s book, *‘The War over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission’*¹. The monograph detailed the arguments that removing Saddam Hussein was necessary for reasons of: American self-defence relating to WMD, Saddam Hussein’s warlike character in the region, and the promising breakdown of containment and sanctions to replace them with democratic state following the toppling of the Iraqi government. They argued (2003: 18-25) that Saddam Hussein’s regime had provided bases to several terrorist groups including Mujahedin-e-Khalq; Kurdistan Workers’ Party ; Palestine Liberation Front ; Abu Nidal Organisation; in addition to having offered Osama Bin Laden sanctuary in 1998, and funded Al Qaeda in Sudan. However, the most notable emphasis was on the need to invade Iraq for humanitarian reasons and the wider liberal democratic peace in the Middle East (18-25).

Actually, the first chapter of the book did not provide a discussion of the threat WMD might pose to American security. Instead, it described Saddam’s human rights abuses and criticized previous US indifference to them. They stated that the aim of Saddam’s removal from power was not primarily the threat it might pose to US security and the wider Middle East, but “the ultimate goal of regime change is liberal democracy” (183).

As the final act of before the Iraq War, on 19 March PNAC published a letter signed by leading neoconservatives and liberal interventionists. It maintained that regime change in

Iraq would achieve three goals: First, to disarm Iraq of its WMD; second, to establish a peaceful and stable democratic government; third, to provide an important bridge to the wider democratic development of the Middle East. Regime end in Iraq was “not an end in itself, but a means to an end” and was not the ultimate neoconservative foreign policy goal. “The successful disarming, rebuilding, and democratic reform of Iraq can contribute to the *democratisation of the wider Middle East*” (“Statement on Post-War Iraq”).

Inspections for WMD continued in Iraq under the leadership of Hans Blix; Head of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC); but Bush was not comfortable with the continuation of inspection as it would difficult to maintain military presence in Iraq. Ultimately, on January 27, 2003 Hans Blix delivered his report on the inspections program claiming that “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance [...] of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace”. He continued criticizing the weapons declaration stating that “Regrettably” it “does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number” (Qtd in. Feith 352).

Following these events the administration would not be patient to carry on the inspection. Because of the failed trial to gain a second resolution, Bush prepared a meeting of four leaders: Blair, Aznar of Spain , Barroso of Portugal and Bush. The group approved that, according to UNSCR 1441, Iraq did not submit to the obligations prescribed in the resolution, and therefore the United States had the authority to use its military force against Iraq. Or in Powell words: “to authorize “serious consequences”, the new language for action” (Woodward, *Plan of Attack* 358).

4.3 Reasons for War

To topple down the regime in Iraq, the Bush administration provided four reasons for the invasion: firstly, owning Weapons of Mass Destruction stockpiles; secondly, Iraq's support of terrorism; thirdly, the threats Iraq pose to its neighbors; and finally, Saddam's tyrannical nature. The four main problems with the Iraqi regime were described by Feith using a mnemonic of "WMD and the three Ts" (283). Eventually, for many critics, the decision to democratize Iraq was a direct reason of 9/11 attacks but its development to "a global war on terror" leaves a gap to understand how the decision was made gradually. To generate a greater understanding of the policy, this chapter analyzes the creeping uprising of the policy during his early eight months of the presidency.

4.3.1 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Weapons of Mass Destruction were the *casus belli* the administration focused on to launch a military attack against Iraq. The Bush administration members listed WMD first when arguing their actions toward Iraq. Thus, Iraq's failure to meet prescribed Security Council resolutions and its developments of WMD made it the reasonable way to reach international support for a possible campaign in Iraq. In 2003 Wolfowitz claimed that "For bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on" (Qtd in. Halper and Clarke 202).

The main problem the administration suffered was evidence. General Franks, the responsible for the plan for suppression of Scud missiles that Saddam might have, added "Mr. President", he said "we've been looking for Scud missiles and other weapons of mass destruction for ten years and haven't found any yet, so I can't tell you that I know that there are any specific weapons anywhere. I haven't seen Scud one" (Woodward, *Plan of Attack* 173).

Actually, American knowledge of Iraqi's WMD went back to 1973, when the Republican Congressman Robert Huber told Congress of Soviet supplied of poisoned gas to Iraq to suppress its Kurdish minority. In another occasion Iraqi WMD and chemical weapons were mentioned; it was Rumsfeld's first visit to Baghdad in 1983 where he met Tariq Aziz. Lawrence Freedman argued that little was said about WMD during this visit, and this issue was occasionally mentioned in the context of a range of issues relevant to US-Iraq relations (Freedman 163).

In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States revised all probable threats to its national security. Iraq being of much concern before the events, it was placed prior to any other threat and it was quickly linked to terrorism even if no evidence was proved its direct link to al Qaeda. On deciding of how to keep the United States secure, Bush revised the concern about weapons and terrorism as an important part of the rationale for overthrowing Saddam. Feith argued that in the previous decade US intelligence official reports stressed Saddam Hussein's acquisition of chemical and biological weapons stockpiles. In fact, in 2008 the Bush administration realized that CIA was wrong when it said that it would find substantial chemical and biological weapons stockpiles in Iraq (Feith 224-225).

The Bush administration was concerned of linking WMD with terrorists. Its policy was mainly to deal with Saddam Hussein as potential threat that sponsored terrorism in the region. This attitude was not a birth of 9/11 events, it was a chance the Arabic world provided to Americans.

4.3.2 Terrorism and Authoritarianism

The Bush Doctrine's most frequently mentioned justifications for activist democracy promotion was central to defeat terrorism in the Middle East. Key foreign policy makers in the Bush administration emphasized that the presence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East helped deeply to evolve terrorist actions from dictatorships' high pressures against citizens. They contended that the cure of terrorists violent actions was to 'drain the swamp' where it grew, through converting authoritarian Arab governments into democracies using force where necessary.

The Bush administration's claims that democratisation through armed intervention was essential to defeat terrorism and dictatorships in the region were adopted from key elements of neoconservative perspectives, mainly the neoconservative assertion on the linkage that firmly exists between totalitarianism and conflict, and their belief in American power that helped to change the status quo of the Cold war; it could also change the violent nature of terrorists in the Middle East.

President Bush confirmed that terrorism was a state of mind that had to be defeated. At a meeting with Congressional leaders he asserted that terrorists: "hate Christianity. They hate Judaism. They hate everything that is not them" (Woodward, *Bush at War* 45). It is clear that President Bush had linked terrorism according to religious belonging instead of extremism. The attacks were launched by a group of Arabic men from different nationalities but Muslim background. Thus, Bush equalized the meaning of a terrorist to men who belong to Muslim religion background. In other words, he provided an Arabic tongue and Muslim religiosity to the definition of a terrorist. Furthermore, he interpreted Arabic reaction to external challenges as actions against Christianity and Judaism. For that, national interest was defined on religious basis.

According to American needs, in 1979 Iraq was first included in the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism as a founding member. It was taken off in 1982 as a reward for Iraq's shutting down the Baghdad headquarters of the Palestinian Abu Nidal. In 1990, it was re-included again after Iraqi's occupation of Kuwait (Freedman 160). Iraq was perceived as associated heavily with terrorists groups. On February 26, 2003 President Bush discussed the future of Iraq and stated that Saddam's removal from power "will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron" that funds their training, and "offers rewards to families of suicide bombers".

In his 2003 State of the Union address President Bush outlined a number of damages Saddam Hussein could bring, and the threats his regime posed. He accused him of brutality and dictatorship with "ties to terrorism" and a history of rash violence. Bush stated that with a great potential wealth Saddam Hussein would not be permitted to threaten the region of the Middle East and the United States. In a conversation with Bob Woodward about Bush's understanding of the case against Iraq war; "that [is] my job to secure America", the President replied (Woodward, *Plan of Attack* 152). Furthermore, Bush was ready to fight Saddam where he is, at his soil and outside US territory. On September 7, 2003 President Bush addresses the nation claiming that the "surest way to avoid attacks on our people is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans", "so that we do not meet him again on our own streets, in our own cities".

For the United States, deterrence would no longer work, as it was a way to punish but not to prevent. It recognized the ineffectiveness of deterrence to deal with aggressive terrorists. To ensure American national security, war was considered to be suitable to prevent further attacks. In September 2001, Douglas Feith had drafted a paper entitled "Strategic Thoughts" on behalf with Rumsfeld who send it to the President Bush. The paper discussed the concept of US global war on terrorism. The main point of the paper was that the United

States necessary focus on the state actors within the enemy network, Iraq being at the heart, who would sponsor terrorist groups with biological and nuclear weapons that could harm people. One way to achieve this was through disturbing terrorist groups and compelling their state sponsors to change policies on terrorism and on weapons of mass destruction. The administration believed that the effectiveness of this method can be achieved only through military action against some of the state sponsors in the case of Iraq and putting pressure against others.

Other documents were established concerning a war with Saddam Hussein as a part of war on terrorism. On October 3, 2001 “Strategic Guidance for the Defense Department” and in June 2002 “Political-Military Plan for Iraq” were introduced by Defense Department officials. Both plans framed the war on terrorism as a confrontation with state and non-state supporters of terrorist groups, as well as terrorists groups themselves. The objective of the paper was a focus on states that assisted terrorism as well as aspiring to WMD. The June plan asserted that the U.S. objective in Iraq should not be only to end the threat from Saddam Hussein regime, but to help us “convince or compel other countries to renounce WMD and support terrorism” (Qtd in. Feith 283).

Senior figures of the Bush administration contended that it was the authoritarian nature of the Arab Middle East that bore a large responsibility for the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the promotion of Jihadist terrorism. The President Bush often confirmed that the authoritarian Arab States provided the ground where Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism grew, as governments put down their freedom they turned to violent extremism. On March 8, 2005 the President Bush discussed ‘War on Terror’ and argued that:

“[American] strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror, especially in the

broader Middle East. Parts of that region have been caught for generations in a cycle of tyranny and despair and radicalism. When a dictatorship controls the political life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from their social and economic failures, dictators place blame on other countries and other races, and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This status quo of despotism and anger cannot be ignored or appeased, kept in a box or bought off, because we have witnessed how the violence in that region can reach easily across borders and oceans. The entire world has an urgent interest in the progress, and hope, of freedom in the broader Middle East”.

The National Security Strategy of 2006 reflected this thinking when analyzing the roots of terrorism in the Arab World. It concluded that ‘political alienation’ and ‘sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation’ combined with domestic repression and severe restrictions on freedom; all together they provide ‘an ideology that justifies murder’ that drove some individuals in the Arab world towards terrorism and political extremism (10).

When making the claims about the links between authoritarianism and terrorism, the Bush Doctrine was echoing aspects of the neoconservative interpretation of totalitarian theory. In his article “Understanding the Bush Doctrine” Robert Jervis noted that the President Bush and key officials of his administration believed in the view that regime type played a highly important role in international relations. The Bush Doctrine expressed the view that any dictatorial regimes would promote and encourage an ideology of violence in virtue of being oppressive state, and the easy solution to solve this problem was through transforming the state into a democracy.

Well-known neoconservative figures often articulated these ideas and implicitly linked them to the tradition theory in neoconservative paradigm. Concerning the neoconservative analysis of the roots of Jihadist terrorism, Joshua Muravchik in “The Neoconservative Persuasion” argued that:

“The problem lay in the political culture of the Middle East. The question was how to change it. One of the defining features of that political culture was tyrannical government. We argued that if we can spread democracy as a form of government in that region, then the process of socialisation that occurs in democracies will lead people away from thinking murder and suicide are the way to carry on an argument, and foster more political and peaceful ways”.

Muravchik held that the explanations which provided that terrorism roots based on poverty or Jihadists’ misunderstanding and grievance were false. He contended that the political climate of repression caused by Arab authoritarianism that drove frustrated civilians to extremism. Similarly, as Dobriensky held in ‘*Democracy Promotion in the 21st century*’ that the responsible for Jihadist terrorism were primarily the authoritarian states in the Middle East. Paula Dobriensky argued that in the Arab World “the danger to America comes not exclusively from dictators who make war directly upon us, our allies, and our interests – it also emanates from dictators who create an atmosphere so poisonous and so brutal that evil sprouts and motivates a small but radicalized cadre to terrorism”. Thus, it was only through changing the status quo in the Middle East and democracy transformational process that the United States could basically weaken terrorism and ensure its security.

Many members of the President Bush cabinet like Condoleezza Rice and Dick Cheney repeatedly reflected their belief that the terrorist-breeding status quo of the Middle

East was no longer acceptable. Since the events of 9/11, the United States carried the task of removing the regimes responsible for generating terrorists' radicalism.

Since the first National Security Council meeting of the Bush administration in January 2001, influential neoconservative key advisers like Wolfowitz Feith and Perle had been supporting for regime change in Iraq (Bamford 284-5). A number of these figures brought many aspects of their neoconservative policy they had adopted in the Project for a New American Century and other journals of the 1990's.

During the eight months of Bush's presidency and before the September 11 attacks, the neoconservatives within and outside the administration could not show clearly their intention of how to deal with Saddam as the government lacked a decisive action on Iraq. But they repeatedly warned of the dangers Saddam Hussein posed and the opportunities of toppling the rule and the regional political transformation that would occur.

After 9/11 attacks, neoconservative policymakers and their allies in the government pushed the administration to adopt policies of regime change and democratisation in Iraq as the top priority of the war on terrorism. In a speech at Whitehall Palace in London, the President Bush contended a shift in his foreign policy when adopting new policies that seek to bring a democratic transformation in the Middle East arguing that governments in the region had failed to deter terrorism: "We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. He emphasized that:

“[The United States] in the past [...] have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold. As recent history has shown,

we cannot turn a blind eye to oppression just because the oppression is not in our own backyard”.

In the afternoon of September 11, 2001, James Bamford quoted what Donald Rumsfeld noted in conversations with his staff as he wanted: “best info fast; judge whether good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only U.B.L. [Osama bin Laden].” “Go massive,” he noted. “Sweep it all up. Things related, and not” (285-6).

Similarly after the attacks, Paul Wolfowitz with other officials including Cheney had the same idea and quickly began talking up an Iraqi connection with Al Qaeda and implicitly the events of September 11. In his book “Against All Enemies”, the former Bush administration counter-terrorism chief, Richard Clarke claimed that Wolfowitz was eager to get Iraq in the middle of the debate and to target it first as a response to the attacks, believing that Iraq and not Afghanistan was where the war on terrorism should begin. He claimed that: “there were other terrorist concerns, like Iraq, and whatever we did on this al Qaeda business, we had to deal with the other sources of terrorism” (Clarke 231).

Moreover, according to Bob Woodward in the ‘*Plan of Attack*’, Rumsfeld and Feith supported the idea of regime change in Iraq as the first response to the attacks, whereas Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet opposed this view and tried to convince President Bush to leave the option aside and concentrate on Afghanistan (22). Feith revealed that a plan for a military action against Iraq began in late September 2001 as Rumsfeld ordered his military chiefs to draw up war plans against Iraq and to find a link between the threat Saddam Hussein posed for the United States and the terrorists attacks (14). This showed that neoconservatives within the Bush administration reflected a sense of urgency following 9/11 attacks that considers Saddam Hussein a key for the political transformation of the Middle East that was required to defeat terrorism.

The war on terrorism began on October 2001 as the U.S. launched a war against Afghanistan and the administration quickly turned to link Iraq with the war on terrorism and the need of democracy promotion through regime change. On November 29, 2001, Paul Wolfowitz a meeting of a group of neoconservatives and some foreign policy intellectuals who helped in the making of neoconservative think tanks of the 1990's like the Project for a New American Century, for discussing and assessing Iraqi involvement in the war on terror.

This group called themselves 'Bletchley II', after the name 'Bletchley' that was used to call the team of mathematicians and cryptologists the British set up during World War II to break the German communications code. It included Bernard Lewis, Fareed Zakaria, Fouad Ajami, Mark Palmer, Ruel Marc Gerech and James Q Wilson, produced a paper entitled "The Delta of Terrorism" (Woodward, *State of Denial* 83-4).

The participants of the Bletchley group saw that Jihadist terrorists of the Middle East region posed an existed threat comparable to Soviet communism of the Cold War and that the Iraqi Baathist regime which has an Arab form of fascism represented the nexus of this threat. They additionally concluded that a confrontation with Saddam was inevitable as a key to win the war on terrorism (84). In December 2001, 'The Delta of Terrorism' paper was given to the President Bush and his national security team. This paper had a great impact on the formulation of Bush's interventionist rationales in Iraq and provided some aspects that seemed to be the policy to deal with Iraq for the following years.

Notably, not only inside the Bush government that the linkage between the war on terrorism and regime change to promote democracy in Iraq was influenced by the neoconservative thinking. Outside the government influential policy makers and the President Bush himself after September 11 adopted many concepts of the Project for a New American Century and the publications of *the Weekly Standard*. In the address to a Joint Session of

Congress and the American people, on September 20, 2001, Bush declared that “any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime”.

As such, Bush’s statements are similar to the Project for a New American Century letter demands and as many writers at *the Weekly Standard*². In developing a decision of regime change in Iraq, President Bush and his foreign policy makers repeatedly argued that it was Saddam Hussein’s tyranny character that was responsible for promoting terrorism in the Middle East. Outside the administration, neoconservatives had a limited influence on the thinking about Iraq but they provided interventionist policy prescriptions that were adopted in official policy making and boosted by neoconservative peers within the government.

After the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Bush administration consistently emphasized the centrality of democratising the country to ensure the win of the war on terrorism. The neoconservatives within Bush administration held the view that regime change policy and the invasion of Iraq was the right thing to end terrorism networks. Following 9/11 the administration believed that terrorism is no longer a manageable evil that it had to be treated in another way even if at the expense of American lives. To them, sponsoring regimes had to be attacked and Saddam overthrown deemed to be necessary.

Conclusion

By 2003 it became clear that the neoconservative early themes of caution and backing opposition groups in an attempt to topple threats to the United States have vanished. The idea that the U.S. could use its power to consider its national interests and to solve security issues and democratisation policies had been developed by neoconservatives in the latter half of the 1990s. But, it was not fully perceived until the 2001 attacks were launched, yet, this led

neoconservatives to conceptualize that the threats US faced are largely based on lack of political freedom.

The Bush Doctrine's armed democracy promotion policies were central themes of the U.S. post-September 11 grand strategies and were clearly linked to the justifications for regime change in Iraq. Establishing a new regime in Baghdad was seen to be integral to confront authoritarianism and the roots of Jihadist terrorism, to spread freedom, to encourage a democratic peace, to advance American interests and security, and further to foster a domino effect theory in the region of the Middle East. The Bush Doctrine's interventionist democratisation strategy is the neoconservative ascendancy over the American foreign policy after 9/11 attacks. The key neoconservative figures in the Bush administration who shared much of the neoconservative outlook and the 2001 September attacks both created unique conditions for the formation of a highly ambitious foreign policy of armed democracy promotion in Iraq.

End Note

¹ Heilbrunn J. argued that this book has not received the attention it deserves, as it was the most lengthy neoconservative foreign policy text (245).

² On September 20, 2001 senior neoconservative members of the Project for a New American Century wrote a letter to President Bush on war on terrorism. They argued that in the war against terrorism they fully support a call for a broad and sustained campaign against the terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them including Iraq. The United States must find and punish the perpetrators of the horrific attack of September 11, and go after terrorism wherever they find it in the world. Additionally, many signatories of this letter also regularly wrote in the *Weekly Standard* following the attacks.

³ Following his withdrawal from the neoconservative group, in his book 'America at the Crossroads' Francis Fukuyama asserted a misinterpretation of his view: that there is a universal hunger for liberty in all people that will inevitably lead them to liberal democracy, and that Americans are living in the midst of an accelerating, transnational movement in favour of liberal democracy. He argued that the End of History is an argument about modernization. What is initially universal is not the desire for liberal democracy but rather the desire to live in a modern society (54).

Works Cited

“Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People”. *Voices of Democracy*.

The U.S. Oratory Project 20 September 2001. Web 2 Aug. 2011.

Asmus, Ronald D. "Commit for the Long Run." *The Washington Post*: 0. Jan 29

2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2011 .

Asser, Martin. “Analysis: A tougher line?”. *BBC News*. Middle East 22 February 2001. Web

12 May 2011.

Balint, Benjamin. *RUNNING COMMENTARY: The Contentious Magazine that Transformed*

the Jewish Left into the Neoconservative Right. New York: Public Affairs, 2010.

Bamford, James. *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence*

Agencies. New York: Doubleday, 2004.

Boot, Max. “The End of Appeasement”. *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.21 (10 Feb. 2003). Web

18 Mar. 2012.

---. “The False Allure of “Stability””. *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.13 (9 Dec. 2002). Web 18

Mar. 2012.

Borger, Julian. “US big guns silent on ‘regime change’”. *The Guardian*. The guardian 13

Feb. 2002. Web 4 July 2011.

Brooks, David. "Hell of a Week". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 13 December 2001. Web 5 Apr. 2011.

---. "The Fog of Peace". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.3 (30 Sep. 2002). Web 15 Sep. 2011.

Clarke, Richard A. *Against All Enemies Inside America's War on Terror*. New York: Free Press, 2004.

Daalder, Ivo H. and James M. Lindsay. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.

"Defending and Advancing Freedom: A Symposium." *Commentary* 11 2005: 21-68. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2011 .

Dobriansky, Paula J."Promoting Democracy in the 21st Century: An Essential Tool Against Terrorism". *U.S.Department of State*. 9 February 2004. Web 30 Oct. 2011.

Dorrien, Gary. *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana*. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Eliot, Abrams. "Iraq can't Resist Us." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Dec 18 2001. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2012.

Eliot, Cohen A. "World War IV." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Nov 20 2001. *ProQuest*. Web. 18 Sep. 2012.

Feith, Douglas J. *WAR AND DECISION: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*. New York: Harper Collins, 2008.

Freedman, Lawrence. *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.

Fukuyama, Francis. *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Gerecht, Reuel Marc. "Liberate Iraq". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 6.33 (14 May 2001). Web 22 June 2011.

---. "Regime Change in Iran?". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.45 (5 Aug. 2002). Web 22 June 2011.

Halper, Stefan and Jonathan Clarke. *America Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Irving, Kristol. "Board of Contributors: A Post-Wilsonian Foreign Policy." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Aug 02 1996. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2011.

Jervis, Robert. "Understanding the Bush Doctrine". *The Academy of Political Science*. *Political Science Quarterly* 118.3 (2003): 365-88. Web. 21 Oct. 2011.

Kagan, Donald. "REACTION TO 'BUSH'S REAL GOAL IN IRAQ': Comparing America to Ancient Empires is 'Ludicrous'." *The Atlanta Journal - Constitution*: 0. Oct 06 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

Kagan, Frederick W. "War Sooner Rather Than Later". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.24 (3 Mar. 2003). Web 15 Sep. 2011.

Kagan, Robert. "Bush's Missile Defense Triumph". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 5.39 (26 June 2000). Web 30 Oct. 2011.

---. "Iraq: The Day After." *The Washington Post*: 0. Jul 21 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

---. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. New York: Vintage Books, 2004.

Kagan, Robert and William Kristol. "A Distinctly American Internationalism". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 5.11 (29 Nov. 1999). Web 18 Aug. 2011.

---. "Bush's War Budget". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 25 June 2002. Web 30 Oct. 2011.

---. "Cheney Trips Up: The vice president's Middle East expedition didn't help the war on terror". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.28 (1 Apr. 2002). Web 5 Mar. 2011.

---. "Clinton's Foreign Policy (cont.)". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 12 March 2001. Web 5 Mar. 2011.

- . "Going Wobbly". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.37 (3 June 2002). Web 5 Mar. 2011.
- . "Lost in the Wilderness". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 12 April 2002. Web 5 June. 2011.
- . *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*.
California: Encounter Books, 2000.
- . "Remember the Bush Doctrine". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 5 April 2002. Web 5 June.
2011.
- . "The "Adults" Make a Mess". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 6.33 (14 May 2001). Web 15
Apr. 2012.
- . "The Bush Era". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 1 February 2002. Web 15 Apr. 2012.
- . "The Detour". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.29 (8 Apr. 2002). Web 16 Apr. 2012.
- . "The Gathering Storm". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.7 (29 Oct. 2001). Web 30 Sep.
2012.
- . "The Right War". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.3 (1 Oct. 2001). Web 5 Apr. 2011.
- . "The Right War for the Right Reasons". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 9.23 (23 Feb. 2004).
Web 12 Apr. 2011.
- . "The U.N. Trap?". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.10 (18 Nov. 2002). Web 5 Apr. 2011.

---. "What to Do About Iraq". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.18 (21 Jan. 2002). Web 18 Mar. 2012.

Keller, Bill. "The Sunshine Warrior." *New York Times Magazine* Sep 22 2002: 48,6.48. *ProQuest*. Web. 9 Nov. 2012.

Krauthammer, Charles. "Holiday from History." *The Washington Post*: 0. Feb 14 2003. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

---. "Is this the Way to Decide on Iraq?" *The Washington Post*: 0. Sep 20 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

---. "Kidnapped by the Times." *The Washington Post*: 0. Aug 18 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 17 Sep. 2012.

---. "Kofi's Choice". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.34 (13 May 2002). Web 3 Oct. 2011.

---. "No Turning Back Now." *The Washington Post*: 0. Jan 24 2003. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

---. "Peace through Democracy." *The Washington Post*: 0. Jun 28 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 11 Sep. 2012.

---. "The Neoconservative Convergence." *Commentary* Jul 2005: 21-6. *ProQuest*. Web. 3 Nov. 2012.

---. "The War: A Road Map." *The Washington Post*: 0. Sep 28 2001. *ProQuest*. Web. 17 Sep. 2012.

---. "The Window of Legitimacy." *The Washington Post*: 0. Nov 15 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2012.

---. "We can't Blow it again." *The Washington Post*: 0. Apr 19 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 11 Sep. 2012.

Kristol, William and Gary Schmitt. "Lessons of a Nuclear North Korea". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 28 October 2002. Web 30 Oct. 2011.

Kristol, William, et al. "Letter to President Bush". *Project for the New American Century*. PNAC, 20 September 2001. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.

Lawrence, Kaplan F. and William Kristol. *The war over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*. California: Encounter Books, 2003.

McClellan, Scott. *WHAT HAPPENED Inside the Bush White House Washington's Culture of Deception*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.

Muravchik, Joshua. "Freedom and the Arab World: Terrorism Thrives where People aren't free". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.16 (31 Dec. 2001). Web 5 Mar. 2011.

---. "Hearts, Minds, and the War Against Terror." *Commentary* 05 2002: 25-30. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2011.

---. "The Bush Manifesto." *Commentary* 12 2002: 23-30. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2012.

---. "The Neoconservative Persuasion and Foreign Policy". *The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English web site*. Ikhwanweb, 12 December 2007. Web 20 Feb. 2011.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Article 51". *NATO*. Nato.int 24 Oct. 1945. Web 22 Mar. 2011.

Pipes, Daniel. "Missing: Realistic Take on Arafat." *Daniel Pipes.org*. Los Angeles Times, 5 Apr. 2002. Web. 13 Feb. 2012.

---. "Who Is the Enemy?". *Daniel Pipes.org*. Commentary, January 2002. Web. 3 Feb. 2012.

Podhoretz, Norman. "How to Win World War IV." *Commentary* 02 2002: 19-29. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2012.

---. "In Praise of the Bush Doctrine." *Commentary* 09 2002: 19-28. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

---. "The Obsolescence of Deterrence". ". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.13 (9 Dec. 2002). Web 5 Apr. 2011.

Bush, George W. "President Bush Addresses the Nation". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 19 Mar. 2003. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.

"President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 24 June 2002. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.

- “President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London”. *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 19 November 2003. Web. 29 March 2011.
- “President Bush Meets with French President Chirac”. *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 26 May 2002. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- “President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Hold Press Conference”. *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 6 April 2002. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- “President Delivers “State of the Union ””. *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 28 Jan. 2003. Web. 3 Apr. 2011.
- “President Discusses War on Terror”. *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 8 March 2005. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- “Promoting Democracy in the 21st Century : An Essential Tool Against Terrorism”. *U.S. Department of State*. Archive 9 February 2004. Web 13 Dec. 2011.
- Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.
- Ritchie, Nick, and Paul Rogers. *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Schmitt, Gary and Tom Donnelly. “The Bush Doctrine”. *Project for the New American Century*. PNAC, 30 January 2002. Web. 24 Feb. 2012.
- Smith, Tony. *A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise*. New York: Routledge, 2007.

“The First Gore-Bush Presidential Debate”. *Commission on Presidential Debates*.

Debates.org, 3 October 2000. Web 19 Nov. 2011.

“The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate”. *Commission on Presidential Debates*.

Debates.org, 11 October 2000. Web 19 Nov. 2011.

“The Third Gore-Bush Presidential Debate”. *Commission on Presidential Debates*.

Debates.org, 17 October 2000. Web 19 Nov. 2011.

United Nations. “Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002)”. Web 8 November 2002.

---. “Security Council Resolution 1194 (1998)”. Web 9 September 1998.

---. “Security Council Resolution 1137 (1997)”. Web 12 November 1997.

---. “Security Council Resolution 688 (1991)”. Web 5 April 1991.

---. “Security Council Resolution 479 (1980)”. Web 4 October 1982.

United States. Cong. Senate. Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee .

107th Cong., 1st sess. Web 2 Feb. 2011.

---. The President’s International Affairs Budget Request for FY 2003. 2nd sess. Web 13

March 2011.

United States. Dept. of Defense. “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st

Century Defense”. 3 January 2012. Web 22 Dec. 2012.

United States. Dept. of State. “Winning the Struggle Between Freedom and Terror in the

Middle East”. 31 August 2006. Web 22 Dec. 2011.

United States Gov. “Public Law 107-243-Oct. 16 2002: Authorization for Use of Military

Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002”. Web 2 Feb. 2011.

---. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America". March 2006. Web 18 Jan. 2011.

Victor, Davis Hanson. "Our Enemies, the Saudis." *Commentary* Jul 2002: 23-8. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

Wattenberg, Ben. "Richard Perle: The Making of a Neoconservative". *Public Broadcasting Service*. Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, 14 Nov. 2002. Web. 24 Aug. 2012.

Weiner, Tim. "Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan's Forceful Envoy, Dies." *New York Times*: 0. Dec 09 2006. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.

---. *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

---. *State of Denial: Bush at War Part III*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.

Woolsey, R. J. "Defeating the Oil Weapon." *Commentary* 09 2002: 29-33. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2011 .

---. "What Our Enemies Want...". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.2 (24 Sep. 2001). Web 18 Mar. 2012.

CHAPTER FIVE

From Theory to Practice: Democracy in Iraq

2003-2006

Introduction

Since the invasion of Iraq, important critiques have been made of the outcomes of the Bush administration's democracy promotion strategy. But before discussing the results, it is significant first to understand what the reasons President Bush and his team provided to make democracy the only possible solution to end Terrorism and authoritarianism in Iraq. Actually, they argued for the universality of freedom and the decision of the United States to launch a war against Iraq is what provides the liberal character both to President Bush and his senior neoconservative advisers. In the assessment of the situation some critics have examined the effects of intervention, while some have also discussed how this intervention has affected the threat posed by Jihadist terrorism.

5.1 Armed Democratisation is the Cure?

To set out the reason behind going to war after Iraq, the Bush administration repeatedly argued for the universality of freedom and the right of oppressed regimes to live freely. Although the provided reasons neglected the United States plans of using force to establish democratic Iraq. This section examines the liberal character of the Bush administration decisions to launch war in Iraq to explain the shift in their evolution on democracy promotion concept.

The President Bush claimed that his administration explicitly broke with the policies of its predecessors by adopting democratisation policies. In September 2003, President Bush

discussed Freedom in Iraq and the Middle East and provided a precise explanation of shift's necessity:

“Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe [...] As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo”.

Accordingly, Bush's intention of spreading democracy was to use all means available to the United States to reach the “advancement of human freedom and human dignity through effective democracy” (NSCT 9). Through analyzing the “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” (NSCT) document we can set out a number of objectives that the administration sought to reach through democracy promotion In Iraq:

- Wiping out terrorism.
- Promote regional stability and creating peace.
- Promote regional economic growth.
- Ending tyranny.

Undoubtedly, these objectives were drawn from the neoconservative paradigm of democracy promotion. The Bush Doctrine proposed a set of suggestions to achieve its democratisation objective in Iraq.

- Wiping out terrorism through *a democratic Iraq that would enhance American security*.

- Promoting regional stability and creating peace through *a democratic Middle East (Democratising Iraq would cause a democratic domino effect in the Middle East)*.
- Promoting regional economic growth through *freeing the Iraqi people to live in a liberal order*.
- Ending tyranny that fosters terrorism through *toppling down Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq*.

These propositions together formed the United States' foreign policy with Iraq that justified regime change and military intervention for the need of maintaining democratisation.

5.1.1 The Universality of Freedom

The Bush administration considered the concept of freedom universality at the core of American foreign policy. It claimed that all people had a natural right of freedom. In The National Security Strategy of 2002, senior members asserted the wish of all people to live free to be able to choose the form of their government and society. President Bush stated that liberated people from dictatorship and oppression would logically choose freedom, liberal institutions and specifically democracy as their form of government. After 9/11 attacks, these ideas of freedom were planned to be the Bush administration leading concept to regime end in Iraq.

As many aspects of the Bush Doctrine, the concept of freedom was concisely stated in the National Security Strategy of September 2002. President Bush introduced the paper stating that:

“freedom in the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person - in every civilization”(iii). He contended that “Liberty and justice [...] are right and true for all people everywhere. No

nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and to live free of poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police” (iii).

From his early days in office, Bush considered freedom to be a concept of great importance in conducting his foreign policy outlook. It was during his inaugural address in 2001 that Bush championed the concept of freedom as the individual innate desire of freedom that exists within every person. President Bush asserted an American objective of bringing about freedom all around the world to help people through utilizing the United States national power to advance freedom; including its military force where it deemed necessary. As the global super power and hegemony, it was of American nature the mission and responsibility to spread universal rights and to make them applicable to all people. The United States administration, moreover, argued that freedom was in the best interests of people in other nations.

The Bush government announcements concerning the aspect of freedom were consistently associated with the need of democracy promotion in the Middle East and mainly for Muslims. In his 2002 West Point graduation address, Bush stated that: “When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes”. It seems clear that Bush thought negatively of Muslim religious commitments as he referred to the Islamic world as the place where people’s freedoms are oppressed.

Likewise, the Bush administration's Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice wrote in 'the Promise of Democratic Peace' that the desire for freedom was universal, and that the American "power gains its greatest legitimacy when we support the natural right of all people, even those who disagree with us, to govern themselves in liberty". In mid 2005, Rice contended in a speech at the American University in Cairo that: "liberty is the universal longing of every soul, and democracy is the ideal path for every nation". Therefore, President Bush, Rice and other neoconservative officials most of them in the State and Defense Departments, claimed that freedom is the natural right of every person of the Arabic world. Many people there were prevented from obtaining this right, because of tyranny that repressed people from gaining and expressing their freedom.

Accordingly and in their support of spreading freedom to the Middle East, President Bush and others tried to confront with critiques which argue that Arabs and Muslims in particular do not want to live in freedom and that planning a freedom agenda in the region has its limits due to a history of dictator rules coupled with strong religious traditions.

For Bush, those who oppose a freedom agenda in the Arab world represented cultural activists who wrongly believed in Arabic incapability to live in freedom. In a speech to the American Institute discussing the future of Iraq in February 2003, President Bush asserted that: "It is presumptuous and insulting to suggest that a whole region of the world- or the one fifth of humanity that is Muslim – is somehow untouched by the most basic aspirations of life. Human cultures can vastly differ. Yet the human heart desires the same good things, everywhere on Earth. In our desire to be safe from brutal and bullying oppression, human beings are the same. In our desire to care for our children and give them a better life, we are the same".

In another speech in May 2003, the President Bush urged peace for the Middle East arguing that following the Second World War critics questioned the appeal of freedom in countries like: Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, but its effectiveness was proved as freedom took root in such states. When applying this to the Middle East Bush confirmed that “the history of the modern world offers a lesson for the skeptics: do not bet against the success of freedom”. Just as it had brought change in countries like USSR, Germany and others, the United States would press the spread of freedom in Iraq and the Arab Middle East to help its people to realize their hope for freedom that had been suppressed by authoritarian rules there.

This view reflected the neoconservative claims of Paula Dobriansky, Paul Wolfowitz and others, discussed in chapter one of this thesis. Each of them asserted the universality of freedom and that it was imperative to encourage freedom in dictatorships like Iraq. Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Paula Dobriansky, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, held important positions in the Bush administration and it is likely that their ideas about the universality of freedom had its impacts on the claims expressed in the Bush Doctrine.

5.1.2 Liberal Democratisation

The Bush Doctrine pillar of democratisation in Iraq was overtly liberal in nature. Liberal views were reflected in the Bush administration military intervention and its aspects of democratising Iraq. The liberal outlook Bush’s foreign policy reflected was influenced by the liberal international relations theories expressed by democratic globalists and post-Cold War optimism of the global appeal of liberalism appeared following the collapse of communism. Accordingly, the United States had developed a rationale for intervention as the

lone power that held the prescription for successful liberal societies, and the only path available for promoting liberal democracy was through armed actions.

According to the Bush administration maintaining a liberal order was the only way in which people in the world could organize their lives and government. In his West Point speech, President Bush asserted that “the 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on nonnegotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance.”

In the National Security Strategy of September 2002, the Bush administration believed that with the end of the great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with the decisive victory for “the forces of freedom”(i) which provided unprecedented opportunity to US to share a commitment of protecting human rights of freedom to assure their future prosperity. The document confirmed that the United States sought to build “a balance of power that favours human freedom” aiming to maintain “conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty” (i). The President Bush argued that the U.S was not attempting to impose liberal values of freedom but instead it would give all people a chance to protect their own “basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom” as “a single model for national success” (i).

The attitude that favours American duty of spreading the liberal values of freedom was adopted from the neoconservative reading of Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man*’ (1992). Senior officials of the Bush administration derived the End of History argument as an ideal conception the United States should adopt for spreading liberal values internationally that required American military actions³. Influential members of the

Bush government conceived of Fukuyama's argument as part of the U.S. post 9/11 attacks grand strategy in the Middle East to expand liberal view through force for the goal of ending tyranny. They wanted to realize 'the End of History' concept. Therefore, democratic globalists' interpretation of this argument became a guiding framework for the Bush's Doctrine's aspects for promoting a liberal democratic order in authoritarian states.

The documents that articulated the Bush Doctrine basically reflected an American administration strong faith in liberalism in broad theoretical terms. For President Bush and many influential officials of his cabinet, the United States held a number of universal prescriptions for liberal democracy, economic prosperity and social order. The National Security Strategy of September 2002 was introduced contending that the U.S. would "actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world" (ii). For the development of applicable plans to "promote effective democracies" and to expand many of liberal values abroad, the Bush administration's National Security Strategy of 2006 outlined the key elements of a successful liberal democracy. According to the strategy document:

"As tyrannies give way, [the United States] must help newly free nations build effective democracies:

- Honor and uphold basic human rights, including freedom of religion conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press;
- Are responsive to their citizens, submitting to the will of the people, especially when people vote to change their government;
- Exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their own borders, protect independent and impartial systems of justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law, and resist corruption; and

- Limit the reach of government, protecting the institutions of civil society, including the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent business, and a market economy.” (4)

The National Security Strategy asserted that “[e]lections are the most visible sign of a free society and can play a critical role in advancing effective democracy. But elections alone are not enough – they must be reinforced by other values, rights, and institutions to bring about lasting freedom. Our goal is human liberty protected by democratic institutions” (5). Hence, participating in elections and the formation of governments should base on liberal conceptions of separation of power and checks and balances between sources of governmental authority. Moreover, the rule of law, equality among citizens and free market economies were very essential to ensure effective liberal democracy.

Whilst a considerable amount of literature has focused on democracy promotion and the Iraq war, few has acknowledged the formal institutionalization process of the freedom agenda that contributed a key explanation of the manner in which the Bush administration sought to spread democracy through coercive regime change. Thus, it is important to note that the Bush Doctrine’s claims of liberal democracy had followed both “stick and carrot” methods¹. These ‘carrots’ were reflected in a variety of aid programs to apparently assist the development of civil society, women’s groups, education and enterprise in Arab states. Especially important were the *Middle East Partnership Initiative* (MEPI), and the *Broader Middle East North Africa* initiative (BMENA).

The Middle East Partnership Initiative was the most dominant institutional changes made by the Bush administration. This program was officially launched on December 12, 2002 by Secretary of State Collin Powell who argued that: “It is time to lay a firm foundation of hope. I am announcing today an initiative that places the United States firmly on the side of

change, of reform, and of a modern future for the Middle East. [...] Through the *U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative*, we are adding hope to the U.S.-Middle East agenda. We are pledging our energy, our abilities, and our idealism to bring hope to all of God's children who call the Middle East home.

The MEPI program was founded to broaden the US transformational approach of the Middle East by focusing on factors highlighted in the *UN Arab Human Development Report* of 2002 which marked a “freedom deficit” in the Middle East and the Northern African (MENA) States and argued that a new strategy is needed to bring “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” in accordance with educational improvements and women’s empowerment in the region. Accordingly this program was divided into four aspects: political, economic, education, and women’s issues. These pillars were planned to generate short term grants for a period of two years or less that based on addressing particular challenges of democratisation in the region. The Bush administration believed in the MEPI ability to complement and facilitate progress in each of its pillars.

Another effective program, the *Broader Middle East and North Africa* initiative was launched by the United States during its 2004 G8². It was an attempt to reflect a multilateral dimension to its liberal democratisation in the Middle East. This initiative duplicated many of MEPI’s aims and attempted to create a multilateral objective of “promoting democracy and good governance, building a knowledge society, and expanding economic opportunities’ for the MENA. Its central initiative was the *Forum of the Future* that was intended to be an annual meeting in which government and civil society groups from the G8 and the MENA would meet to discuss reform measures.

Following September 11 attacks, the U.S. adopted a new approach to its relations with the Middle East with democracy promotion as a core objective. Indeed, MEPI and BMENA demonstrated concrete attempts to utilize American resources and security policy

instruments to promote democracy in the Middle East. The Bush administration adopted different tools of new institutions and armed intervention to create a legal basis for a liberal grand strategy of democracy promotion that was fundamental to American national interests.

The prescriptions for liberal democracy outlined by the Bush Doctrine and institutional process were strongly supported by neoconservatives. Influential neoconservative figures in the Bush administration like Wolfowitz and Perle, and others well known neoconservatives outside the Bush administration such as Kristol and Kagan, consistently backed liberal democracy claims of the Bush Doctrine. On the concern of liberal institutions, Paula Dobriansky, a lesser known neoconservative, held the position of Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs and Democracy, and served to reinforce calls for the spread of its beliefs on democracy successful plans. She stressed the need for liberal institutions and civil society to support the development of successful democracy. In 2004, in ‘Advancing Democracy’ article, Paula Dorbiansky argued that:

“Democracy-building is a protracted process, and one or two free elections do not make a democracy. A mature democracy requires far more than periodic holding of even free and fair elections. It calls for limited government, with many of the economic, social and cultural issues being handled within a private sphere. The rule of law is another must, with a particular emphasis on ensuring governmental accountability”

Dobriansky urged the establishment of liberal institutions before holding the elections, in spite of their integral part to the process of democracy building to ensure that checks and balances on the power of the government be official in law to guarantee the rights of all minorities within the state. She added that while the United States was “happy to share [its] experience, promoting democracy does not mean imposing the American

political and constitutional model on other countries". Dobriansky asserted that the United States government believed that "citizens in emerging democracies must be free to develop institutions compatible with their own cultures and experiences", and that while their "desire for freedom, the rule of law and a vibrant civil society, and for a voice in one's government, is universal" (41) the new emerged liberal democratic systems would not necessarily resemble the American system.

For that, the Bush administration did not offer an alternative to the values, institutions, and order offered by liberal democracy. Its deep faith in the future of liberalism and its support for democratisation was strongly related to its justification for armed intervention in Iraq. The Bush Doctrine's claims of promoting a liberal world order using its military power were mainly applied to Iraq. Purdy stated that "the Bush Doctrine stakes its case" for intervention in Iraq "on the idea that these [liberal] values can be effectively achieved by imperial intervention. The basis of this idea [...] is the belief that top-down American competence and bottom-up local spontaneous order will meet to produce a market economy, stable democratic institutions, and a civil society that protects basic liberty and security".

The United States government aimed to launch a liberal democratisation through armed intervention due to meet its labeled objectives: to defeat threats posed by terrorists in the region of the Middle East to enhance American security and material interests, and to secure freedom and peace in the region. Each of the prepositions was made by the Bush Doctrine for armed democratisation in Iraq, reflected key elements of its liberal interventionist thinking. The main goal of this logic was the need for regime change and democracy promotion in Iraq.

5.2 Transformative Democracy in Iraq

Following the bush's administration clumsy attempts to manage the aftermath of the Iraq War, some neoconservatives have tried to downplay any suggestion that their rationale for the US invasion was anything other than an expression of the national security of the United States. Perle argued that at no point in the run-up of the Iraq War did neoconservatives discuss military democratisation, and it is ridiculous to suggest that the Bush Doctrine involved a democratic crusade (). Douglas Feith also mentioned that neither President Bush nor the neoconservatives advocated the Iraq War on grounds of spreading democracy. He further attempted to distinguish between going to war in order to spread democracy and going to war to defeat an enemy for reasons of national security and then if necessary trying to make that country democratic (*War and Decision* 234).

Logically, to advocate regime change, it is somewhat reasonable to think of the regime which will replace it. It is awkward to convince critics that neoconservatives did not spend the eighteen months between the attacks of 9/11 and the Iraq War making the case for the United States military to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from power, and to further replace it with a liberal democratic regime that would improve the lives of Iraqi citizens. Of course, this was framed with relation to the national security of the United States and that their emphasis on liberal democracy and American power is what distinguish them from other schools of foreign policy.

5.2.1 The Early Years 2003-2005

Democracy promotion in Iraq represents a useful case study of both Bush's and neoconservatives' theoretical claims about democratisation in practice. Critics of intervention in Iraq often mentioned that the developments in the state during the first two years of occupation are important to analyse the limitations in practice over the ability of the

United States to foster liberal values. Further, the Bush administration's policy of democracy promotion faced considerable obstacles in the formation of an elected government in 2005 unlike that which policy makers expected would be established in the months after regime change in 2003.

In general, the Bush administration made three assumptions about the appeal of liberal values and the process of democratic transformation in Iraq. The first of these was the idea that regime change would be an easy task. In a press conference held just before the invasion of Iraq started, Marc Grossman; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; mentioned that regime change operation would need some arms of the Ba'athist regime, it would nevertheless possible to keep many Iraqi state institutions to be used during democratisation ("Assisting Iraqis").

Concerning the Bush administration's plans for post-war Iraq, Grossman pointed out that "you may go to the Ministry of Health, for example, and find there that if you took out the top one or two or three or four people, who are Saddam Hussein cronies or otherwise unacceptable to the coalition, you might find a whole rest of the ministry that could transit quite quickly back to Iraqi sovereignty". Grossman argued that some ministries should be kept since they might be helpful to facilitate democratisation, maintaining essential services and aiding American forces in establishing a provisional government. Similarly, Douglas Feith argued that in the power vacuum of the post-Saddam Iraq, many ministries could be easily purged of their Ba'athist leaders and thus quickly become part of an interim regime (361). Paul Wolfowitz, meanwhile, believed that Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki's estimation that the United States would need up to "several hundred thousand troops" to secure Iraq after regime toppling was "widely off the mark" as 130.000 would be sufficient (Ricks 97).

The second assumption was that the process of democratisation would be led by exiled Iraqi political leaders. Neoconservatives in the government were determined that democracy promotion in Iraq should be led by pro-American politicians primarily associated with Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress [1]. The journalist David Reiff argued that the version of the proxy was a strategy proposed by neoconservative intellectuals such as Wolfowitz, Perle and Khalilzad during the 1990's. Nevertheless, this policy had become less feasible after September attacks, its proponents now believed that while regime change in Iraq would better be carried by direct American military force, the Iraqi National Congress should lead the democratic regime to be established in Baghdad (31). Reiff added that high level Pentagon planners believed that Iraqis would easily embrace the Iraqi National Congress, as this group was apparently considered by a majority of the population as the most feasible and popular option to set up a democratic government.

On the other hand, Douglas Feith attempts to rebut the claim that he and leading planners assumed that Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress would play a key role in democracy promotion. Feith writes that "some critics have charged that we were seduced by Ahmed Chalabi's predictions that Iraqis would rejoice when liberated from Saddam's tyranny", and that democracy would be rapidly established by the INC. According to Feith "on each of these points, the critics are mistaken" (363-5). James Bamford mentioned that there existed exaggerations on this question, nevertheless it is difficult to deny the importance of the role Chalabi and many of the exiles would play in democratisation. According to Bamford, Chalabi's claims about his popular following, about the way in which Iraqis would rapidly embrace liberal democratic ideas, and about the overall ease of regime change, encouraged the belief among some members of the Bush administration that through installing Iraqi National Congress members in positions of power, democratisation would proceed quickly and smoothly with little cost to the United States (291-4).

The third assumption made by the Bush administration resulted directly from the previous two. The idea was that a program of rapid democratisation was a realistic option for Iraq. Senior leaders of the Bush administration, Colin Powell and Richard Armitage, generally believed that since there were exiled leaders who showed their readiness to control Baghdad after its fall and that the transition to democracy could occur quickly, then regime change is going to be an easy task. Douglas Feith regularly discussed in his memoir the plan for democratisation in Iraq which was known as the Iraqi Interim Authority Plan. Feith argued that the Bush administration envisioned a three-stage process with which a transitional regime led by exiles would be built immediately following regime change, whereby power would be given to a new government within months and Iraq would be safe, democratic and sovereign state within a year (368-9).

In his book 'Squandered Victory', Larry Diamond writes that it was the Iraqi Interim Authority Plan which influenced democracy promotion process that was championed by Jay Garner, the retired US Army lieutenant general who was first charged with leading the occupation of Iraq (32). Garner aimed to appoint a government in May 2003, to appoint a constitution-writing assembly in June, and to move towards ratification of this constitution and then national elections by August 2003 (33). Diamond views this as an ambitious program of democratisation that exemplifies the Bush administration's high degree of confidence that political outcomes in Iraq would conform to its pre-war assumptions about democratic transformation in the state (33).

5.2.1.A The Coalition Provisional Authority: The Plan for Democracy:

Following the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, the Bush administration quickly established an occupation authority to supervise democracy promotion in Iraq. In April 2003, the Department of Defence established the Coalition Provisional Authority

(CPA) in Iraq, and President Bush appointed retired diplomat, Paul Bremer to lead it (Bremer 10). From April 2003 to June 2004, the organization attempted to control the process of economic, political and social reorganisation in Iraq. The CPA planned to enact strategies that derived from the pre-war assumptions but they revealed many problems in practice. The Coalition Provisional Authority quickly found that in practice, the pre-war assumptions made about government had been misplaced.

The journalist James Fellows, in his study of regime change in Iraq, he noted that in a result of the American invasion in 2003, the Iraqi military forces and the state in general suffered a total collapse. There were no remaining state institutions or police forces or government employees which could aid the United States to secure or initiate the process of democratisation. Along with the serious security situation, the CPA regularly faced the question of how to establish democracy in Iraq. The dire task of this process was deciding when and how to hold elections.

In the memoir, *My Year in Iraq*, Paul Bremer repeatedly emphasises his opposition to the ideas of rapid democratization expressed in the Pentagon's Interim Authority plan. Bremer argued that discussion in the Pentagon about elections in Iraq in the months following regime change was a "reckless fantasy" that showed misplaced pre-war assumptions that democracy promotion would not face any serious obstacles in Iraq (12). For him, without security and among a total collapse of Iraqi state institutions and basic services, pushing for early elections was out of the question. So, Iraq would have to be ruled by the CPA for an extended period (205).

Concerning neoconservatives, Bremer critically writes against their support for the Iraqi Interim Authority plan and writes:

“I came to realise that some folks in Washington underestimated the complexity of the challenge and thought we could solve all our problems by simply transferring authority immediately to the Iraqi Governing Council, as if this group could somehow overcome the interconnected security-economic-political problems we in the CPA could not. That kind of wishful thinking did not augur well” (117).

In his 2006 book, *The Assassin's Gate*, George Packer critically mentioned that the CPA mainly sought to “fill all the blanks left empty back in Washington by the war's visionaries who had imagined that freedom and democracy would emerge spontaneously in Iraq”(187). Packer argued that Bremer and the CPA plans for democratisation seemed not to be practical in the reality of Iraq after regime change, and they provided nothing about the way to establish democracy properly.

In the Washington Post, Bremer announced ‘Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty’ article in which he provided a seven-step plan, and he declared that “at the present elections are simply not possible”. Instead, the only way in which Iraq could become democratic was through writing a constitution by which essential democratic rights could be insured and the institutions and the rule of law required could be established preparing for elections. Bremer argues for the necessity of constitution-writing before holding the elections, although this might result in extending the American presence in Iraq but it was essential in order to bring about effective democracy.

In the “*Squandered Victory*”, Larry Diamond examined Bremer’s plan and noted that the CPA faced pressure from the Bush administration and Iraqi Governing Council members to adopt a modified plan of democratisation that would ensure the return of sovereignty during 2004 (153-5). After few months, the CPA announced a revised democratisation strategy known as the “November 15 agreement”. This plan called for a “Transitional

Administration Law” by March 2004, an interim government for the period June 2004 to January 2005, an election in January 2005, the national ratification of a constitution by October 2005, and elections again in December 2005.

Diamond described the process as a “formidable timetable” which assumed little or no resistance from Iraqi political groups and that the institutions required for stable democracy could be established in such a short period (154-5). The CPA and its successor the American embassy in Baghdad continued ahead with the plan holding all procedures scheduled for 2005. Nevertheless, the plan faced significant challenges from native Iraqi leaders and had unexpected results in later years.

5.2.1.B The Challenge of Ayatollah Al Sistani

The CPA and many policy makers of the Bush administration assumed dormant reactions of the Iraqi political leaders towards the timetable for democratisation established in 2003. Yet during 2003, the leader of the Shi’a in Iraq, Ayatollah Al Sistani increasingly confounded the Bush administration’s plans about the development of democracy in Iraq. He repeatedly called to establish an elected political government directly elected by Iraqi people and mainly dominated by the majority religious Shi-ite. Al Sistani had an immense influence in Iraq politics and both the CPA and the Bush administration belatedly understand that. Over time they became to realise democratization in Iraq could only succeed if they acceded to most Sistani’s demands.

Ayatollah al Sistani first showed his disagreement with the CPA program of democratisation in Iraq was when he released Fatwa in June 2003. In his Fatwa, al Sistani showed his unwillingness to the way in which the CPA sought to control the democratisation progress, and he advocated the institutionalization of elections. Larry Diamond argued that the CPA mainly ignored Al Sistani influence in the country as it

equalled him to other religious figures in Iraq. Diamond viewed his dismissal following the release of the Fatwa as “far reaching, ominous implications, for he was the most revered moral authority in Iraq” (44).

In an interview with the journalist who covered Iraq during the first years of occupation, Rajiv Chandrasekaran mentioned that Ayatollah al Sistani commanded the support of most shi'a in Iraq and that he could mobilise millions by issuing fatwas and making public announcements on his views about democratisation. Following the November 15 agreement was signed; Al Sistani made his influence well known, as he announced his dissatisfaction with the CPA's plan to appoint an interim regime without first completing a constitution written by elected members. As pointed out in Bremer's memoir, Al Sistani warned that if he remained displeased with the CPA plans, then he would announce another fatwa stating his opposition to the whole democratisation process (211-2). Bremer feared this would lead to Shia population to reject the agreement and would likely put democracy promotion in difficult situation.

It was at this point that the CPA began to realise the extent of Sistani's influence. Bremer mentioned that, facing the prospect of the Shia majority coming out in opposition to the November agreement the CPA agreed to modify democratisation process (212). The changes made to the CPA's plan were discussed by Bremer who writes in his memoir that he and his advisers:

“decided to float the idea of an interim constitution, which we hoped would get past the Sistani fatwa and allow us to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi government under a legal framework establishing Iraq's political institutions, structure and democracy while protecting minority and human rights. But we would also agree to the conditions set forth in Sistani's fatwa

– that elections be held as soon as possible for a body to draft Iraq's permanent constitution” (213-214).

Accordingly, the CPA plans for democratisation were modified on the demands of Ayatollah al Sistani and this shows the weakness of the occupation authority. Considerably, the process of democratisation seemed not to be easy, different to that which the Bush administration had envisioned prior to regime change. Chandrasekaran argued that the CPA had belatedly recognized that democratization process was coming to be dominated by religious group of shi'a that previously were not thought to have a political outlook and were less popular than the exiled leaders who had turned to Iraq after regime change (*Imperial Life*, 88-9).

In his study of Middle East democratization, “*Imperial Democratization*”, Glenn Perry argued that the CPA attempts to appease Sistani by changing elements of the plan for democratisation did not prevent him from pressing for direct national elections (70). Later the CPA proposed a “caucus” system of indirect elections that it hoped would please Al Sistani’s demands for elections. The process of elections would be under the CPA control and it would occur at local and regional levels in order to select suitable delegates for a national assembly of “notables, rather than open ones of citizens” (70). Then this assembly would write the constitution demanded by Sistani. Shortly after the announcement of the caucus proposal, Al Sistani declared his opposition to this election strategy and insisted on direct national elections. Against the caucus plan, Ayatollah Al Sistani mobilised over one hundred thousand Shi'a to protest. Perry argued that the action was decisive in forcing the CPA to abandon this proposed election system (71). Similarly, during the writing of the interim constitution in early 2004, Al Sistani again challenged the CPA and the Governing Council to include his demands regarding Islam and democracy in the constitution (72).

The actions of Al Sistani in the period from 2003 to early 2005 made some influential figures in the Bush administration reconsider their assumptions about democratisation in Iraq. In *the State of Denial*, Bob Woodward argued that President Bush and some officials around him gradually realised that it was Ayatollah Al Sistani who was integral to the democratic future of Iraq not the pro-Western Iraqi exiles as they expected (263). Woodward writes that in the National Security Council meeting of December 2003, Paul Bremer asked “are we going to let a 75 year old cleric decide what our policy is going to be in Iraq?” (264). Vice President Dick Cheney noted that he believed it was necessary to “cultivate” Sistani, even if the CPA and Bush administration disliked Al Sistani or opposed his goals. Later at another meeting, President Bush contended that “Sistani is right” about the necessity of elections in Iraq. Bush said that he had “the majority community wanting elections, and I’m supposed to say no? (371).

The Bush administration’s embrace of Al Sistani in its plan for democratisation in Iraq represented an important shift in practice from the ideas expressed in the terms of the Bush Doctrine. Entering Iraq with a number of assumptions about the building of democracy, the bush administration in practice was pressured to carry out democracy on Al Sistani’s terms; even as it seemed that this would led to the formation of a regime quite unlike that which it had originally aimed to establish.

5.2.2 Democracy and the Increase of Terrorism (2003-2006)

The claims made in the Bush Doctrine about encouraging democracy as a route to reduce terrorism have been brought into question by the case of toppling the regime and democratisation in Iraq. Critics have argued that interventionist democratisation in Iraq played a key role in enabling the growth of terrorism in the country. According to critics, the presence of democracy in Iraq is not in itself a cause of terrorism; it is the process of

democratisation adopted by the United States that helped the growth of Jihadists and facilitate sectarian terrorism among Iraqi communities. Furthermore, the critics questioned the Bush prepositions about the links between democratisation and the reduction of terrorism in Iraq and the broader Middle East, as many of Bush administration's claims have been seemingly contradicted in practice.

5.2.2.A Sectarian Terrorism in Iraq:

Regime change in Iraq played an important role in deepening sectarian violence between Iraqi's Shi'a and Sunni communities. Overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime unleashed political sectarianism, while democratic elections were supposed to help to facilitate ethnic violence. In 2003 the CPA institutionalised a political system in which sectarian identities were the primary manner by which groups can easily understood and expressed their political interests. The idea was that demographic proportional representation would ensure that all groups in Iraq would have voice. This facilitated the sectarian violence as it encouraged divisive identity politics and the belief that group interests could be advanced by force (Adeed 229)

In 2005, three elections were held in Iraq. They played a decisive part in the consolidation of sectarianism and accordingly proved to be one of the most politically consequential in the modern history of Iraq (Adeed and Diamond 89). According to Adeed Dawisha and Larry Diamond, in January 2005 the election for a transitional assembly was "almost purely a national-identity referendum" (93).

In the first election, the Shi'a United Iraqi Alliance Party gained the most votes and they were closely followed by the Kurdish Alliance and smaller religious groups generally associated with either of these sectarian groups. Meanwhile, Sunnis boycotted this election and they stroke against the interim regime. Similarly in the election of October 2005 to

ratify the constitution of Iraq, the results were determined primarily by sectarian affiliations. The majority of Shi'a and Kurds voted in favour of the constitution which would guarantee for them a position in government. While Sunnis came close to prevent the ratification of the document through their negative vote (94). The outcome of the elections reinforce the idea that politics in Iraq had deeply become sectarian in character, as groups viewed their interests primarily through sectarian lenses but not in terms of Iraqi national interests. Finally, another election held in December 2005 for a full-term national assembly and it empowered the United Iraqi Alliance and its allies to form a Shi'a dominated government (97).

In *Squandered Victory*, Diamond argued that the consolidation of political sectarianism through elections played a key role in inciting terrorism that covered much of Iraq in 2006 (324). The election of a Shi'a dominated regime brought with it Shi'a militia group to power and they assumed important positions in the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence, from which they could easily infiltrate the police forces and parts of the army (156-7). Violence in Iraq became worse mainly during 2006 as a result of the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara in February that year, as this caused repeated round of sectarian killings by Shi'a against Sunnis and retaliation killings by Sunni. Observers at the time feared that Iraq could disintegrate into "communal cantons" through a process of a large scale ethnic division. While Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki and Al Sistani denounced the explosion and the sectarian violence, some major Shi'a parties in the government were in fact implicated in much of this violence. Accordingly, the democratic elections permanently championed by the Bush administration played a major part in enabling sectarian terrorism in Iraq rather than undermining the appeal.

5.2.2.B Jihadist Terrorism

Academic literature criticised deeply the Bush administration persistent claims about undermining Jihad through intervention in Iraq; as toppling the Iraqi regime and events in the state from 2003-2006 actually played a major role in fostering Jihadist violence. As a principle, Democracy in itself did not encourage Jihad, but rather through its actions. The Bush administration established in Iraq the best breeding ground for Jihad. During the first two years of American intervention in Iraq, Jihadist terrorism reached high levels in the state and it was facilitated in large part by the insecurity and chaos resulting from regime change.

Some agencies of the United States government have acknowledged the key role intervention in Iraq played in fostering Jihadist violence. In April 2006, the CIA released a report entitled “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States” and according to it, regime change and democratisation in Iraq made the state “the “cause celebre” for Jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating support for the global jihadist movement”(2). The report argued that “the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and [this] would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere” (2). Similar to the CIA’s assessment , a classified Joint Chiefs of Staff report dated May 2006 argues that Jihadists in Iraq “retain the resources and capability to sustain and even increase current levels of violence” throughout 2006 and 2007 (Woodward, *State of Denial* 481). The report actually predicted that the levels of violence in Iraq would increase. Jihadist attacks reached at a near all-time high in October and November 2006, and again reached higher levels in the first months of 2007, before it was undermined by the surge and the Sunni rebellion against Al Qaeda in the second half of 2007 (481-84). The report concludes that the primary cause of this violence is the chaotic security situation resulting from the invasion of 2003.

According to scholar Greg Bruno, Jihad was brought to Iraq with Al Qaeda presence and the United State's arrival helped to embolden a hard-line form of it. In 2004, Al Qaeda was established in Iraq under the leadership of the Jordanian Jihadist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For Bruno, Zarqawi developed in Iraq a more extreme version of Jihadist ideology than that of Osama Ben Laden in which jihad actions was carried out against both occupiers and Muslim people. Al Qaeda in Iraq was likely responsible for a number of the most deadly bombings in Iraq carried out to 2007, including the bombing of the Jordanian embassy and the United Nations mission in Iraq in 2003, as well as the bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samara in February 2006, and the attack on a Yazidi village in northern Iraq in August 2007 that killed over 500 people. Zarqawi was behind the bombing of three hotels in Amman in November 2005 and there is evidence that Al Qaeda in Iraq had links with Jihadists in the Gulf, Lebanon and Egypt (Hegghammer 11).

Following the killing of Al Zarqawi in June 2006 by an American airstrike, al Qaeda in Iraq slightly lost its organisational capability but it rehabilitated quickly. Intervention in Iraq played a key role in developing a keen type of Jihad , a more extreme version than that of the broader al Qaeda network. Accordingly, the Bush administration's actions in Iraq contributed to a situation that was enabling rather than undermining violence.

5.3 Critics on Terrorism

The consequences of activist democracy promotion in Iraq had led some critics to question the US government about the need to know the root of terrorism. The President Bush consistently claimed that the oppressive governments of the Arab world were the primary source of Jihad and the promotion of democracy was the key to undermine this threat. Critics argued that these claims had often led to significant doubt when it came to practice.

Concerning the roots of terrorism in the region of the Middle East, a major criticism levelled against the Bush administration's propositions to prove the absence of evidence that authoritarian regimes are the primary source of Jihadist violence. In September 2005, *Foreign Affairs* magazine released a critical article written by Gregory Gause in which he challenged the Bush claim of the tied link between authoritarianism and terrorism. His article investigates the truth that the more democratic a country becomes the less likely it is to produce terrorism. Gause writes that "although what is known about terrorism is admittedly incomplete, the data available do not show a strong relationship between democracy and an absence of or a reduction in terrorism. Terrorism appears to stem from factors much more specific than regime type" (62).

He argues that there is "no solid empirical evidence for a strong link between democracy, or any other regime type and terrorism" (62). Writing two years following the invasion, Gause maintained that there is no evidence that democracy in the Arab world will "drain the swamp" or will even eliminate support for terrorist groups or reduce the number of potential recruits for them (65). According to him, the case of Iraq shows that intervention in the Middle East can help to embolden Jihadist terrorism rather than eliminate the conditions in which it breeds.

Critics of the Bush Doctrine like Francis Fukuyama accused the Bush administration of the marginalization of compelling alternatives that can better account for the origins of Jihad. Fukuyama contends that most people in the Middle East "don't dislike the United States or the West as such but rather dislike American foreign policy. They believe that the United States supports Israel one-sidedly against Palestinians, and support Arab dictators like Egypt's Mubarak or the Saudi royal family at the expense of democracy" ("After the Neocons", 74). He points out that Islamic fundamentalists view conflict in Iraq between the United States and authoritarian regime in Egypt and Saudi Arabia as obstacles to Islam that

require a violent response (76). Jihadists groups accelerate their actions since the invasion of Iraq because they believe that their religion remained under siege and that they view as a global insurgency against American foreign policies in the Middle East (Crockatt 94).

In the view of a number of scholars, the example of Iraq can help to show that armed democracy promotion is an ineffective way to deal with the problem of terrorism. In the context of escalating violence in Iraq, Fukuyama writes that the long-term problem is “not somehow “fixing” the Middle East” through democratisation, but rather seriously examining the American foreign policy that seems to have done so much to aggravate Jihadist ideology (75).

Similarly, Gregory Gause argued that the idea often expressed by President Bush that democratic elections in a state like Iraq would ensure the undermining of Jihadist ideology, in reality it is “logical to assume that terrorists, who rarely represent political agendas that could mobilize electoral majorities, would reject the very principles of majority rule and minority rights on which liberal democracy is based” (66). Therefore, despite the Bush Doctrine’s claims, the presence of a democratic regime does not undermine the Jihadist ideology, and the link between authoritarianism and Jihad is weak.

5.4 The Return to Reality

Until 2006, the Bush administration and its neoconservative supporters chose to marginalize the ‘Realist’ caution on the need for American power to spread democracy in Iraq. However, the dire situation in Iraq with a confluence of events in 2006, particularly the elections, the hostile forces in the Palestinian and Lebanon territories, and the decline of neoconservative personnel in the administration; all compelled President Bush and his foreign policy team to mainly alter their strategy in Iraq and to ultimately change many of their ambitions in favour of an increasingly realist posture in their last two years.

On 10 January 2007, President Bush in an “address to the Nation” declared that “it is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq”. In the context of the military violence in Iraq, he mentioned that “there is no magic formula for success in Iraq” and without a change in American approach in the region, the risks of failure would increase. The outcome, Bush states, would be “a disaster for the United States”. He argued that while the elections held in Iraq in 2005 were a stunning achievement, sectarian and Jihadist’s violence “overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made” and brought the achievement of democracy promotion in Iraq into doubt. In an attempt to improve the situation, Bush announced the “surge” strategy that focused on the deployment of an additional 30.000 troops to Iraq. Many observers within the Bush administration itself doubted the new approach as the situation in Iraq deteriorated sharply by 2006 and violence continued to escalate.

On grounds towards a change in strategy in Iraq, leading neoconservative personnel departed their jobs. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld resigned in November 2006 following significant losses in the mid-term congressional elections. He actually had come under pressure for what many viewed as mishandling of the situation in Iraq and his refusal to reappraise democratisation policy that he championed. Yet, by December 2006 he was replaced by Robert Gates, a realist-leaning foreign policy thinker who has served as CIA director in George H.W. Bush’s administration. Gate’s appointment was important, as it highlighted a possible transition away from neoconservative ideology towards moderation. Both Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith left the Pentagon, while Lewis Libby and Richard Perle were removed from their positions in government amid scandals (Lobe). Ultimately, from 2006 onwards, neoconservative influence in Bush’s government started to wane as many new advisers appointed to the administration.

The Bush administration’s resurgence to realism has not only been confined to Iraq. In his last two years in presidency, Bush had abandoned many of his administration’s ambition

for regional democratic transformation. Nonetheless, he realized the difficulty of putting theoretical views into practice. He contended that “no nation in history has made the transition to a free society without setbacks and false starts”, and that “free societies do not take root overnight”, but rather they require a lengthy period of development that ultimately results in the consolidation of liberal democracy.

Marina Ottaway noted in *Who Wins in Iraq?* that by 2006 American foreign policy showed an increasing shift towards “realism”, and in many ways the situation was “a return to pre- 9/11 policies”; a return, after a few years of calling for democracy to “business as usual”. This development is a significant contradiction with what earlier Bush’s claims that the United States would decisively break with sixty years of policy that advanced “stability at the expense of liberty” in Iraq and the Whole Middle East region.

The resurgence of realism among many foreign policy academics and the effective change of Bush administration’s perspective of fostering democracy in Iraq had both affected leading neoconservatives to question a number of their thoughts on democracy, and to some extent to adopt more realist-leaning stances. As a result of the difficulties the Bush government faced in Iraq, many neoconservatives revoked much of their support of democracy promotion, while some others like William Kristol, Joshua Muravchik and Norman Podhoretz, continuously remain unapologetic supporters of regime change and democratisation.

While neoconservative’s common belief is that American values and interests can usually be advanced by spreading democracy, Francis Fukuyama broke with many of his group following the invasion of Iraq. In *America at the Crossroads* he writes that he has “concluded that neoconservatism, as both a political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something that I can no longer support” (xi). He argued that “one of the

consequences of the perceived failure in Iraq will be the discrediting of the entire neoconservative agenda and a restoration of the authority of foreign policy *realists*” (183).

This outlook apparently reflects the 1990s neoconservative foreign policy thinking leaning to realist discourse, which would take a considerably more cautious view from beneficial courses of activist democratisation. Similar to Fukuyama views, Robert Kagan has also turned to offer realist leaning alternatives to his thinking. In a set of article and his 2008 book, *The Return of history and the End of Dream*, he has moved away from what he once regularly advocated with William Kristol. In contrast to his arguments in the influential article ‘*Toward a neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy*’, Kagan expressed skepticism about the global spread of democracy in his article ‘*Is Democracy Winning?*’. In attempt to answer a controversial question: is the world reverting to struggle between great powers? Or is the democratising spirit of 1989 still alive? He answered and warned that the enduring threat in the twenty-first century is not Jihadist terrorism, but renewed great power conflict. He argued that:

“The spread of democracy was not merely the unfolding of certain ineluctable processes of economic and political development. The global shift towards liberal democracy coincided with the historical shift in the balance of power towards those nations who favoured it. But that shift was not inevitable, and it need not be lasting. Today, the re-emergence of the great autocratic powers, along with the reactionary forces of Islamic radicalism, has weakened that order and threatens to do so further in the years and decades to come.” (*The Return of History* 104-5).

As such, Kagan adopted a realist balance of power posture and contended that in order to check the emergence of tyrannical powers; the democratic world must form a “league of

democracies” and return to policies of containment, rather than regime change to deal with present threats (97). The remarkable transition of Kagan’s thinking showed a new realist personality who is more concerned with containing great powers struggles than encouraging democratic transformation.

Charles Krauthammer exemplified the change in outlook toward a more cautious tendency. In 2007, in “the Partitioning of Iraq” he contended that “[neoconservative] original objective was a democratic and unified post-Hussein Iraq. But it has turned out to be a bridge too far”, as violence escalated and the situation worsened. Such developments were “exacerbated by post-invasion U.S. strategic errors,” especially those relating to military strategy and the attempts at democratisation. Similar views were also expressed in “How Not to Get Out of Iraq” by Max Boot who announced that both Democrats and Republicans has already pronounced “the entire operation failure” and demanded “ a “change of course, a “new strategy””. He downplayed “the surge” and argued that the only option which was left for the United States was “simply to leave Iraq—i.e., to bring all the troops home as soon as possible”. These sentiments do not reflect neoconservative commentators’ views following 9/11 attacks and calls for interventionist democracy promotion in Iraq. Instead, these elements of the resurgence of foreign policy realism and the new measures adopted concerning democracy promotion in Iraq have made it clear and much likely that the neoconservative policy of activist democratisation will not retain lasting influence.

Conclusion

Through studying the development of democracy in Iraq and its effects on the region to 2006, a number of scholars have concluded that the application of the propositions made about democracy are often highly problematic. The Bush administration entered Iraq with

pre-assumptions about how likely to develop democracy; these were quickly challenged in practice because of Iraq state of collapse and insecurity that followed regime change.

Indeed, the administration did not anticipate the influential role of some leaders in Iraq, like Ayatollah Al Sistani, would play in forcing considerable changes to democratisation pre-prepared plans of 2003. Examining the unexpected consequences that stem from regime change and democratisation in Iraq, critics argued that intervention in the state helped to embolden Jihadist and sectarian terrorism, rather than decreasing such forms of violence.

End Notes

¹ This distinction is also referred to as “hard” and “soft” power approaches to democratisation. In ‘Choosing a Strategy’, Thomas Carothers did not consider the “soft” approach of institutionalization to be a part of activist democratisation for three reasons: first, it is not a justification for interventionist democratisation; second, it reflected a continuation of civil society aid programs pursued by the Clinton administration; and finally, it is not a favoured strategy by neoconservatives as it can reinforce the political status quo.

² G8 or the Group of Eight: eight of the richest industrial countries in the world: Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States. Politicians from these countries have regular meetings to discuss economic problems and policies.

Works Cited

- Boot, Max. "How Not to Get Out of Iraq". *Commentary*. 9 Jan. 2007. Web. 22 Nov. 2012.
- Bremer, Paul L III. "Iraq's Path to Sovereignty". *The Washington Post*. WP (8 September 2003). Web 12 March 2013.
- . *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. New York: Threshold Editions, 2006.
- Bruce, Riedel. "The Return Of The Knights: Al-Qaeda And The Fruits Of Middle East Disorder." *Survival* (00396338) 49.3 (2007): 107-120. Academic Search Complete. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
- Bruno, Greg. "Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq". Council on Foreign Relations. CFR (19 Nov. 2007). Web 12 July 2015.
- Bush, George W. "President Discusses the Future of Iraq". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 26 Feb. 2003. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- . "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 1 June 2002. Web. 4 Apr. 2011
- . "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 6 Nov. 2003. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- Crockatt, Richard. *America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism and the Global Order*. London, Routledge, 2003.
- Dawisha, Adeed, and Larry Diamond. "IRAQ'S YEAR OF VOTING DANGEROUSLY." *Journal of Democracy* 17.2 (2006): 89-103. *ProQuest*. Web. 17 Aug. 2015.

- Dawisha, Adeer. "The Unraveling of Iraq: Ethnosectarian Preferences and State Performance in Historical Perspective." *The Middle East Journal* 62.2 (2008): 219-30. *ProQuest*. Web. 22 Dec. 2014.
- Diamond, Larry. *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*. New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2006
- Dobriansky, Paula J. "Advancing Democracy". *The National Interest*. Ed. John O'Sullivan. 77 (2004): 40-47. *The National Interest*. Web 13 Dec. 2011.
- Fallows, James. "BLIND INTO BAGHDAD." *The Atlantic Monthly* Jan 2004: 52,54,56-58,60,62-66,68-70,72-74. *ProQuest*. Web. 2 Aug. 2013.
- Feith, Douglas J. *WAR AND DECISION: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*. New York: Harper Collins, 2008.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press A division of Macmillan, Inc., 1992.
- "Interview Rajiv Chandrasekaran". *Public Broadcasting Service*. PBS, (17 oct. 2006). Web. 25 March 2014.
- Gause, Gregory III, F. "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?." *Foreign Affairs* 84.5 (2005): 62-76. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
- Grossman, Marc. "Assisting Iraqis With Their Future: Planning For Democracy". *U.S. Department of State*. U.S. Department of State Archive, 19 March 2003. Web. 3 Apr. 2011.
- Kagan, Robert, and Robert Cooper. "Is Democracy Winning?". *Prospect Magazine*. *Prospect Magazine* 24 May 2008. Web. 12 May 2011.

Kagan, Robert. *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008.

Krauthammer, Charles. "The Partitioning of Iraq." *The Washington Post*: 0. Sep 07 2007. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Mar. 2011.

Lobe, Jim, and Michael Flynn. "The Rise and Decline of the Neoconservatives." *Institute for Policy Studies*. RightWeb.org 16 November 2006. Web. 22 Aug. 2011.

Ottaway, Marina. "Who Wins in Iraq?." *Foreign Policy*. Foreign Policy 21 February 2007. Web. 12 Apr. 2011.

Packer, George. *THE ASSASSINS' GATE: America in Iraq*. New York: Straus and Giroux, 2006.

Perry, Glenn E. "IMPERIAL DEMOCRATIZATION: RHETORIC AND REALITY." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 28.3 (2006): 55-87. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

Powell, Colin, L. "The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative: Building Hope for the Years Ahead". *U.S. Department of State*. U.S. Department of State Archives, 12 Dec. 2002. Web. 22 May 2012.

"President's Address to the Nation". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 10 Jan. 2007. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.

Purdy, Jedediah. "Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments". *Global Policy Forum*. Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs (Fall 2003). Web 5 June 2011.

Rice, Condoleezza. "The Promise of Democratic Peace". *The Washington Post*. The Washington Post 11 Dec. 2005. Web 4 July 2011.

Rieff, David. "Blueprint for a Mess". New York Times Magazine. NY. 2 Nov. 2003.

United States Gov. "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism". September 2006. Web 18 Jan. 2011.

---. "The National Security Strategy of the United States". 17 September 2002. Web 18 Jan. 2011.

CONCLUSION

There exists now plentiful evidence that neoconservatives had long planned forcible regime change in Iraq, and that 9/11 attacks enabled them to take critical positions within the Bush administration and to achieve dominance over making decision. They consider forcible regime change in Iraq as the key to a transformation of the whole Middle East, both through the dramatic presence of US military power and through the installation of a democratic regime in Iraq. In fact, the foreign policies of US presidents during and after the Cold War all combined an emphasis on democracy, but the Bush approach to democracy promotion is distinctive. Its distinguishing features are the centrality of military intervention, the focus on the Middle East and its relation with the war on terrorism. Actually, they have all been highly problematic as the Bush team has made the Middle East the front line of its freedom agenda, reflecting the close tie it draws between the war on terrorism and democracy promotion.

Actually, the US first declared goal of invasion was not democratisation; it was rather the *casus belli* of removing Saddam's weapons of mass destruction to which 'regime change' was simply the means. It was the only reason everyone could agree on and the only one that could plausibly be put before the United Nations to legitimate the war. According to supporters of the Bush administration, Iraq's previous use of chemical weapons, its capacity to produce nuclear and biological weapons, and the fear that these could be provided to terrorist organisations, particularly al Qaeda; were the main drivers of US-led military intervention in Iraq. Once weapons were shown not to have existed, democratisation moved centre-stage as the major justification for the invasion.

Whether the Iraq War was necessary or not, it will remain an issue of highly dispute between historians for decades to come. It really marked the apex democracy policy development reached in the neoconservative thinking and their advocacy of the principle, and

it also represented the final act in the neoconservative ideological evolution as it severely damaged the standing of neoconservatives. The centrality of Iraq in the neoconservative discourses of democracy promotion is clearly distinguished and it embodies in the mentioning of Iraq as a dangerous and threatening country to the security of the United States and to its people. Neoconservatives' changing positions to the principle has moved from just an attachment to a belief to the degree that they had called its forcible spreading abroad, beginning with Iraq. Even during the period neoconservatives showed sympathy to Realism and most called to keep US stability in the Middle East during the Iraq-Kuwait war, Charles Krauthammer described Iraq as "the weapon state" and urged to end the regime and to replace it with a democratic one. Other neoconservatives urged regime change in Iraq by other means than intervention since it was not of American interest to launch wars. Indeed, neoconservatives notably planned for a regime change in Iraq and waited for the right time to action.

The neoconservative origins of democracy promotion support are traced back to the 1960's and the 1970's of the last decade and with it its spreading to Iraq which they went hand in hand since they became a well known influential group. Neoconservatives have been especially influential in the formulation of foreign and military policy, particularly in the administrations of the presidents; Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush.

Actually, "regime change" policy was first discussed during the Reagan Era to end Saddam Hussein's government. At the time, it was not of American interest to topple the regime. The United States showed a tilt towards Iraq as a necessity to keep a vital interest in the Gulf region. It continued its containment strategy with Iraq to ensure stability in the region mainly following the collapse of the Nixon Doctrine and the 'Twin Pillar' concept. The coming of Bill Clinton to the White House distanced neoconservatives from power but they persistently continued to publish on pages of neoconservative magazines about Iraq and

the necessity to end the rule of Saddam Hussein. Later on, following 9/11 attacks the neoconservative discussions of regime change in Iraq added a military element to democratise the country and described the American action to end Saddam's rule as a necessity not a choice.

Most neoconservatives began the 1990's supporting George H. W. Bush's realist perspective towards Iraq that urged restraint and a return to a focus on domestic affairs. The neoconservative reaction to the Gulf War offered a realistic position with Iraq. Interventionist democracy promotion was not yet a feature of the neoconservative thinking. At that time, there existed generational differences on the role the United States should play in the international arena about the necessity to bring about regime change in Iraq for the case of democracy promotion. In general, calls for a more cautious and a limited, more realistic, role of US to end the First Iraq war of 1991 is what characterized their foreign policy vision. Yet, they eventually welcomed the twenty first century with open calls for American global hegemony in the cause of wider liberal democracy promotion, starting with Iraq. These positions were not new as history demonstrated their firm support for democracy promotion through the influential positions neoconservatives held in different American institutions both before and after the Cold War.

In an attempt to explain the neoconservative shift in their theoretical leanings in the post-Cold War world we can point to a change in neoconservative personnel with a younger generation that was more radical and excited than the prudent elders. Actually, their generational differences were not essentially on doubting the effectiveness of democratisation paradigm. Rather, it was on the basis of timing and whether or not the United States was ready to adopt it for its foreign policy. Other factors of Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis and the democratic peace theory also had a stimulating impact on the ambitious change in the development of democratisation paradigm as the guiding liberal theoretical frameworks in the

neoconservative discourse of the United States foreign policy agenda. Neoconservatives primarily encountered these liberal theories and implied their conclusions for arguing democracy promotion through the use of power at the heart of American interest. They actually exploited the End of History widespread academic influence to publicly claim democracy promotion advantages in the post-communist world. While that the democratic peace theory influence embodies in its support for the use of military power to achieve democratisation and its emphasis on peaceful coexistence among democratic governments.

The First Iraq War was a textbook example of neoconservative caution in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. In their responding to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, neoconservative opinions were originally adopted from Kirkpatrick's view that the US should not use military force and Perle's perspective that regime change was needed to occur but it would better to happen through the Iraqi opposition. The common neoconservative argument stated of the necessity to forcibly remove Iraq's army from Kuwaiti territory, Saddam Hussein needed to be remained in power to balance the Iranian power in the region.

By contrast, neoconservative arguments after the 9/11 attacks were interpreted with a liberated tone as they avoided notions of stability and fully embraced the view of the widespread transformation of the Middle East which could begin with forcible regime change in Iraq. For neoconservatives, the outcome of these events would enhance both US national security and the prospect of liberal democracy that represents the best prescription for the United States foreign policy.

This thesis explores three factors of change in the development of democratisation paradigm in the neoconservative thinking following the end of the Cold War. First, the unsurpassed position the United States gained following the collapse of bipolarity created the

groundwork for second generation neoconservatives to apply more ambitious measures of American power to bring about democracy to non-democratic states, as it was not the case for first generation neoconservatives who suspected its necessity and called for restricted foreign strategy. Secondly, the impact of various democracy promotion discourses and the Democratic Peace Theory during the Clinton administration had influenced neoconservatives to explicitly advocate military democratisation. Finally, Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis also helped in the evolution of democratisation policy among neoconservatives and they were inspired by his thoughts to bring it at the heart of coercive regime change in Iraq.

Fukuyama's work has provided an important contribution in establishing a foundation for a neoconservative thought. Fukuyama's thesis provided a compelling paper as it theoretically explained how and why a global liberal order was now more possible than ever before. Having established the pillars of liberal democracy and stated why liberal democracy represents the final stage of human evolution, Fukuyama then turns to explain: how democracy itself comes about in a society, and it is here that many arguments were reconsidered and developed by many neoconservatives during the 1990s and leading up to the Iraq War in 2003.

The neoconservative foreign policy paradigm of democracy promotion was strongly influenced by a simplified version of democratic peace theory which democracy by definition equaled to peace. During the 1990s, the theory was revisited by liberal scholars to imply a strong need for democracy promotion policies and its conclusions of peace in international sphere. Basically, the Democratic Peace Theory argues for a clear connection that exists between democratic states and the absence of war among them.

Early forms of democratic peace theory introduced by Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett did not provide implications for interventionist foreign policy; instead it was rather

concerned with explaining a theoretical understanding of the importance of peace among democracies. The new version produced by Larry Diamond believed that only by using military force to spread democratic values, the liberal world can assure its security and that the increasing states would belong to the same zone of peace. As a justification for the use of power abroad, democratic peace theory added significant theoretical depth to neoconservative arguments for American military intervention in the pursuit of democracy. The version of democratic peace that was articulated and embraced by neoconservatives during the 1990's was clearly originated in activist liberals' interpretation of the theory as leading neoconservative figures had always been asserting that democracy resulted to peace and the possibility of military intervention to do so.

Other material factors of the end of the Cold War and later 9/11 attacks of 2001 were also pivotal in influencing the new direction that neoconservatives took on democratisation during this period. Without the decline of bipolarity in the international system and the rise of American unipolarity that the end of the Cold War brought, certainly neoconservatives would not dare to think of an American new mission to democratise non-democratic countries or attempt to topple down existed regimes without expecting Soviet counter-attacks. The removal of the Soviet Union as a counter-balance to American power in the international sphere, however, reduced the possible constraints to exercise American power and freed neoconservatives to develop foreign policy ideas that could be much braver than those which could have been attempted without settling down US-Soviet tensions.

For most neoconservatives, it was not until after the September attacks of 2001 that they publicly coupled regime change in Iraq with military force. In the immediate post-Cold War, neoconservatives had removed the primary overseas constraints on US foreign policy but it was not until after 9/11 that they linked the United States' domestic security with the lack of political freedom in Iraq and the wider Middle East region. It would be difficult to

expect behind which circumstances, without 9/11 attacks, that US would launch a military intervention against Iraq. They had already been discussing regime change in Iraq for a long decade, but 9/11 event shortened the way to war.

Regardless of neoconservatives' different positions on the principle of exporting democracy, Iraq represents a key and central case as they constantly mentioned the American duty to end the oppressor regime there. Surprisingly, the case of Iraq constituted also a pivotal case for US democratisation policy as it unveiled the hidden side that has always been existed, in the practice of democracy promotion. History is full of examples of US invasion or incursion in foreign countries, but there are potential examples after 1990, in which neoconservative views were clearly reflected in their writings in magazines and news papers. In Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, neoconservatives reflected differently to US decision to intervene. In the case of Haiti and Bosnia, neoconservatives showed opposition to military intervention and they had concluded that Haiti did not represent an essential national interest for the United States. In the conflict of Kosovo, the neoconservatives clearly backed US action.

In the three cases previously mentioned what was different to that of Iraq is the purpose of intervention. In Iraq, the purpose of the invasion was to bring about democracy. Unlikely, the purpose of US intervention in Haiti was primarily to support an elected leader who was ousted in a coup. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the purpose was mainly humanitarian in order to protect a population that was subjected to aggression. The above examples all democratisation were not the main purpose of the invasion, it was rather an indirect consequence. These cases and others of US military mission served to illegitimate the existing regimes without dismantling state apparatus.

The only case which seems close to Iraq in the purpose of military invasion is Afghanistan. The purpose declared by the American government was democracy promotion but it was rather punitive regime change. The US decision to invade Afghanistan was due to the responsibility of al-Qaeda in the 9/11 attacks. Mainly, armed democratisation seemed to be inappropriate, it was described alike since it shares with Iraq similar US foreign policy objectives in the region.

Neoconservatives have used Germany and Japan as models for the Iraqi invasion. In both cases, the purpose of the invasion was not to build democratic countries; it was rather to defeat aggressors and to remove their capacity for future aggression. In Iraq, dismantling WMD proved to be a fake reason that covers US occupation of the country. Since the Second World War, the history of US involvement in other countries shows that market freedoms for US business and economy are more important than political democracy. The new regime would clearly serve a number of US purposes and interests, particularly its oil security. Through the privatisation of Iraq's oil and placing it in the hands of companies associated with US. In a way or another, the imposition of democracy was not the sole major purpose of US invasion of Iraq. In this respect Iraq is likely to serve a client regime of the United States regardless of its political project in the country.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq cost more than four thousand American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, and brought death to many tens of thousands of Iraqis. Even if one knew nothing about Iraqi history and politics, the arguments would appear very doubtful. The reasons declared publicly with Bush and other high-level US officials conclude that an imminent threat posed to US by the Baghdad regime and that US had to act quickly. Later, the claims proved to be without foundation and untrue, but it is still not understood why do the United States launch such costly war to introduce democracy to a country in the Middle East.

It is worth mentioning the Jewish character of neoconservatives to understand that the crucial factor in President Bush's decision to attack Iraq was to defeat one of Israel's regional enemies. President Bush's support of Israel was prodded by Jewish neoconservatives holding high-level positions in his administration. They publically reaffirmed the United States commitment to the security of the United States. Jewish-Zionist plans for war against Iraq had been in place for years, and this thesis precisely discussed the case regardless of neoconservative high-level of secrecy in making decisions. In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, ardently pro-Zionist neoconservatives in the Bush administration worked to press their agenda. Saddam Hussein was not involved in anti-American terrorism, but he was a supporter of anti-Israeli terrorism. He refused Israel presence in the Middle East and he provided tens of millions of dollars to groups that committed terrorist acts in Israel. For that, Israel is safer with his ouster from power particularly as American troops and money did the job instead of Israeli government and its army.

The forcible democratization in Iraq is clearly proved a failure while others are still ignoring as they consider the 2009 relatively peaceful elections in Iraq the evidence of the war success. One thing can be said with certainty is that the example of the invasion and occupation of Iraq could never serve to support any future attempt at forcible democratisation. For the reason that the enormous costs it has imposed on all involved in the war not least on the Iraqi people. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were killed and over two million refugees were displaced in other countries. Such costs have served to discredit enforced democratisation from the agenda of any possible transitions to democracy. Thus, the war in Iraq does not offer a model; it represents rather a serious warning.

Therefore, the results of the Bush freedom agenda are largely discouraging. The United States removed a dictatorial regime in Iraq and established a democratically oriented elected government there. But this new democracy is very weak with a weak social structure

of regional war-leaders and sectarian divisions. As such, Iraq is now liberated from a dictator and it was there where created a violent civil war that has caused a serious state of deficiency in different fields. Iraq now is a training ground and an operational base for jihadist terrorists but the new government will be very weak for years to come, and the power vacuum will invite threatening outside influence from Iraq's neighbouring countries including Iran. The United States government regard the clear benefit to the Iraqi people is the removal of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship, but it is very hard to see how this might justify the blood that it has spent on democracy promotion project to this point.

With regard to the domino effect theory in the rest of the Middle East, the administration outcomes are very limited. The United States planned to act as a catalyst for democratisation across the Middle East through "the domino effect" and thus it would reduce the threat to Israel's security, since democracies do not wage war against each others. The hope of advancing a regional democratic agenda has been deeply undermined by the Iraq War. Following the events in the early 2005 of President Mubarak's decision to hold direct presidential elections in Egypt and movement toward elections in Palestine, the President Bush and his top advisors spoke of a "Baghdad Spring" in the region and argued that the events are the evidence that US democracy was bearing fruit. The United States government speaks of a "spring" while the Arab citizens are seeing every day on their televisions tens or even hundreds of Arabs dying as a result of a democratic experiment in their region. The results of the war like refugees, Jihadist terrorism and Iraqi-Sunni tensions caused other Arab governments less likely to try democratic political openings which most of its citizens protest against.

Beyond the particular circumstances of the country, the example of imposing democracy in Iraq by force is contradicted and likely to fail. The democratisation through invasion is fundamentally self-contradictory. The basic idea of democracy is that people

should determine their own affairs and it is self-contradictory to use forcible invasion and occupation to convince them to be free. Democracy core idea of popular self-determination concludes that people have the right to choose their own governor. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the establishment of self-governing states through popular struggle against empire. For neoconservatives, oppressors like Saddam in Iraq had violated the human desire to live in a free, self-determining democracy. They forget to take into consideration the truth that an occupying power is seen by most inhabitants also ineligible to govern. Thus, the lack of legitimacy to govern provokes resistance and this lead to intensifying insecurity in the country, as the events in Iraq demonstrated following the invasion.

Therefore, democracy as the realisation of “the will of the people” requires legislation which expresses that will and a powerful government to make it effective. There also should be agreement on who governs the people whose will is to be realised through the electoral and legislative processes. In Iraq, these conditions for democracy are fractured by the process of invasion. In the first place, the invasion brings the destruction and the collapse of the existing state apparatus, including its administration, security and politics. Indeed, the invasion confirms the end of oppression but it also helps in the flourishing of uncivil society and this means the collapse of the state itself in its different fields. This mainly happened since the US department lacked a political and economic reconstruction strategy.

The major elements of the war on terror which articulated by neoconservatives and practiced by the Bush administration had deeply damaged the concept of democracy promotion. On the top is the decision to associate democracy promotion with the military intervention in Iraq which was widely considered illegitimate with the cause of tremendous human suffering. During the Cold War democracy was used as an instrument for political intervention, after it increasingly gained legitimacy as a useful strategy in international

relations. The Iraq War added a militaristic coloring to the concept and as such democracy promotion became a tool of hegemonic interventionism instead.

Accordingly, the conduct and outcomes of the Second Iraq War have had direct implications for the prospect of democracy in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. The US ongoing global democratic expansion was weakened with its failings in the Iraq War. The project has led to the deformation of the state structure and to the deformation of the principle in the home country responsible for the war. The next election in the United States proved the capacity of the electoral process there at least to bring about democratic renewal.

Neoconservatives both inside and outside the administration were seen as cheerleaders and were charged with oversimplifying the causes of the terrorist threat the United States face, resulting in instability in the streets of Baghdad. More than any other group, it was the neoconservatives who pushed for democratising Iraq and the broader Middle East. They were widely blamed for being the decisive voices for regime change in Iraq, and yet it is their idealistic agenda that brought Iraq to be the most threatening country to the security of US.

Supporters of US democratisation policy listed US achievements in Iraq as key successes of the principle. For them, dislodging the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein is particularly important since the Iraqi population was not able to do it on its own. The intervention helped the Kurds in northern Iraq who suffered terribly under Saddam Hussein. Also, the United States organized and protected the holding of free and fair elections at both the national and local levels. This allowed the Shiite majority to dominate the government for the first time, while strengthening special rights for the Kurdish ethnic minority. If these are the by-products of the invasion, what about the main US foreign policy objectives? In essence, the invasion of Iraq has not made the United States safer; it has not made Iraq a

stable state; it has not ended terrorism; it has not spread democracy to the Middle East. Thus, the war was so costly without serving a single major US foreign policy objective.

Neo-conservatism has long had a weak relationship with International Relation theories and this thesis tries to locate a case in which neoconservatives showed leanings to two different theories; Realism and International Liberalism. But very few works have attempted to assess where neo-conservatism really lays in the context of IR theories or to build of it a stand-alone theory. Actually, one of the key driving forces of neo-conservatism is its ability to manage and shape US politics more than all other theories. If most academics argue that the failure to democratise Iraq marked the end of the neoconservative standing, future researches need to explore why neoconservatives still represent powerful voices in the American foreign policy discourses while scholars relatively fail to frame its strands as a theory of IR.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES:

A. MEMOIRS:

Baer, Robert. *See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism*. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003.

Feith, Douglas J. *WAR AND DECISION: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*. New York: Harper Collins, 2008.

B. ADDRESSES, SPEECHES AND LETTERS:

Abrams, Elliott, et al. "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm". *The Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies*. IASPS.org. 21 June 2011.

---. "Letter to Gingrich and Lott on Iraq". *Project for the New American Century*. PNAC, 29 May 1998. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.

---. "Letter to President Clinton on Iraq". *Project for The New American Century*. PNAC, 26 Jan. 1998. Web. 24 Jan.2011.

---. "Statement of Principles". *Project for the New American Century*. PNAC, 3 June 1997. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.

Bush, George W. "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm". *The Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies*. IASPS.org. 21 June 2011.

---."President Bush Addresses the Nation". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 19 Mar. 2003. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.

---"President's Address to the Nation". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 10 Jan. 2007. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.

- . "President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 24 June 2002. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- . "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 1 June 2002. Web. 4 Apr. 2011.
- . "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 6 Nov. 2003. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- . "President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 19 November 2003. Web. 29 March 2011.
- . "President Bush Meets with French President Chirac". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 26 May 2002. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- . "President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Hold Press Conference". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 6 April 2002. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- . "President Delivers "State of the Union"". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 28 Jan. 2003. Web. 3 Apr. 2011.
- . "President Discusses the Future of Iraq". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 26 Feb. 2003. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- . "President Discusses War on Terror". *The White House President George W. Bush*. The White House Archives, 8 March 2005. Web. 19 Nov. 2011.
- . "The First Gore-Bush Presidential Debate". *Commission on Presidential Debates*. Debates.org, 3 October 2000. Web 19 Nov. 2011.
- . "The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate". *Commission on Presidential Debates*. Debates.org, 11 October 2000. Web 19 Nov. 2011.

---. "The Third Gore-Bush Presidential Debate". *Commission on Presidential Debates*.

Debates.org, 17 October 2000. Web 19 Nov. 2011.

Bush, George H. W. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf

Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit". *The American Presidency Project*.

americanpresidency.org, 11 Sep. 1990. Web. 22 Feb. 2011.

Clinton, William J. "American Foreign Policy and the Democratic Ideal." *Orbis* 37.4 (1993):

651. Academic Search Premier. Web. 13 Dec. 2012.

---. "Statement on Signing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998". *The American Presidency*

Project. americanpresidency.org, 31 Oct. 1998. Web 24. Jan 2011.

---. "The President's Radio Address". *The American Presidency Project*.

americanpresidency.org, 19 Dec. 1998. Web. 24 Jan 2011.

Reagan, Ronald. "Promoting Democracy and Peace." *National Endowment for Democracy*.

United States Department of State - Bureau of Public Affairs, 8 June 1982. Web. 25

Jan. 2012.

C. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS:

United Nations. "Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002)". Web 8 November 2002.

---. "Security Council Resolution 1194 (1998)". Web 9 September 1998.

---. "Security Council Resolution 1137 (1997). Web 12 November 1997.

---. "Security Council Resolution 688 (1991). Web 5 April 1991.

---. "Security Council Resolution 479 (1980). Web 4 October 1982.

United States Gov. "Public Law 107-243-Oct. 16 2002: Authorization for Use of Military

Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002". Web 2 Feb. 2011.

---. "The National Security Strategy of the United States". 17 September 2002. Web 18 Jan.

2011.

---. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America". March 2006. Web 18 Jan. 2011.

---. "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism". September 2006. Web 18 Jan. 2011. United States. Cong. Senate. Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee . 107th Cong., 1st sess. Web 2 Feb. 2011.

---. The President's International Affairs Budget Request for FY 2003. 2nd sess. Web 13 March 2011.

United States. Dept. of Defense. "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense". 3 January 2012. Web 22 Dec. 2012.

United States. Dept. of State. "Winning the Struggle Between Freedom and Terror in the Middle East". 31 August 2006. Web 22 Dec. 2011.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES:

A. BOOKS:

Allawi, Ali A. *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

Baer, Robert. *See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism*. New York : Three Rivers Press, 2003.

Balint, Benjamin. *RUNNING COMMENTARY: The Contentious Magazine that Transformed the Jewish Left into the Neoconservative Right*. New York: Public Affairs, 2010.

Bamford, James. *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies*. New York: Doubleday, 2004.

Baylis, John et al. *The Globalization of World Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

- Bremer, Paul L III. *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. New York: Threshold Editions, 2006.
- Clarke, Richard A. *Against All Enemies Inside America's War on Terror*. New York: Free Press, 2004.
- Cox, Michael et al., eds. *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Crockatt, Richard. *America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism and the Global Order*. London, Routledge, 2003.
- Daalder, Ivo H. and James M. Lindsay. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
- Davis, John. *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War: From Forty One to Forty Three*. Burlington: Ashgate, 2006.
- Diamond, Larry. *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*. New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2006
- Diamond, Sara. *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States*. New York: Guilford, 1995.
- Donnelly, Jack. *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Dorrien, Gary. *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Dumbrell, John. *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes: 1992-2000*. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Ehrman, John. *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Policy 1945-1994*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

- Fossedal, Gregory. *The Democratic Imperative: Exporting the American Revolution*. New York: New Republic, 1989.
- Freedman, Lawrence. *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.
- Friedman, Murray, ed. *Commentary in American Life*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
- . *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press A division of Macmillan, Inc., 1992.
- Gershman, Carl. "Freedom Remains the Touchstone". *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco: ICS, 1991:35-42.
- Glazer, Nathan. "A Time for Modesty". *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco: ICS, 1991: 133-41.
- Halper, Stefan and Jonathan Clarke. *America Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Harries, Owen, ed. *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991.
- Heilbrunn, Jacob. (2008) *They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons*. New York: Doubleday, 2008.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Twentieth Century*. Oklahoma : Oklahoma Press, 1993.
- Ikenberry, John G. et al. *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009.

- Kagan, Robert and William Kristol .*Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*. California: Encounter Books, 2000.
- .*Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. New York: Vintage Books, 2004.
- Kagan, Robert. *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008.
- Khadduri, Majid, and Edmund Ghareeb. *War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Krauthammer, Charles . *Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World*". Washington, D.C: The AEI Press, 2004.
- Lawrence, Kaplan F. and William Kristol. *The war over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*. California: Encounter Books, 2003.
- Ledeen, Michael. *Freedom Betrayed: How America Led a Global Democratic Revolution, Won the Cold War, and Walked Away*. Washington D. C. :AEI Press, 1996.
- McClellan, Scott. *WHAT HAPPENED Inside the Bush White House Washington's Culture of Deception*. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Beijing: Peking University Press, 1985.
- Muravchik, Joshua. *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny*. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1991.
- . *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge To Neo- Isolationism*. Washington, D.C. : The AEI Press, 1996.
- Packer, George. *THE ASSASSINS' GATE: America in Iraq*. New York: Straus and Giroux, 2006.
- Power, Samantha. *"A problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

- Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.
- Ritchie, Nick, and Paul Rogers. *The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Ritter, Scott W. *Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of America's Intelligence Conspiracy*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005.
- Roberts, Brad, ed. *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*. Washington DC: MIT, 1990.
- Shultz, George P. *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993.
- Smith, Tony. *A Pact with the Devil*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Sniegoski, Stephen J. *The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel*. Norfolk, Virginia: Enigma Editions, 2008.
- Solomon, Lewis D. *Visionary Intellectual, Policymaker, and Strategist*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Massachusetts: Addison- Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.
- Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.
- . *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.
- . *State of Denial: Bush at War Part III*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.
- Wurmser, David . *Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein*. Washington D.C. The AEI Press: 1999.

B. ARTICLES:

- Asmus, Ronald D. "Commit for the Long Run." *The Washington Post*: 0. Jan 29 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2011 .
- Asser, Martin. "Analysis: A tougher line?". *BBC News*. Middle East 22 February 2001. Web 12 May 2011.
- Battle, Joyce. "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984". *The George Washington University*. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 82 (2003). Web. 20 Jan. 2011.
- Boot, Max. "How Not to Get Out of Iraq". *Commentary*. 9 Jan. 2007. Web. 22 Nov. 2012.
- . "The End of Appeasement". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.21 (10 Feb. 2003). Web 18 Mar. 2012.
- . "The False Allure of "Stability"". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.13 (9 Dec. 2002). Web 18 Mar. 2012.
- . "Think Again: Neocons". *Foreign Policy*. FP, 1 Jan 2004. Web. 24 Sep. 2011.
- . "What the Heck Is a 'Neocon'?". *Wall Street Journal*, Dec 30 2002. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Web. 5 Aug. 2011.
- Borger, Julian. "US big guns silent on 'regime change'". *The Guardian*. The guardian 13 Feb. 2002. Web 4 July 2011.
- Bowden, Mark. "Wolfowitz: The Exit Interviews". *The Atlantic*. Atlantic Unbound, July/Aug. 2005. Web. 5 Aug. 2011.
- Bremer, Paul L III. "Iraq's Path to Sovereignty". *The Washington Post*. WP (8 September 2003). Web 12 March 2013.
- Brooks, David. "A Return to National Greatness: A Manifesto for a Lost Creed". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 2.24 (3 Mar. 1997). Web 22 July 2011.

- . "Bully for America". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 2.40 (23 June 1997). Web 12 May 2011.
- . "Ex-Left Still can't Get no Satisfaction." *Wall Street Journal*: 1. Oct 23 1987. *ProQuest*. Web. 22 Jan. 2012
- . "Hell of a Week". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 13 December 2001. Web 5 Apr. 2011.
- . "The Fog of Peace". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.3 (30 Sep. 2002). Web 15 Sep. 2011.
- Bruce, Riedel. "The Return Of The Knights: Al-Qaeda And The Fruits Of Middle East Disorder." *Survival* (00396338) 49.3 (2007): 107-120. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.
- Bruno, Greg. "Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq". Council on Foreign Relations. CFR (19 Nov. 2007). Web 12 July 2015.
- Cohen, Eliot A. "How to Fight Iraq". *Commentary* 90.5 (1990):21. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 12 Jan. 2012
- . "The Future of Force". *The National Interest* 21 (1990): 3-15. Web 12 Feb 2012.
- Crock, Stan. "Bush's Foreign Policy: Like Father, Like Son?". *Project for the New American Century*. PTNAC, 14 Aug. 2000. Web. 31 July 2011.
- Dawisha, Adeed, and Larry Diamond. "IRAQ'S YEAR OF VOTING DANGEROUSLY." *Journal of Democracy* 17.2 (2006): 89-103. *ProQuest*. Web. 17 Aug. 2015.
- Dawisha, Adeed. "The Unraveling of Iraq: Ethnosectarian Preferences and State Performance in Historical Perspective." *The Middle East Journal* 62.2 (2008): 219-30. *ProQuest*. Web. 22 Dec. 2014.
- "Defending and Advancing Freedom: A Symposium." *Commentary* 11 2005: 21-68. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2011 .
- Diamond, Larry. "The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World Order." *Current History* 93.579 (1994): 1-7. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Jan. 2012.

Dobriansky, Paula J. "Advancing Democracy". *The National Interest*. Ed. John O'Sullivan.

77 (2004): 40-47. *The National Interest*. Web. 13 Dec. 2011.

---."Promoting Democracy in the 21st Century: An Essential Tool Against Terrorism".

U.S.Department of State. 9 February 2004. Web 30 Oct.2011.

Donnelly, Thomas. "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a

New Century". *The Project for the New American Century*. PTNAC, Sep. 2000. Web.

25 Mars 2011.

Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs". *Wiley* 12.3 (Summer,

1983): 205-235. JSTOR. Web. 23 Mar. 2011.

---. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part2". *Wiley* 12.4 (Autumn, 1983): 323-

353. JSTOR. Web. 23 Mar. 2011.

Eliot, Abrams. "Iraq can't Resist Us." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Dec 18 2001. *ProQuest*. Web.

12 Sep. 2012.

Eliot, Cohen A. "World War IV." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Nov 20 2001. *ProQuest*. Web. 18

Sep. 2012.

Everest, Larry. "Four Questions for Saddam—and the U.S.". *New America Media*.

Commentary, 17 Dec. 2003. Web. 24 May 2011.

---. "Fueling the Iran-Iraq Slaughter". *Z Communications*. Z Net, 5 Sep. 2002. Web. 22 Sep.

2011.

Fallows, James. "BLIND INTO BAGHDAD." *The Atlantic Monthly* Jan 2004: 52,54,56-

58,60,62-66,68-70,72-74. *ProQuest*. Web. 2 Aug. 2013.

Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?". *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989). Web.

21 Oct. 2011.

Gause, Gregory III, F. "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?." *Foreign Affairs* 84.5 (2005): 62-

76. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.

Gerecht, Reuel Marc. "Liberate Iraq". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 6.33 (14 May 2001). Web
22 June 2011

---. "Regime Change in Iran?". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.45 (5 Aug. 2002). Web 22 June
2011.

Gigot, Paul A. "A Great American Screw-Up: The U.S. and Iraq." *Wall Street Journal*: 0.
Dec 18 1990. *ProQuest*. Web. 5 Apr. 2011.

Grossman, Marc. "Assisting Iraqis With Their Future: Planning For Democracy". *U.S.
Departement of State*. U.S. Departement of State Archive, 19 March 2003. Web. 3
Apr. 2011.

Hermann, Margaret G., and Charles W. Kegley. "Democracies and Intervention: Is there a
Danger Zone in the Democratic Peace?". *Journal of Peace Research* 38.2 (2001):
237-245. SAGE Pub. Web 12 Jan. 2012.

Himmelfarb, Gertrude. "Responses to Fukuyama: Gertrude Himmelfarb". *The National
Interest* 16 (1989): 24-26. Web 12 Feb. 2012

Hoagland, Jim. "How CIA's Secret War on Saddam Collapsed". *Washington Post*.
ShiaChat.com , 26 June 1997. Web 24 Jan 2014.

---. "How to Attack Iraq". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (16 Nov. 1998). Web. 15 Feb. 2011.

"Interview Rajiv Chandrasekaran". *Public Broadcasting Service*. PBS, (17 oct. 2006). Web.
25 March 2014.

Ish-Shalom, Piki. "The Civilization Of Clashes: Misapplying The Democratic Peace In The
Middle East." *Political Science Quarterly* 122.4 (2007): 533-554. Academic Search
Premier. Web. 11 Jan. 2012.

--- . "Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic-Peace Thesis and the Politics
of Democratisation". *European Journal of International Relations* 12.4 (2006): 565-
598. SAGE Pub. Web 12 Jan. 2012.

- Jervis, Robert. "Understanding the Bush Doctrine". *The Academy of Political Science*.
Political Science Quarterly 118.3 (2003): 365-88. Web. 21 Oct. 2011.
- Judis, John. "On the Home Front: The Gulf War's Strangest Bedfellows; Will the
AIPAC/Bandar/Defense Industry Alliance Survive the Peace?" *The Washington Post*
(pre-1997 Fulltext): 0. Jun 23 1991. ProQuest. Web. 5 Jan. 2012.
- Kagan, Donald. "REACTION TO 'BUSH'S REAL GOAL IN IRAQ': Comparing America to
Ancient Empires is 'Ludicrous'." *The Atlanta Journal - Constitution*: 0. Oct 06
2002. ProQuest. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.
- Kagan, Frederick W. "War Sooner Rather Than Later". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.24 (3
Mar. 2003). Web 15 Sep. 2011.
- Kagan, Robert, and Robert Cooper. "Is Democracy Winning?". *Prospect Magazine*.
Prospect Magazine 24 May 2008. Web. 12 May 2011.
- Kagan, Robert and William Kristol. "A Distinctly American Internationalism". *The Weekly*
Standard. WS 5.11 (29 Nov. 1999). Web 18 Aug. 2011.
- . "Bush's War Budget". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 25 June 2002. Web 30 Oct. 2011.
- . "Cheney Trips Up: The vice president's Middle East expedition didn't help the war on
terror". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.28 (1 Apr. 2002). Web 5 Mar. 2011.
- . "Clinton's Foreign Policy (cont.)". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 12 March 2001. Web 5
Mar. 2011.
- . "Going Wobbly". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.37 (3 June 2002). Web 5 Mar. 2011.
- . "Lost in the Wilderness". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 12 April 2002. Web 5 June. 2011.
- . "Remember the Bush Doctrine". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 5 April 2002. Web 5 June.
2011.
- . "The "Adults" Make a Mess". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 6.33 (14 May 2001). Web 15
Apr. 2012.

- . "The Bush Era". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 1 February 2002. Web 15 Apr. 2012.
- . "The Detour". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.29 (8 Apr. 2002). Web 16 Apr. 2012.
- . "The Gathering Storm". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.7 (29 Oct. 2001). Web 30 Sep. 2012.
- . "The Right War". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.3 (1 Oct. 2001). Web 5 Apr. 2011.
- . "The Right War for the Right Reasons". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 9.23 (23 Feb. 2004). Web 12 Apr. 2011.
- . "The U.N. Trap?". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.10 (18 Nov. 2002). Web 5 Apr. 2011.
- . "What to Do About Iraq?". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.18 (21 Jan. 2002). Web 18 Mar. 2012.
- Kagan, Robert. "American power--a guide for the perplexed." Commentary Apr. 1996: 21. Academic Search Premier. Web. 19 June 2012.
- . "A Way to Oust Saddam". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (28 Sep. 1998). Web 22 July 2011.
- . "Bush's Missile Defense Triumph". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 5.39 (26 June 2000). Web 30 Oct. 2011.
- . "Democracies And Double Standards. (Cover Story)." Commentary 104.2 (1997): 19. Academic Search Premier. Web. 19 June 2012.
- . "Iraq: The Day After." *The Washington Post*: 0. Jul 21 2002. ProQuest. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.
- . "Lieberman's Dissents." *The Washington Post*: 0. Aug 13 2000. ProQuest. Web. 15 July 2012.
- . "Most Favoured Nation – or Most Appeased?". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 1.37 (3 June 1996). Web 21 March 2011.
- . "Saddam Wins --Again". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (4 Jan. 1999). Web 12 March 2011.

- . "THE 'INEVITABILITY' COP-OUT". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (9 Feb. 1997). Web 12 March 2011.
- . "What China Knows That We Don't: The Case for a New Strategy of Containment". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (20 Jan. 1997). Web 18 Aug. 2011.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Perpetual Peace*. New York: Columbia UP, 1939. *Questia*. Web. 4 June 2012..
- Katzman, Kenneth. "Iraq's Opposition Movements". *Federation of American Scientists*. CRS Report, 26 March 1998. Web. 14 Feb. 2011.
- Keller, Bill. "The Sunshine Warrior." *New York Times Magazine* Sep 22 2002: 48,6.48. *ProQuest*. Web. 9 Nov. 2012.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Power and Interdependence revisited". *International Organization* 41.4 (Autumn 1987): 725-753. JSTOR. Web. 23 Dec. 2012.
- Khalilzad, Zalmay M. "Six Steps Against Terror". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (5 Aug. 1996). Web 18 Aug. 2011.
- King, William F. "Neocoservatives and Trotskyism". *American Communist History* 3.2 (2004): 247-266. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 22 Sep. 2011
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane. "A Normal Country in a Normal Time." *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco, CA: ICS, 1991. 155-63.
- . "Dictatorships Double Standards." *Commentary (pre-1986)* 1979: 34-. *ProQuest*. Web. 2 Jan. 2012.
- Krauthammer, Charles. "American Power--for what?: A Symposium." *Commentary* 01 2000: 21-47. *ProQuest*. Web. 11 July 2012.
- . "Holiday from History." *The Washington Post*: 0. Feb 14 2003. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

- . "In Defense of Democratic Realism". *The National Interest* 77 (Fall 2004): 15-25. Web
12 Feb. 2012.
- . "Is this the Way to Decide on Iraq?" *The Washington Post*: 0. Sep 20
2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.
- . "Kidnapped by the Times." *The Washington Post*: 0. Aug 18 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 17
Sep. 2012.
- . "Kofi's Choice". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.34 (13 May 2002). Web 3 Oct. 2011.
- . "LET'S HOPE HE'S LYING". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 3.24 (2 Mar. 1998). Web 12
March 2011.
- . "No Turning Back Now." *The Washington Post*: 0. Jan 24 2003. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep.
2012.
- . "Peace through Democracy." *The Washington Post*: 0. Jun 28 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 11
Sep. 2012.
- . "The Neoconservative Convergence." *Commentary* Jul 2005: 21-6. *ProQuest*. Web. 3 Nov.
2012.
- . "The Partitioning of Iraq." *The Washington Post*: 0. Sep 07 2007. *ProQuest*. Web. 12
Mar. 2011.
- . "The Unipolar Moment". *Foreign Affairs* 70.1 (1990/1991): 23-33. *JSTOR*. Web. 24. Sep.
2011.
- . "The Unipolar Moment Revisited." *The National Interest* 02 2003: 5-17. *ProQuest*. Web.
3 May 2012
- . "Universal Dominion" *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San
Francisco, CA: ICS, 1991. 1-13.77.
- . "The War: A Road Map." *The Washington Post*: 0. Sep 28 2001. *ProQuest*. Web. 17 Sep.
2012.

- . "The Window of Legitimacy." *The Washington Post*: 0. Nov 15 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2012.
- . "We can't Blow it again." *The Washington Post*: 0. Apr 19 2002. *ProQuest*. Web. 11 Sep. 2012.
- Kristol, Irving. "A Foolish American Ism-Utopianism". *New York Times*: SM31. 14 Nov. 1971. *ProQuest*. Web. 15 Sep. 2012.
- . "Board of Contributors: A Post-Wilsonian Foreign Policy." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Aug 02 1996. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2011.
- . "Defining Our National Interest". *America's Purpose: New Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy*. San Francisco: ICS, 1991. 53-73.
- . "The Neoconservative Persuasion". *The Weekly Standard*. *Weekly Standard* 8.47 (Aug. 2003). Web. 24 Apr. 2011.
- . "Toward a Moral Foreign Policy". *Wall Street Journal*: 15 Nov. 1983. *Academic Search Complete*. Web 15 Sep. 2012.
- Kristol, William and Gary Schmitt. "Lessons of a Nuclear North Korea". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 28 October 2002. Web 30 Oct. 2011.
- Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan. "A 'Great Victory' for Iraq." *The Washington Post*: 0. Feb 26 1998. *ProQuest*. Web. 15 July 2012. .
- . "Bombing Iraq Isn't Enough". *The New York Times*. *Nytimes*, 30 Jan. 1998. Web. 25 Dec. 2011.
- . "The Right War for the Right Reasons". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 9.23 (23 Feb. 2004). Web 12 Apr. 2011.
- . "Toward A Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 75.4 (1996): 18-32. *Academic Search Complete*. 21 Sep. 2011.

Kristol, William, et al. "Letter to President Bush". *Project for the New American Century*.

PNAC, 20 September 2001. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.

Kristol, William. "A Party of Appeasement?". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 5.4 (11 Oct. 1999).

Web. 21 June 2011.

---. "Honoring Democracy". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 10.18 (24 Jan. 2005). Web 12 March 2011.

---. "Morality in Foreign Policy." *The Weekly Standard* Feb 10 2003: 7-. *ProQuest*. Web. 5 Jan. 2012.

Ledeen, Michael. "Bill Clinton's Bay of Pigs". *The Weekly Standard*. WS (7 Oct. 1996). Web

22 July 2011.

Levy, Jack S. "Domestic Politics and War". *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18.4 (Spring

1988): 653-673. *JSTOR*. Web. 23 Apr. 2012.

Lionel, Barber. "Views of the World." *Financial Times*. FT.com/life & Arts, 19 May 2006.

Web. 26 Aug. 2011.

Lobe, Jim, and Michael Flynn. "The Rise and Decline of the Neoconservatives." *Institute for Policy Studies*. RightWeb.org 16 November 2006. Web. 22 Aug. 2011.

Lopez, Kathryn Jean. "Closing In: A Conversation with Lawrence Kaplan and Bill Kristol on

Iraq". *National Review Online*. An NRO Interview, 24 Feb. 2003. Web. 24 Aug.

2011.

McCartney, Paul T. "American Nationalism and American Foreign Policy from September

11 to the Iraq War". *The Academy of Political Science*. *Political Science Quarterly*

119.3 (2004): 399-423. *JSTOR*. Web. 23 Aug. 2011.

Monten, Jonathan. "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy

Promotion in U.S. Strategy". *International Security* 29.4 (Spring 2005): 112-156.

Web. 23 Aug. 2011.

Muravchik, Joshua, and Lawrence F. Kaplan. "Right to Intervene." *The Washington Post* (pre-1997 Fulltext): 0. Apr 23 1991. *ProQuest*. Web. 5 Jan. 2012.

---."The Anti-Defense League." *Commentary* 102.5 (1996): 42. Academic Search Premier. Web. 19 June 2012.

Muravchik, Joshua. "Endowing Democracy." *New York Times*: A.19. Jun 18 1984. *ProQuest*. Web. 2 Jan. 2012.

---."Freedom and the Arab World: Terrorism Thrives where Peopole aren't free". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.16 (31 Dec. 2001). Web 5 Mar. 2011.

---."Hearts, Minds, and the War Against Terror." *Commentary* 05 2002: 25-30. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2011.

---. "Kennedy's Foreign Policy: What the Record shows." *Commentary* (pre-1986) 1979: 31-. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Feb. 2012.

---. "The Bush Manifesto." *Commentary* 12 2002: 23-30. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep. 2012.

---."The Neoconservative Persuasion and Foreign Policy". *The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English web site*. Ikhwanweb, 12 December 2007. Web 20 Feb. 2011.

---."The Past, Present, and Future of Neoconservatism". *Commentary Magazine*. *Commentary Magazine*, Oct. 2007. Web. 4 Sep. 2011.

Myroie, Laurie. "The method to Saddam's madness". *The Washington Times*. lauriemyroie.com, 13 Jan. 1999. Web 12 March 2011.

"National Security Decision Directive 75". *Federation of American Scientists*. The White House Washington, 17 Jan. 1983. Web. 25 May 2012.

"National Security Directive 26". *Federation of American Scientists*. The White House Washington, 2 October 1989. Web. 25 May 2012.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Article 51". *NATO*. Nato.int 24 Oct. 1945. Web 22 Mar. 2011.

Ottaway, Marina. "Who Wins in Iraq?". *Foreign Policy*. Foreign Policy 21 February 2007.

Web. 12 Apr. 2011.

Owen, John M. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace". *The MIT Press* 19.2 (Fall,

1994): 7-125. JSTOR. Web. 5 June 2012.

Padhoretz, Norman. "Strange Bedfellows: A Guide To The New Foreign-Policy

Debates." *Commentary* 108.5 (1999): 19. Literary Reference Center. Web. 10 July

2012.

Perle, Richard. "No Magnanimity Yet for Iraq." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Feb 28

1991. *ProQuest*. Web. 5 Feb. 2012.

---. "Statement of Richard Perle: Fellow, American Enterprise Institute". *United States*

Senate Committee on Armed Services. United States Senate, 28 Sep. 2000. Web. 26

July 2011.

Perry, Glenn E. "IMPERIAL DEMOCRATIZATION: RHETORIC AND REALITY." *Arab*

Studies Quarterly 28.3 (2006): 55-87. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

Pipes, Daniel. "Missing: Realistic Take on Arafat." *Daniel Pipes.org*. Los Angeles Times, 5

Apr. 2002. Web. 13 Feb. 2012.

---. "The Scourge of Suicide Terrorism." *Daniel Pipes.org*. National Interest, Summer 1986.

Web. 13 Feb. 2012.

---. "What Kind of Peace [to Follow the Kuwait War]?". *Daniel Pipes.org*. National Interest,

1991. Web. 13 Jan. 2012.

---. "Who Is the Enemy?". *Daniel Pipes.org*. *Commentary*, January 2002. Web. 3 Feb. 2012.

Podhoretz, Norman. "A Statement on the Persian Gulf Crisis." *Commentary* 1990: 17-

. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Feb. 2012.

---. "How to Win World War IV." *Commentary* 02 2002: 19-29. *ProQuest*. Web. 12 Sep.

2012.

- . "In Israel, With Scuds and Patriots" *Commentary* 91.4 (1991): 19. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 7 Jan. 2012.
- . "In Praise of the Bush Doctrine." *Commentary* 09 2002: 19-28. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.
- . "The Obsolescence of Deterrence". ". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 8.13 (9 Dec. 2002). Web 5 Apr. 2011.
- Powell, Colin, L. "The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative: Building Hope for the Years Ahead". *U.S. Department of State*. U.S. Department of State Archives, 12 Dec. 2002. Web. 22 May 2012.
- Purdy, Jedediah. "Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments". *Global Policy Forum*. Carnegie Council on Ethnic and International Affairs (Fall 2003). Web 5 June 2011.
- Quinn, Adam and Michael Cox. "For Better, for Worse: How America's Foreign Policy became Wedded to Liberal Universalism". *Global Society* 21.4 (2007): 499-519. Web. 21 Oct. 2012.
- Rice, Condoleezza. "The Promise of Democratic Peace". *The Washington Post*. The Washington Post 11 Dec. 2005. Web 4 July 2011.
- Rieff, David. "Blueprint for a Mess". *New York Times Magazine*. NY. 2 Nov. 2003.
- Rosen, Jane. "The Kirkpatrick Factor." *New York Times*: A.48. Apr 28 1985. *ProQuest*. Web. 2 Feb. 2012.
- Russett, Bruce. "Why Democratic Peace?". *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996: 82-115.
- Russett, Bruce et al. "The Democratic Peace". *The MIT Press* 19.4 (Spring, 1995): 164-184. JSTOR. Web. 5 June 2012.

- Russett, Bruce, William Antholis, Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Zeev Maoz. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1993. *Questia*. Web. 4 June 2012.
- Ryan, Maria. "Neoconservative intellectuals and the limitations of governing the Reagan administration and the demise of the Cold War". *Comparative American Studies* 4.4 (4 December 2006): 409-420. Web 12 May 2012.
- Schmitt, Gary and Tom Donnelly. "The Bush Doctrine". *Project for the New American Century*. PNAC, 30 January 2002. Web. 24 Feb. 2012.
- Sciolino, Elaine. "C.I.A. Asks Congress for Money to Rein in Iraq and Iran". *The New York Times*. New York Times, 12 April 1995. Web. 14 Feb. 2011.
- Shachtman, Max. "The Case for Unity: New Perspectives for American Socialism." *Archives.org*. Independent Socialist League, July 1957. Web. 22 Feb. 2012.
- Sharansky, Natan. "What are we Fighting for? --- Spread Freedom in the Mideast." *Wall Street Journal*: 0. Oct 10 2001. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 June 2012 .
- Solarz, Stephen J. et al. "Letters To The Editor." *Foreign Affairs* 78.2 (1999): 160-168. MasterFILE Elite. Web. 15 Jan 2012.
- Stansfield, Gareth. "Can the Iraqi Opposition Unite?". *The Guardian*. Theguardian, 23 March 2003. Web. 15 May 2012.
- Talabani, Jalal. "Jalal Talabani: No Grounds for a Relationship with Baghdad". *Middle East Forum*. *Middle East Quarterly* IX.1 (Winter 2002). Web. 18 Feb. 2011.
- Tyler, Patrick E. "Congress Notified of Iraq Coup Plan". *The New York Times*. New York Times, 9 Feb. 1992. Web. 31 August 2011.
- Victor, Davis Hanson. "Our Enemies, the Saudis." *Commentary* Jul 2002: 23-8. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

Wattenberg, Ben. "Richard Perle: The Making of a Neoconservative". *Public Broadcasting Service*. Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, 14 Nov. 2002. Web. 24 Aug. 2012.

Weiner, Tim. "Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan's Forceful Envoy, Dies." *New York Times*: 0. Dec 09 2006. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2012.

"Wolfowitz Says U.S. Would Seek to Liberate, Not Occupy, Iraq". *Free Republic*. U.S. Dept of State "Washington File". 24 Feb. 2003. Web. 31 Jan. 2012.

Wolfowitz, Paul, and Zalmay M. Khalilzad. "Overthrow Him". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 3.12 (1 Dec. 1997). Web 18 Aug. 2011.

Wolfowitz, Paul. "Statement before the House National Security Committee". *Project for the New American Century*. PNAC, 18 September 1998. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.

Woolsey, R. J. "Defeating the Oil Weapon." *Commentary* 09 2002: 29-33. *ProQuest*. Web. 13 Sep. 2011 .

---. "What Our Enemies Want...". *The Weekly Standard*. WS 7.2 (24 Sep. 2001). Web 18 Mar. 2012.

Wurmser, David. "Iraq Needs a Revolution." *Wall Street Journal*: 1. (Nov 12 1997). *ProQuest*. Web. 15 July 2012.

Zalmay, Khalilzad. "Why the West Needs Turkey." *Wall Street Journal*: 1. Dec 22 1997. *ProQuest*. Web. 15 July 2012.